The Minister of Foreign Affairs may prefer not to put the instructions and intentions of his royal master into writing but to deliver them orally, because then he has a greater freedom of interpretation according to circumstances as they arise, than he would have if he were bound by the written word. There is further a danger that such instructions when committed to paper may be wittingly or unwittingly left in the hands of some foreign diplomatist belonging to the opposite party. The risks thus incurred are too obvious to need any emphasis of mine. Whereas if the instructions be left in oral form, they can at least be repudiated if a dangerous situation were to arise from their being made known to an enemy prince. There are of course occasions where it is impossible not to commit to writing instructions given to a plenipotentiary, but it is a good rule in all negotiation to delay the issue of formal and binding instructions to as late a date in the negotiations as possible, so that the general lines upon which it is likely to proceed may be present to the mind of the minister who draws them up for the guidance of the ambassador.
It is not permissible without a serious violation of the law of nations to compel a minister to show his instructions in order to prove his good faith, nor is it permissible for a minister to communicate it in any form without an express command from his master, for he can fully rely on his letter of credence to establish both his identity and his good faith; besides which he is equipped with full powers in which the business of his negotiation is always fully described.
Discretionary Freedom.
Now such instructions may be as judicious and astute as can be imagined, but their use will lie in the wise interpretation by the diplomatist himself; and, as I have pointed out, the really able negotiator will always know how best to execute his master’s commands so that the instructions received from him may be drawn up on information which is both up-to-date and adequate. Thus it is that while the final responsibility for all success or failure in diplomacy would seem to rest upon the King and his ministers at home, it is none the less true that since these ministers can only act upon information from abroad, the influence which an enlightened diplomatist can exercise upon the actions and designs of the home government is very large. Incapable men acting abroad will make nothing even of the most brilliant instructions; capable men by the accuracy and sagacity of their reports and suggestions can do much to improve even the most mediocre instructions, and therefore the responsibility for diplomatic action is in reality shared in about equal degree between the home government and its servants abroad. The home government cannot know when the opportunity for appropriate action will arise, and therefore the reports on foreign situations which are transmitted in despatches from diplomats abroad ought to be so designed as to present as far as possible an intelligent description of events.
Value of the Trained Mind.
What an astonishing diversity and inequality there is in the conduct of men. No one, not even a minister of state, would think of building a house without the assistance of the best architect and the best workmen whom he could find; but it is the commonest occurrence to find that those who are charged with the transaction of very important state business, upon which the weal or woe of the whole realm depends, never think of entrusting it to trained minds, but give it to the first comer, whether he be a cunning architect or a mere hewer of stone. Therefore ministers and other persons in authority are culpable in a high degree if they do not secure for the foreign service of the state the most capable and sagacious men. For the errors in diplomacy sometimes bring more calamitous results than mistakes in other walks of life, and unless the negotiator can intelligently discern the coming event, he may plunge himself, his master, and his native land in irretrievable disaster.
Incompetence the Parent of Disaster.
It is a crime against the public safety not to uproot incapacity wherever it is discovered, or to allow an incompetent diplomatist to remain one moment longer than necessary in a place where competency is sorely needed. Faults in domestic policy are often more easily remedied than mistakes in foreign policy. There are many factors in foreign affairs which lie beyond the control of the ministers of any given state, and all foreign action requires greater circumspection, greater knowledge, and far greater sagacity than is demanded in home affairs. Therefore the government cannot exercise too great a care in its choice of men to serve abroad. In making such a choice the Foreign Minister must set his face like a flint against all family influence and private pressure, for nepotism is the damnation of diplomacy. He is in some sense the guarantor to his Majesty of those whom he presents as diplomatists. Their good success will do him honour, their failure will fall with redoubled force upon his head, and may require herculean efforts by him in order to repair the damage it has caused. Hence it is of the first interest, both for the Foreign Minister himself and for the well-being of the state, to see that the high public offices of diplomacy are not filled by the intrigues and personal cabals which reign at every court, and which often place in the King’s hands unworthy instruments of his policy.
The Diplomatist prepares Himself for a Foreign Mission.
Now when a diplomatist has been appointed to a foreign post his first care should be to ask for the despatches of his predecessor in order that he may inform himself exactly of the state of affairs with which he will have to deal. He will thus be able to pick up the thread and to make use both of the knowledge and of the different personal relationships which have gathered round the embassy during his predecessor’s term of office. And as all public affairs are like a great network, one linked with another, it is of the first importance that a diplomatist proceeding to a foreign post should be a complete master of recent history both in regard to his own state and in regard to the relations which exist between the country of his new service and all neighbouring countries. Therefore, when the newly appointed diplomatist has read with care the despatches of his predecessor, he should make notes upon them, endeavouring to foresee the difficulties which he will meet both in such trivial matters as a novel ceremonial, or in the more weighty business of state, so that he may be able to discuss them with his own Foreign Minister, and thus receive what enlightenment he can.