It sometimes occurs that ministers abuse the right of free passage, which they possess for their own provisions and the equipment necessary for their establishment, to carry on a clandestine trade from which they draw large profits by lending their name to fraud. This kind of profit is utterly unworthy of the public minister, and makes his name stink in the nostrils of the King to whom he is sent as well as to his own prince. A wise minister may be well content to enjoy the large privileges to which he is entitled in every foreign country without attempting to abuse them for his own private profit, or by countenancing any fraud which is committed under the protection of his name. The Spanish Government was obliged a few years ago severely to regulate these privileges for all foreign envoys residing in Madrid, and the Republic of Genoa found it necessary to adopt the same somewhat humiliating precautions in order to prevent diplomatists from engaging in illicit traffic. The privileges conferred by the law of nations upon envoys abroad permit full freedom in their proper duty of labouring to discover all that passes in the council-chamber of his Majesty, and to take steps to form close relations with those best able to supply this information, but they are not to be interpreted as covering any attempt to form a conspiracy against the public peace; for the same international right which covers the person of a diplomatist must also be held to cover the peace and security of the kingdom to which he is accredited. Therefore the diplomatist will be on his guard against any action which may seem to lend the authority of his name or office to revolutionary plots or to other hostile acts against the peace of the realm. Should he neglect this precaution, he may find himself treated as an enemy.

Henry IV. and the Duke of Savoy.

Charles Emanuel the first Duke of Savoy maintained certain connections in France with some of the principal peers at the Court of Henry IV., and engaged with them in plots and cabals. He attended the French Court under the pretext of paying his respects to the King, but in reality with the intention of spreading his own influence and fortifying his own designs, which were to prevent Henry IV. from forcing him to restore the Marquisate of Saluse which he had usurped. The King discovered the Duke’s intrigue, and held a cabinet meeting on the matter. The Council was of opinion that the Duke had come under a false show of friendship in order to disturb the peace of the realm, that the King was therefore fully within his rights in laying hands upon him as upon an enemy, that in consequence of his own acts the Duke could claim no immunity, and that therefore the King would be justified in preventing him from leaving France until he had restored the marquisate in question. But the King did not agree with his ministers, but said: ‘The Duke came to visit me on my parole. If he has failed in his duty I do not wish to imitate so evil an example, and I have so fine a precedent in my own house that I am compelled to follow it rather than to follow the Duke.’ In this he spoke of Francis I., who in a similar case gave the Emperor Charles V. a free passage through France without insisting that he should relinquish the Duchy of Milan; and although several of the King’s counsellors at that time were of opinion that he should profit by the opportunity to compel the Emperor to restore the duchy, which indeed he had several times promised to do, Francis I. preferred to maintain his own honour above every other interest. Henry IV. acted on the same principle; he permitted the Duke of Savoy to depart unmolested after heaping honours and entertainments upon him, but the moment the Duke had returned to his own Court the King demanded the restitution of the Marquisate of Saluse according to his promise. The Duke refused, whereupon the King invaded Savoy, occupied the whole duchy, and compelled him to keep his word, not only to the extent of the marquisate but of several other parts which he was compelled to cede to the King by a treaty concluded at Lyons, on the 17th January 1601.

Reparation for Abuse of Immunity.

Those who think that one may lay forcible hands upon a sovereign who has broken his word will easily persuade themselves that in a similar case no international law can protect the person of a mere minister; but those who are really well instructed in the law of nations and in the question of sovereign rights are of opinion that a foreign envoy being subject to the laws of the country where he lives it is not possible to put into motion against him the machinery of domestic justice, that the only redress for wrongs done by him is an appeal to his master, and that if his master refuses reparation the responsibility must lie with him and not on his minister abroad who merely executes his order. This privilege, be it remembered, extends not merely to the ambassadors themselves but often to their servants, as is illustrated in the following example.

The Merargue Conspiracy.

King Henry IV., whom one may take as a model for princes, was warned by the Duke de Guise of the Merargue Conspiracy in which a Provençal squire named Merargue had entered into an arrangement with Dom Balthazar de Zuniga, the Spanish ambassador, to hand over the city of Marseilles to the Spaniards at a moment of profound peace. The King arrested not only Merargue, but also the private secretary to the Spanish ambassador, a man named Bruneau. Both were convicted of conspiracy. Merargue was executed, and the King handed over the private secretary to his own ambassador, saying that he would be glad to see Bruneau sent across the frontier, though he himself reserved the right to demand satisfaction from the Spanish King for Bruneau’s misdemeanour.

Immunity a Function of Sovereignty.

Now if princes had the right to proceed against foreign envoys at their courts, the latter would never feel themselves secure, because then it would be easy to get rid of any of them on flimsy pretexts, and the precedent once set up in a good case would surely be followed in many cases where nothing but idle suspicion could be brought against the envoy in question. This indeed would be the end of all diplomacy. Of course it is true that a minister who breaks faith cannot expect others to keep faith with him, especially if he is engaged upon conspiracies or any of those practices against the prince and safety of the realm of which I have spoken. But even in such a case the wise prince will not break the law of nations, which should always be respected. He will rather use his good offices at the court whence the erring envoy came in order to have him withdrawn. At the same time it is always permissible to place a watch upon a faithless ambassador, in order to hinder him in practices which would otherwise do harm to the state, and of course on the other part a wise ambassador will certainly avoid falling into such intrigues, for the very protection which he enjoys under the law of nations is a guarantee of his person and of his good behaviour. Benefits under it are reciprocal, and the reciprocal duties which it imposes should be scrupulously observed. If they are not, no law of nations can guarantee an intriguing ambassador for ever against the fury of the populace once they are aroused by suspicion.

Its Abuse undermines True Diplomacy.