Subsequently I despatch a démenti of a Berlin telegram published by The Times, according to which we propose to demand the surrender of twenty ironclads and the colony of Pondicherry, together with a war indemnity of ten milliards of francs. This I describe as a gross invention which cannot possibly have been credited in England, or have created any anxiety there. I then hint at the probable source, namely, the clumsy imagination of an unfriendly and intriguing diplomatist. “That comes from Loftus,” says the Chief, as he gives me these instructions. “An ill-mannered fellow who was always seeking to make mischief with us.”
Tuesday, February 7th.—From Bucarest despatches it seems as if the reign of Prince Charles were really coming to a speedy end. With the retention of Dalwigk at Darmstadt, the old confederacy of opponents of German unity remains firmly entrenched, and the well-known intrigues continue unhindered. A telegram from Bordeaux brings the expected news. Gambetta yesterday announced in a circular to the Prefects that his Parisian colleagues having annulled his decree with regard to the elections, he has informed them of his resignation. A good sign. He can hardly have a strong party behind him or he would scarcely have resigned.
Wednesday, February 8th.—The Chief is up at an unusually early hour, and drives off at 9.45 to see the King. Favre arrives shortly before 1 o’clock, accompanied by a swarm of Frenchmen. There must be ten or twelve of them. He confers with the Minister after first lunching with us.
In the evening the Chief and his son dined with the Crown Prince, but first remained for a while with us. He again observed with satisfaction that Favre had not taken offence at his “spiteful letter,” but, on the contrary, had thanked him for it. The Chief had repeated to him verbally that it was his duty to share the dish which he had helped to cook. To-day they had discussed the way of raising the Paris war contribution; the French wanted to pay the greater part of it in bank notes, and we might lose in that way. “I do not know the value of what they offer,” he said; “but in any case it is to their advantage. They must, however, pay the whole amount agreed upon. I will not remit a single franc.”
Thursday, February 9th.—Speaking again of the Paris contribution, the Chancellor observed at dinner: “Stosch tells me he can dispose of fifty million francs in bank notes to pay for provisions, &c., in France. We must have proper security, however, for the remaining hundred and fifty millions.” Then alluding to the foolish story about our wanting Pondicherry, he continued: “I do not want any colonies at all. Their only use is to provide sinecures. That is all England at present gets out of her colonies, and Spain too. And as for us Germans, colonies would be exactly like the silks and sables of the Polish nobleman who had no shirt to wear under them.”
CHAPTER XIX
FROM GAMBETTA’S RESIGNATION TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE
Friday, February 10th. Fresh complaints respecting the intrigues of Dalwigk, and especially the measures for depriving the national constituencies in Hesse of their representatives and securing the victory of the Ultramontane and Democratic coalition. The Chief desires me to see that an “immediate and energetic campaign in the press” is organised against these and other mischievous proceedings inspired by Beust’s friends. He also wishes the Moniteur to reprint the long list of French officers who have broken their parole and escaped from Germany.
We were joined at dinner by the Duke of Ratibor and a Herr von Kotze, the husband of the Chief’s niece. Strousberg, a business friend of the Duke’s, was mentioned, and the Chief observed that nearly all, or at least very many of the members of the Provisional Government were Jews: Simon, Cremieux, Magnin, also Picard, whose Semitic origin he would hardly have suspected, and “very probably Gambetta also, from his features.” “For the same reason, I suspect even Favre,” he added.
Saturday, February 11th.—In the morning I read the newspapers, and particularly certain debates in the English Parliament at the end of last month. It really looks as if our good friends across the Channel had a suspicious leaning towards France, and as if they were not at all disinclined to interfere once more—indeed, in certain circumstances, an Anglo-French alliance would appear quite possible. It is a question, however, whether they might not fall between two stools. A very different result might well ensue. From what one hears and reads in the newspapers, the feeling in this country is almost as hostile to the English as to ourselves, and in certain circles more so. It may well happen that if England adopts a threatening attitude towards us, we may surprise our cousins in London with the very reverse of a Franco-English alliance against Germany. We may even be obliged to seriously consider the forcible restoration of Napoleon, which we have not hitherto contemplated. According to a telegram of the 2nd inst., Bernstorff is to see that these ideas are cautiously ventilated in the press.