On all these grounds the minister is to be pitied who receives commands from his master to form cabals in a foreign state, and he will need all his skill and courage to carry out such commands without being trapped in the process. It has been truly said that there is no service which a prince may not expect from good subjects and faithful ministers, but such obedience cannot be held to cover any action against the laws of God or of justice, which do not countenance for one moment attempts on the life of a prince, or against the security of the state, or any other unfriendly act committed under cover of the protecting title of ambassador. A good ambassador will always discourage plans of this kind, and if his master persists in them he may and should demand his recall, and retire into obscurity, jealously guarding his sovereign’s evil secret. In justice to most reigning sovereigns it must be said that few of them engage in designs of this kind. The vast majority of intrigues and cabals are made in their name in foreign states, or are suggested to them by their ministers or by astute diplomatists, who undertake to carry them out, and through them to confer great benefits upon the prince himself. But these diplomatists are often the first to fall into traps set by their own hand, and are then objects of pity to no man. Numerous examples of this kind can be quoted, and I think no one will challenge the truth of my observation when I say that in nine cases out of ten diplomatists who give such advice are actuated more by personal ambition or petty spite than by the true interests of the nation they serve.
Secret Service No Abuse of Immunity.
But let me not be misunderstood, there is all the difference between the attempt to debauch the subjects of a sovereign prince in order to ensnare them in conspiracy against him, and the legitimate endeavour to use every opportunity for acquiring information. The latter practice has always been permissible, and indeed is a necessary part of diplomacy. No criticism can fall upon a foreign envoy who successfully adopts the practice; the only culprit in such a case is the citizen of a foreign state who from corrupt motives sells information abroad. Apart from considerations of international law the interest of the public peace demands the preservation of the privileges of foreign envoys, for otherwise wars would be even more frequent than they are, because no prince would permit insults to his ministers to go unavenged. They are rightly resented, and the prince may pay heavily in his own peace of mind and the repose of his subjects for a moment of passion. He need do no more, however, than demand satisfaction for the bad conduct of any foreign envoy, and if he has just cause of complaint he will probably receive it. In any case the dismissal or recall of an ambassador will be read as a pointed lesson to all his colleagues in diplomacy, who will then understand that the price of evil conduct is the humiliation of dismissal.
The Credentials of an Ambassador.
When an ambassador is sent to a foreign court, his master gives him a letter addressed to the foreign prince requesting him to give the same credence to the bearer of the letter as to its writer. This despatch is called a letter of credence, which thus establishes the identity of its bearer and stands as the hall-mark of his office. In France there are two sorts of letters of credence: one called Lettre de Cachet, which is despatched and countersigned by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and sometimes also called Lettre de la Chancellerie. The other is written by the hand of one of the royal private secretaries, and signed by the King himself; it is countersigned by any minister, and is usually handed direct in private audience to the foreign prince to whom it is addressed. The former type of letter is presented in ceremonial public audience. When a negotiator is appointed by his prince to a free state or an assembly, which for this purpose is treated as though it were a court, he does not receive letters of credence, but his character and identity are fully established in his full powers, which he must exchange with ministers on arriving. The document known as full powers is an authorisation by the prince to his representative abroad to undertake all kinds of public business, the results of which the sovereign himself agrees to accept by the proxy of his minister; but as a rule in such full powers the particular matter under discussion is carefully specified, and the authority to act is confined to it.
Full Powers.
There are two kinds of full powers: one deriving directly from the sovereign and the other from his deputies, that is to say, his ministers of state who have sufficient authority to nominate plenipotentiaries in his absence. Such powers are particularly desirable where the states lie far apart from one another. In such negotiations as those between the Court of Madrid and the Low Countries, or the different Italian states, the advantage of this procedure is obvious.... Passports are of course merely letters which establish the identity and good faith of the person as distinct from the representative of state, and they are given even in time of war in order to secure a safe passage between countries at war for ministers engaged upon negotiation which may lead to peace....
Instructions.
The instruction is a written document containing a statement of the principal intentions of the prince or the state; it is to be regarded as a general aid to memory and a general guide to conduct. It is secret and must be retained under the control of him who receives it, though of course there are occasions on which he will receive the command to communicate specific portions of it to a foreign minister or a foreign prince. Such communication is regarded as a rule as a mark of special confidence, but on the other hand it often happens that two instructions are given, one the ostensible, that is to say it is drawn up in such terms that it can be shown to other princes, and the other secret, which contains the true and final intentions of the prince himself. But even the latter type of instruction is subject to alteration by the daily despatches which the negotiator receives from home, and which ought to be read as so many new instructions drawn up in accordance with the reports which he has transmitted to his own court. It follows therefore that the manner of reports which a negotiator despatches to his home government will have a large influence upon the type of instruction which he receives from time to time.
Oral Instructions.