“While the Emperor was with me on the 4th a telegram from London was brought to him, according to which England declared that, although not in favour of the appointment of a technical commission ad hoc for the settlement of the bridge question at Silistria, she would be pleased to see the Servian Frontier Commission entrusted with that task. The Emperor said he could agree to that, and that only technical members should be appointed to the Commission.”
These papers also include the letter from the Emperor William to Bismarck, dated 10/9/79, which accompanied the foregoing report: “Herewith I send you the conclusion of the notes of my conversation with the Emperor Alexander. My letter from Berlin, which crossed your memorandum No. 1, showed you that your views, which you now repeat with more detail in No. 2, are in contradiction—first in principle, and then that an answer could not be given until I had spoken with the Emperor Alexander. Your premises in the memoranda could be transformed into truth for me only after I had spoken to the Emperor, and—as I wrote you through Minister von Bülow—after light had been thrown upon the correspondence. Up to that time I regarded your memoranda comme non avenus. For me my notes have brought this light. The Emperor regrets having written the letter, as it has given rise to misunderstandings; as the words ‘ce qui doit avoir des suites fâcheuses et dangereuses’ should absolutely not be regarded as threatening a rupture, but only as directing my attention to the fact that if some restraint were not placed upon the press, ill feeling might arise between our two countries, which neither of us desired, and therefore that measures should be taken accordingly. That being as true as anything in this world can be, I could only express my complete approval, all the more so as the Russian Government had already taken such steps, and I had ordered similar measures prior to my departure. As you will see from the notes, I corrected the view taken by the Emperor Alexander of the votes given by my Commissioners in the East, and he fully understood this, although he stated that he had already received news of the unfavourable consequences of these votes, which was quite new to me, but which explained the Emperor’s dissatisfaction on that score. You will also read how I defended you against the passage in the Emperor’s letter. He fully agreed that our policy during the war in the East was of the greatest benefit to Russia, which involves the highest recognition for yourself. I could assure him that till now you had maintained your old sentiments towards Russia, as was sufficiently proved in 1877 and 1878. On this occasion the Emperor expressed his conviction that peace could only be preserved for Europe by our holding together à trois, as we had done since the meeting in Berlin in 1872. Having hitherto held the same conviction myself, I could only agree with him. As the three persons, Adlerberg, Giers, and Milutin, spoke in exactly the same sense, the light which I looked for at this meeting at Alexandrowo respecting the sentiments of the Emperor and those persons who stand highest in his confidence has been forthcoming so far as I am concerned. None of them has the slightest wish to wage war upon us. The great additions to the Russian army which were raised as a reserve during the Turkish war, are retained as a permanent increase because they believe themselves to be threatened by a European coalition, and therefore must be in a state of preparation which would enable them to meet this alone.
“Since therefore, for me, the premises in your memoranda fall to the ground, namely, that owing to the danger threatened from Russia we should give up the policy we have hitherto pursued in our relations with that country and not only seek but actually conclude a European coalition of a defensive nature against Russia, I cannot lend myself to this project in its present extension. In view of the explanation given by the Emperor Alexander of his letter to me, which I originally did not regard as a threat but only as a desire to see the existing good relations between our States maintained by means of restrictions upon the press, it could only be a source of satisfaction to me to see the milder tone which prevailed in your answer sent by me to the Emperor, the moderate pressure and the truths which it contained being sufficiently intelligible and also understood. The words ‘une entente séculaire, les legs de nos pères de glorieuse mémoire’ were written according to my own heart, and went to the heart of the Emperor, so that he repeated them to me twice. I could not therefore understand your hostility to Russia, which increases with each memorandum, nor could I see how the expressions quoted above could be interpreted as a mere empty phrase! I was just as deeply affected by the words that we should outwardly maintain a friendly attitude towards Russia while at the same time concluding a coalition against her with Austria, with England, and perhaps with France. And you have its conclusion already so fixedly in view that you have not only communicated your whole project to Count Andrassy, but have also permitted him to speak of it to his Emperor (seinem Kaiser), who also immediately accepts it. Then you invite me to send you instructions, on your way back through Vienna, to conclude a defensive alliance there with Austria against Russia, which would be followed by the larger coalition. Put yourself in my place for a moment. I am in presence of a personal friend, a near relative and an ally, in order to come to an understanding as to some hasty and indeed misunderstood passages in a letter, and our interview leads to a satisfactory result. Shall I now at the same time join a hostile coalition against this sovereign, that is to say, act behind his back in a manner contrary to that in which I spoke to him?
“I will not absolutely deny that the dangers set forth in your memoranda may arise one day, particularly on a change of rulers in St. Petersburg. I am, however, utterly unable to see that there is any imminent danger. How often have you warned me against treaties with other Powers, which tied one’s hands, when there is no positive object in view, and there is only room for conjecture as to an uncertain future. My brother and Minister Manteuffel in particular burnt their fingers over the Three Years’ Treaty with Austria which was concluded after Olmütz, and impatiently awaited the expiry of that term. The present case is quite similar. It is against my political convictions and my conscience to bind my hands for the sake of a possible eventuality.
“At the same time, I must not disavow you and the steps which you have already taken in dealing with Andrassy and his master. Therefore in Vienna, whither all the newspapers already say you are going, you may speak of the eventuality of disagreement with Russia developing into a possible breach, and enter into pourparlers respecting the joint measures to be then taken with Austria. But, following my conscience, I do not authorise you to conclude a convention, to say nothing of a treaty.
“In this way I hope our views will again agree. If it be God’s will that this should be the case, I can look forward with confidence to the future, which would otherwise for me be very dark, and anticipate a genuine continuance of the relations with Russia, which are growing more friendly. I cannot tell you how painful the episode has been to me, when it seemed, for the first time in seventeen years, as if we could not come to an understanding. I impatiently await your answer to the above authorisation, and am convinced that we shall be able to come to an agreement. God grant that it may be so!
“Your faithful and devoted,
“William.
“Finished at Stettin, 12/9/79.”
“As Herr von Bülow, after taking a copy of my additions to the Alexandrowo notes, had the original immediately despatched to you, there is a corresponding change in the opening words of this letter.”