So far M. Favre. The condition of Paris had not altered, the protests addressed to Europe had not put an end to the crisis, nor could they have done so, when Favre, on January 13th, that is, three days after the letter to Granville, and on the day of the issue of his circular to the representatives of France abroad, sent the following despatch to the Chancellor of the Confederation:—
“M. le Comte,—Lord Granville informs me in his despatch of December 29th, which I received on the evening of January 10th, that your Excellency, at the request of the English Cabinet, holds a passport at my disposal which is necessary to enable the French Plenipotentiary to the London Conference to pass through the Prussian lines. As I have been appointed to that office, I have the honour to request your Excellency to give instructions to have this passport, made out in my name, sent to me as speedily as possible.”
I reproduce all these solely with the object of illustrating the great difference between the character and capacity of Favre and of Bismarck. Compare the foregoing documents with those which the Chancellor drafted. In the former, indecision, equivocation, affectation, and fine phrases, ending in the very opposite of what had been emphatically laid down a few lines or a few days previously. In the latter, on the contrary, decision, simplicity, and a natural and purely business-like manner. On January 16th the Chancellor replied to Favre as follows (omitting the introductory phrases):—
“Your Excellency understands that, at the suggestion of the Government of Great Britain, I hold a passport at your disposal for the purpose of enabling you to take part in the London Conference. That supposition is, however, not correct. I could not enter into official negotiations, which would be based on the presupposition that the Government of National Defence is, according to international law, in a position to act in the name of France, so long at least as it has not been recognised by the French nation itself.
“I presume that the officer in command of our outposts would have granted your Excellency permission to pass through the German lines if your Excellency had applied for the same at the headquarters of the besieging forces. The latter would have had no reason to take your Excellency’s political position and the object of your journey into consideration, and the authorisation granted by the military authorities to pass through our lines, which, from their standpoint, they need not have hesitated to grant, would have left the Ambassador of his Majesty the King in London a free hand to deal without prejudice with the question whether, according to international law, your Excellency’s declarations could be accepted as the declarations of France. Your Excellency has rendered the adoption of such a course impossible by officially communicating to me the object of your journey, and the official request for a passport for the purpose of representing France at the Conference. The above-mentioned political considerations, in support of which I must adduce the declaration which your Excellency has published, forbid me to accede to your request for such a document.
“In addressing this communication to you, I must leave it to yourself and your Government to consider whether it is possible to find another way in which the scruples above mentioned may be overcome, and all prejudice arising from your presence in London may be avoided.
“But even if some such way should be discovered, I take the liberty to question whether it is advisable for your Excellency at the present moment to leave Paris and your post as a member of the Government there, in order to take part in a Conference on the question of the Black Sea, at a time when interests of much greater importance to France and Germany than Article XI. of the Treaty of 1856 are at stake in Paris. Your Excellency would also leave behind you in Paris the agents of neutral States and the members of their staffs who have remained there, or rather been kept there, notwithstanding the fact that they have long since obtained permission to pass through the German lines, and are therefore the more specially committed to the protection and care of your Excellency as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the de facto Government.
“I can hardly believe that in a critical situation, to the creation of which you have so largely contributed, your Excellency will deprive yourself of the possibility of co-operating towards that solution, for which you are equally responsible.”
I now let the diary resume its narrative.