“For this reason Austria ought not to remain neutral in such a war, but, on the contrary, must be bound by treaty to support us with her whole power, in the same way as the treaty binds us to do with regard to Russia.”
Continuation of this Imperial communication to the Chancellor, dated Baden, October 4th: “I had not finished the enclosed letter to you yesterday when your long telegram arrived, so that I had still to add the last three-quarters of a page. The standpoint taken by me in this letter has not been affected by my resolve to approve conditionally of the Vienna proposal. But I again ask you what are we to reply if, in reference to the Memorandum to be communicated to him, the Emperor Alexander should ask: ‘What, then, have you decided to do in connection with this Memorandum? most probably concluded an agreement? Until I am acquainted with it, I can come to no decision, therefore show me this agreement.’ But as the agreement in its present form cannot be shown to Russia, we must decline to produce it; and what impression must this refusal make upon the Emperor Alexander? Certainly the very worst. The wording of section 2 is, to my mind, so very strange that I merely wanted to sum up the enclosure by proposing that the neutrality of Austria in case of our being attacked by France be struck out, and Austria be called upon to assume the same obligation to stand by us with her entire strength that we undertake towards Austria in section 1, in case of a Russian attack. Otherwise the conditions are not equal. Strongly impress this upon Andrassy once more.
“William.”
Letter from Andrassy to Bismarck, dated 3rd October, 1879: “I have received your much esteemed letter of the 29th of September, for which I return my warmest thanks. I have since then received through Prince Reuss some communications referring to the position of the negotiations. I enclose them herewith in the form in which they were written down by Prince Reuss himself. I am in a position to declare myself in agreement with the intention manifested in this proposal, but I have nevertheless some scruples as to two points. The first is that a treaty is spoken of, and the second that the conclusion of the treaty is described as impending in the future. My objection to the first is that, if the intention to conclude a treaty is expressly emphasised in the letter of his Majesty the Emperor William, it follows necessarily that they will ask for the text at St. Petersburg, and this will afford the Russian Cabinet, before things are settled between us, an opportunity to commence negotiations à trois from which I do not anticipate a satisfactory result for any of the parties. For this reason I venture to submit a counter, or, more correctly, a parallel proposal, the adoption of which would, it seems to me, be of advantage to both sides. This is:—
“After having sanctioned the signature of the Treaty (underlined by Bismarck in pencil) his Majesty the Emperor William can communicate the entire contents (underlined in pencil by Bismarck) of the Memorandum agreed upon and signed by us, which, of course, implies an agreement, adding on his own part the explanation that this agreement at the same time involves a tacit understanding by both Governments that an attack upon either Empire will be regarded as directed against both, and will also be construed by his Majesty in that sense. His Majesty, satisfied with the statement made by Saburoff, respecting Russia’s love of peace, makes this communication as a proof of his loyalty and frankness. His Majesty may, perhaps, add that this understanding is of an entirely defensive character, and that there is nothing to prevent Russia from removing any antagonistic tendency by herself adhering to the principles laid down in the Memorandum. (Pencil-marked in the margin by Bismarck.) By this means the object of the Emperor William would be fully attained, namely, to communicate the significance of our understanding, while, on the other hand, no mention would be made of the existence of a more precise agreement, and, therefore, the necessity of communicating it would be avoided.
“Such a communication of the text would have among other things the disadvantage, first, that the adhesion of Russia to this text is inconceivable; secondly, that the passage in it referring to France and Italy would become known there almost immediately, and would, at the present time, give rise to quite unnecessary combinations; and, thirdly, that the affair might transpire in Parliament, and lead to undesirable discussions. These considerations commend my proposal. Should you not be able to secure its acceptance in the competent quarter, I could agree to any other method, including the suggestion made by Stolberg, my most gracious master having before his departure declared that he would not make a conditio sine quâ non of preserving secrecy as to the Treaty after signature.
“There is, on the other hand, one point which I would regard as entirely out of the question, namely, any communication of the existence and contents of the Treaty before the sanction of his Majesty, the Emperor William, is actually given or is assured. (Bismarck added in pencil: ‘Quite right.’) Without desiring to forestall the decision upon this point of my most gracious master, I should prefer to renounce altogether the conclusion of an agreement, and in any case I should be obliged to forego for my own part any further share in the negotiations upon such basis. Pray excuse, dear Prince, the somewhat abrupt tone of this statement, but as the matter appeared to me to be pressing, I desired to let Prince Reuss have the letter to-day. Begging you to present my respects to the Princess, I remain, with unalterable and cordial respect,
“Your sincerely devoted,
“Andrassy.”
The Crown Prince writes to Bismarck (quite confidentially) from Baden-Baden, on the 4th of October, 1879: “Count Stolberg will have already informed you prior to the receipt of these lines of the course of affairs up to the signing of the draft Treaty by the Emperor. I therefore say nothing more about this very exciting crisis, the result of which I confidently anticipate will be of far-reaching importance for the position of Germany. I must point out, however, that his Majesty is quite miserable, and keeps on repeating that he has dishonoured himself by his decision, and has been disloyal to his friend the Tsar; so that one clearly sees how fearfully difficult the decision was for him, with his extreme conscientiousness.”