“William.”
To this was added a postscript of no particular importance: review of troops, inspection of fleet, patriotic reception, &c.
Bismarck to Andrassy from Gastein, on the 20th of September: “Honoured Count,—In continuation of my humble communication of the 3rd instant, I have the honour now to complete the answer therein begun to your Excellency’s kind letter of the 1st instant. I have, in accordance with our conferences here, sent repeated and detailed reports on the situation to the Emperor, my most gracious master. The conformity between my views, which are known to your Excellency, and those of my colleagues who represent me, have made it possible for me to overcome the difficulties which were created by distance and opposing influences from other quarters in so far that I am now in a position to state that the Emperor agrees in principle with the views by which I was guided at our recent conferences. According to an official communication from my substitute, Count Stolberg-Wernigerode, the Emperor is prepared to sanction an agreement under which both Powers mutually undertake to continue to promote the maintenance of peace, and in particular to cultivate peaceful relations between both States and Russia, but, in the event of either of them being attacked by one or more Powers, to jointly repel such attack with their entire united strength. According to this I am empowered by my most gracious master to propose an unconditional defensive alliance between Austria-Hungary and the German Empire, either with or without a limit of time. I humbly beg your Excellency to enter upon a verbal discussion of this proposal. I shall have to submit the result of our negotiations to my most gracious master for approval. I entertain no doubt as to my being able to obtain this sanction, if your Excellency be in a position to agree in the name of the Emperor Francis Joseph to the proposal made on our side, in the same simple and general terms in which it is submitted. In any case I shall consider myself fortunate if our conferences lead to this or other results calculated to promote the mutual interests of both Empires and the peace of Europe.
“With friendly and cordial respect,
“I remain your most devoted,
“v. Bismarck.”
Letter from the King to Bismarck, dated Baden-Baden, October 2nd, 1879: “I regret to see from your letter of the 24th ultimo, as also from the memorandum enclosed therewith, from the protocols of your negotiations in Vienna, and from the draft treaty which has been based upon them, that my views with regard to the latter have not found acceptance on any side. As I expressed these views in my letters from Danzig and Stettin of the 10th and 12th ultimo as clearly as it was possible for me to do, you can see for yourself how far they differ from the results arrived at, so that there is no necessity for me to repeat them. Notwithstanding this circumstance, however, I return herewith your letter of the 24th in order that you may form an idea from my marginal notes (which, I regret to say, are only in pencil) of the impression which it has made upon me.
“Germany and Austria are desirous of attaining the same end—security against unprovoked attacks by foreign foes. But owing to the special mention of Russia as the foe in question, I cannot agree to the present proposals nor to the immediate conclusion of a treaty. After again extending the hand in friendship to the Emperor Alexander after the removal of misunderstandings (at Alexandrowo), am I now to conclude an alliance against him, even of a defensive character, in which he alone is referred to as the presumable aggressor, and keep this intention a secret from him? I cannot be guilty of such an act of disloyalty. In mitigation of this objection it has been urged that, le cas échéant, Russia would be informed of the existence of an alliance, if indications of a war against us became evident. This very uncertain expression is so elastic that the notice would either come too late or would only cause still greater irritation. It was further argued that in the state of ferment now prevailing in the internal affairs of Russia the knowledge of the alliance in question would give her the leverage and self-command necessary to master that ferment. But surely for that purpose official knowledge of that honourable intention is necessary. And yet it is of course impossible to give official knowledge of the fact that Russia is regarded as the sole enemy. Therefore in order that it may be possible to communicate the treaty to Russia, the reference to her must be omitted from it, and the enemy be only described in general terms, while it must be incidentally mentioned that in entering upon it the parties have this honourable intention in view. That is what I desire. I am opposed to an immediate ratification of the treaty, because there is at the present moment absolutely nothing which could lead to a war against Germany and Austria, and it is notorious that binding treaties entered into without urgent necessity are double-edged weapons. Austria urges the immediate ratification on the ground that the favourable situation which for the moment exists in France may be endangered, and that the intimacy between Austria and England may cool down. I cannot conceive how such far-reaching political combinations can possibly be made to depend upon the hazard of a Minister of the French Republic who is on the point of being overthrown. The Anglo-Austrian intimacy must after all be very shaky if it depends upon the date of the ratification of a treaty. In view of the consideration shown by Austria for the susceptibilities of France and her apprehensions as to a coolness with England, Milutin’s opinion as to the possibility of a Triple Alliance may after all not be entirely unfounded.
“Now, another circumstance has arisen which may open a way out of the dilemma in which I find myself between my conscience and honour so far as Russia is concerned, and the objections raised to my views on the Austrian side. In reply to my telegraphic inquiry, you have informed me by wire of what Saburoff told you under instructions from the Emperor. You infer from these communications that Russia has already got wind of our Austrian negotiations (as is quite natural), and you wish to conclude from the defensive attitude, which, according to Saburoff’s assurance, Russia intends in future to maintain that this assurance must have been a consequence of the knowledge obtained respecting our negotiations. In these circumstances it might be possible to immediately carry out the suggestion made by me on page 3 as to the manner of communicating our proposed arrangement with Austria, and to give the treaty a general character, not only by omitting the name of Russia, but by inviting her to join in the treaty. You yourself have said to Saburoff that you are thoroughly in favour of the maintenance of the Three Emperors’ Alliance; and the same idea occurs in the memorandum, the protocol, and the treaty. What, then, could be simpler than to confirm in a real written treaty the Drei Kaiser Bündniss which has hitherto been merely verbal, or, at most, only had a written basis in the St. Petersburg-Vienna arrangement? You yourself have further told Saburoff that you would not be able to co-operate in any policy by which Austria would be endangered. It is as right as it is important that Russia should thus receive the first official intimation of that of which it has already got wind. Inasmuch as our Ambassador at St. Petersburg will have informed Minister Giers of your interview with Saburoff, I would ask whether his assurance that Russia would henceforth only pursue a defensive policy based on the Treaty of Berlin is authentic, and whether it signifies a defensive policy as against Germany and Austria. If a satisfactory answer were received, and this were immediately communicated to Austria, there would be no further obstacle in the way of ourselves and Austria acquainting the Emperor Alexander in the manner above mentioned (page 3) with the projected treaty, and inviting his adhesion.
“This would render necessary a modification of section 1; section 2 would drop out entirely; section 4 would be redrafted in accordance with my marginal notes, should it be considered desirable that the draft itself should constitute the first invitation to Russia to join in the treaty, as the whole treaty would be submitted as an instrument affecting so far only Germany and Austria. I consider the omission of section 2 to be necessary, because it is directed exclusively against Russia; and furthermore because it is specially stated in your letter of the 24th ultimo that in case of an attack by France upon Germany, Austria would be dispensed from supporting the latter, and only bound to observe a benevolent neutrality. That is as much as to say that we should support Austria against Russia with our whole power (section 1), while Austria is dispensed from rendering a like service if France should attack us. But the latter eventuality is unquestionably more possible and indeed more probable than a Russian attack, at least up to the present, since there the desire for the revanche is only slumbering, has never been abandoned, and will show itself again directly a suitable opportunity arises. With regard to our—Germany’s—position in a war with France I differ from Field-Marshal Moltke, inasmuch as I cannot endorse his view that our forces are sufficient to enable us to carry on such a war without allies. In that event we should find ourselves in presence of an army entirely different to that of 1870, as the progress which it has made is undeniable. Besides, there is a further consideration, namely, the almost hermetically sealed French frontier, extending from the Swiss to the Belgian frontiers, a continuous line of fortresses and forts, which—even if broken through—would render it impossible to send reinforcements to the front, and would, moreover, enormously hamper the strategic advance of our forces. It is on this restricted field that, according to Field-Marshal Moltke, we are to deliver battle. If we are victorious we cannot pursue the defeated enemy as we did in 1870, being stopped by this girdle of fortresses, to which, instead of engaging in a pursuit, we should immediately have to lay siege. Months might pass before we could capture any of them, and this would give the defeated army time to refit at its leisure behind this line and to meet us well prepared in the event of our breaking through it at the risk of our communications with our base. But if the German army is defeated in the first battle then the left bank of the Rhine is immediately lost and we must withdraw across the river.