Draft (dated Varzin, October 30th, 1879) of a verbal answer to be made to the Emperor Alexander in reply to any question which he might ultimately put: “An institution which arose under the influence of Alexander I. and which preserved the peace of central Europe for half a century, had to be sacrificed in 1866 to irresistible necessity. The German Confederation was an excessive burden to us Prussians, while it did not satisfy the aspirations of the other Germans. The discontent thus created was utilised by the revolutionary party, for the purpose of threatening every German Prince. It was necessary to deprive them of this weapon, and to satisfy the national sentiment. This was done at the expense of the security which the Confederation afforded, almost without cost, to its weaker members.
“That the breach caused by the secession of Austria, which extended from the Carpathians to the Lake of Constance, would have to be filled up was recognised even in the Paulskirche. Later on, after the war of 1866, attempts were unceasingly made to bind Austria to the States, with which it had been formerly united in the German Confederation, so as to prevent her from allying herself with France against them. This object has now been attained without any obligation on our part to defend Trient, Trieste, or, indeed, Bosnia, against Italians, or Turks, or Southern Slavs. Our agreement with Austria no more involves anything in the nature of a threat to our neighbours than would do the erection of a fortress on the frontier, which, of course, has never been regarded in that light, and it is even less of a menace for instance, than the construction of strategic railways. It has, indeed, the character of a mutual assurance society, which every one having similar interests is at liberty to join.”
Report of the Emperor William to Bismarck of his interview at Alexandrowo, from a copy made for the Crown Prince:—
1. September 5th.—“The Emperor Alexander began the conversation by an explanation of his letter to me. Nobody knew anything of it.” (Marginal note by Bismarck: “Gortschakoff revised it.”) (1) He had shown it to no one before it was despatched, and after it had been sent he only communicated it verbally without naming the persons. If, therefore, I had found anything offensive in the letter, as he saw from my answer, he alone was to blame, and he recognised that it was possible for me to have misunderstood him. (2) He was very sorry for that, and since it had had such a serious result as to cause me personal offence, he wished it to be regarded as if it had never been written. Nothing was farther from his intention than the idea of a threat. He had only wished to call my attention to the fact, which was perfectly true, that if the press of both countries continued to rail at each other it must lead in the course of time to a feeling of hostility between the two States, and his sole object was to avoid that. (3) He considered that the preservation of the peace of Europe was only possible in the future, as it had been in the past, so long as good relations between Prussia and Russia were maintained under all circumstances. (3A) The votes given, mostly against Russia, by my Commissioners in the proceedings of the European Commissions in the East had betrayed a hostile attitude on the part of Germany towards Russia, which had caused great irritation in the latter country, and gave rise to the excited comments of the press. (4) In these Commissions Russia was pursuing the object which she had had exclusively in view during the war, namely, to improve and render more assured the fate of the Christian populations, but not to make conquests. If opposition were now offered thereto in the delimitation of the frontier, and more or more Christians were restored against his wish to Turkish sovereignty, the Commissioners must have received instructions to that effect. (5) The German votes had already produced a bad effect in Turkey also, inasmuch as the disagreement which was there seen to exist between Germany and Russia rendered the Turks more obstinate, and caused work to drag on interminably. (6) Prince Bismarck, whom he had hitherto known only as the friend of the Russo-Prussian relations, seemed unable to forget Prince Gortschakoff’s—stupid—circular of 1875. He had strongly advised Prince Gortschakoff against sending this circular, and pointed out to him the evil consequences (of his vanity, en parenthese) because if there actually were anything to smooth over, that was not the way to set about it. Prince Gortschakoff had his way, however. Bismarck’s grudge, and his inability to forget, which began with this irritation against Gortschakoff, appeared to him to have been transferred to Russia, and it was to this that he referred in his letter to me when he said that he could not reconcile such conduct with the character of so eminent a statesman. This expression of his in the letter to me did not refer to the instructions given to the Commissioners with respect to Eastern affairs. Moreover (7), Prince Gortschakoff is a man who has outlived his usefulness, and whom he hardly ever consults now. “In reply to No. 1, I said I could not deny that I had been painfully affected by his letter, particularly because I had considered that his remarks referred only to the votes in question, and they seemed to me a matter of such slight consequence that I could not understand his irritation on that score. It was only through his declaration to the effect that his expression referred to the subject dealt with in No. 7 (doubtless No. 6 is meant) that I now for the first time understood it. I could assure him that Prince Bismarck still regards the relations between Prussia, Germany, and Russia as he always did, but that he saw a feeling gaining ground in Russia, chiefly owing to the press, which he could not understand, in view of the existing laws there, especially as semi-official organs contributed to this detrimental state of feeling. I added that I was prepared to admit that our press was also guilty of similar excesses, but, after all, these were mainly in self-defence against the Russian attacks. We are so tied by our press laws that we can only intervene in the way of personal appeal to the editors of the newspapers, but not legally unless a state of siege were proclaimed in certain districts. Nos. 2 and 3. If the words in question were to be understood as containing no threat I should feel reassured, as the interpretation which the Emperor gave to this passage of his letter was in perfect accord with my own convictions. As his Government had quite recently issued a serious reprimand with regard to improper articles in the newspapers, it was to be expected and hoped, from the power with which the Governor-General was invested, that energetic action would be taken. I, on my part, had caused certain advice to be given to the editors, the law did not permit any more. 3A. Our instructions to the Commissioners in question had remained the same from the very beginning: if Russia and Austria were in agreement always to vote with them; when points arose where that was not the case to vote with the majority, where the Russian proposal was not flagrantly untenable. That had been the case in the matter of Silistria, where I was entirely in favour of the Russian proposal to appoint a Commission to inquire into the question of the bridge on the spot, and also with regard to the military road through Eastern Rumelia. 4. This view was quite new to me, as nothing of the kind had previously been brought to my notice. At the same time, these little frontier details were after all so trifling that they could hardly affect the question of the Christians to any important extent. Unfortunately, the Greek frontier question had only been mentioned at the Congress as the expression of a desire, and not as a demand, and I foresaw, from the first, how it would be, mais pendant le congrès je n’avais pas voix au chapitre. I regarded in the same way the Jewish question in Rumania, the broader solution desired being, to my mind, impracticable, and therefore I wished to see the Greek modification adopted.”
Continuation of this report, dated September 12th, 1879:—
“Nos. 6 and 7. I had never noticed that Prince Bismarck was inspired by particularly hostile feelings towards Prince Gortschakoff on account of the latter’s circular of 1875. My opinion and his upon that note was exactly the same as that of the Emperor Alexander himself; but at the Berlin Congress the same view with regard to Prince Gortschakoff was manifested as was expressed above by the Emperor, and I therefore understood the peculiar position which was now assigned to him. I believe that in my answer to the Emperor I adequately emphasised how little change there has been in Prince Bismarck’s political views so far as Russia is concerned. He had always agreed with me that, remembering the attitude adopted by Russia towards us in 1870, we for two whole years, 1876 and 1877, tried to manifest our gratitude to the Emperor by our neutralité bienveillante, and actually succeeded in preventing a coalition of the Western Powers, including Austria. This seemed to me to disprove the suspicion of the Emperor that Prince Bismarck had out of spite against Prince Gortschakoff changed his political views, and on that account had adopted towards Russia an attitude to which expression had been given in such trifling questions. Up to the present Prince Bismarck’s sentiments towards Russia remained unaltered.
“On the forenoon of the 4th the Emperor came to see me again in order to take leave of me after lunch. He had received a telegram from Jugenheim, from the Empress Marie, who desired to be remembered to me, and was very pleased at our meeting at Alexandrowo. He added: ‘C’est à elle que j’ai communiqué la première ma lettre à Vous dont le brouillon était par differentes correctures presque illisible. I afterwards showed my letter and your answer to Adlerberg, Milutin and Giers; they know exactly what my political opinions are concerning Prussia and Germany, and being in perfect agreement with me on this subject, they are pleased that erroneous impressions will be dispelled by our meeting.’ The Emperor then read me a letter from the Russian envoy reporting a conversation which he had had at Kissingen with Prince Bismarck on the political situation; and a great deal had in particular been said about Prussia and Russia acting together. The envoy found that Prince Bismarck’s former view of the Three Emperors’ Alliance had remained entirely unchanged. The Emperor repeated, en aperçu, the views which we had exchanged, and was heartily glad the misunderstandings had been cleared up and that the old friendship would be maintained between the two States in association with Austria. As to the latter, he now added for the first time: ‘Certainly I had reason to be dissatisfied with her, as her attitude towards me during the war was louche as usual. Without firing a shot she occupied two Turkish provinces, of course never to surrender them again, as the English will never give up Cyprus, respecting which they entered into a separate treaty during the Congress without making any communication to the Great Powers.’ I interrupted him here, saying I believed there had been negotiations at Reichstadt respecting the occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. ‘Yes,’ said the Emperor, ‘but under quite different conditions, that Austria should take part in the war in some way or other. All the same, the main point is that we should hold together à trois.’ Of course I could only confirm that view as my own conviction.
“On the same morning I spoke to General Count Adlerberg, Minister Giers, and Minister of War Milutin, one after the other. The first two spoke with equal warmth in favour of the old relations. They were aware of the Emperor’s letter and of my answer, which I mentioned as entrée de conversation, and they were at one with the Emperor in his satisfaction at the removal of the misunderstandings which they would have thought to be impossible, knowing, as they did, exactly the views to which the Emperor desired to give expression in his letter. I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of these sentiments. I nevertheless told them quite plainly that it was the press that led to an estrangement between our countries. As a strongly worded rescript had now been issued in Russia decidedly disapproving of the hostile attitude adopted by the press towards Germany, an improvement was to be anticipated, that is, if the Governors by whom a state of siege had been proclaimed throughout almost all Russia—a measure to which I could only wish every success—made use of their power to immediately seize all newspapers, pamphlets, &c., which published inflammatory matter. If that were not done the dangerous consequences which the Emperor had foreseen would certainly follow, namely, discord between the two States. In dealing with our own free press, my hands were tied by the law and our representative Constitution, and hence the defensive attitude against the Russian press taken up in our newspaper articles. I had, however, given orders that the editors should be advised to exercise greater restraint themselves, should an improvement take place in the Russian press. The gentlemen in question agreed with me in all this, and hoped for an improvement.
“The conversation with General Milutin began with the subject described above. I then expressed my appreciation of the new organisation introduced during the war, and said I could not understand where the money was found for it. But all Europe had been alarmed at seeing the efforts and the monetary sacrifices made for carrying on the war suddenly retained on a peace footing. He replied: ‘It was precisely the war which proved that the Russian army was not strong enough even to overcome the power of Turkey, its enormous forces being dispersed over the whole empire from Siberia to the Vistula. Therefore a nucleus must be maintained which shall be equal to European requirements. This cost can be met out of Russian resources that are unknown to other countries. We have war frontiers against China, against the countries on the Indian border, against Persia and against Turkey. We have received news that a coalition is being formed between Austria, England, and perhaps France. That points to a new conflict in the East. England is organising and arming Asia Minor, which is being inundated with State officials, generals, and officers in the guise of consuls, a sure indication of hostile intentions upon our position in the Caucasus. The Eastern conflict is near at hand.’ I demurred to the latter statement, and asserted that if once the decisions of the Berlin Congress were carried out in their entirety, no fresh war was to be anticipated there, as Turkey required peace above everything else.
“(Signed) William, 9/9/79.”