I have reason to believe that this interview was the beginning of negotiations (which were several times interrupted) between the Chancellor of the Confederation and the Emperors of Austria and Russia, which gradually led to an understanding and finally resulted in the so-called Drei Kaiser Bündniss, or Three Emperors’ Alliance. The object of these “historical and political statements” was to induce Prince Luitpold to write a letter to his brother-in-law, the Archduke Albrecht, submitting certain views to the personal consideration of the Emperor Francis Joseph. This was one of the few ways in which it appeared possible for those considerations to reach the Emperor’s own ear in an ungarbled form. They were as follows: The turn which events have taken in Paris renders it possible to regard the present war between Germany and France as a defence of monarchical conservative principles against the republican and socialistic tenets adopted by the present holders of power in France. The proclamation of the Republic in Paris has been welcomed with warm approval in Spain, and it is to be expected that it will obtain a like reception in Italy. In that circumstance lies the great danger for those European States that are governed on a monarchical system. The best security for the cause of order and civilisation against this solidarity of the revolutionary and republican elements would be a closer union of those countries which, like Germany, Russia, and Austria, still afford a firm support to the monarchical principle. Austria, however, can only be included in such an understanding when it is recognised in that country that the attempts hitherto made in the Cisleithan half of the monarchy to introduce a liberal system are based on a mistaken policy, as are also the national experiments in a Polish direction. The appointment of Klaczko, a Polish literary man, to a position in which he is in close relations with Beust, the Chancellor of the Empire, whose policy and tendency are well known, together with the latest declarations of Klaczko, must be regarded as indications of Beust’s own views and intentions. This co-operation with the Polish revolutionists, together with the hostility to Russia which is manifested thereby, is for the Chancellor of the German Confederation a serious hindrance to good relations with Austria, and must at the same time be regarded as an indication of hostility to ourselves. In connection with the above the position of the Cisleithan half of the dual State must be taken into consideration, and the difficulties which it presents cannot be overcome except by a conservative régime. It is only through the frank adoption of relations of mutual confidence towards united Germany and Russia that Austria can find the support which she requires against revolutionary and centrifugal forces, a support which she has lost through the disastrous policy of Count Beust.
Prince Luitpold’s letter giving expression to these views failed to produce the desired result. It is true the Archduke Albrecht submitted it to the Emperor, but he showed it at the same time to Beust. His answer, which was inspired by Beust, was in the main to the effect that Austria, so long as no special political advantages were offered by us, did not feel any need of support. If Prussia, as it would appear, regarded a rapprochement with Austria as desirable or requisite, nothing had been heard so far as to what she had to offer in return to the dual monarchy, whose interests were complex. The Emperor would gladly consider any suggestions that reached him in a direct way.
The Tsar Alexander was informed of the attempt made in Vienna through the Bavarian Prince, his attention being at the same time called to the notorious understanding which existed between the present Government in Paris and the revolutionary propagandists throughout Europe. The desirability of a close co-operation of the Eastern Powers against this movement was urged upon him on the one hand, while on the other the necessity was pointed out for Germany to avoid, when concluding peace, anything which might look like disregard for the real requirements of the country in the matter of frontier protection and security, and thus give the German revolutionary party an opportunity of poisoning the public mind. The Tsar declared himself in perfect agreement with these views, and expressed a strong desire for the realisation of the proposed union of the monarchical elements against the revolutionary movement.
Subsequently, after the insurrection of the Communists in Paris, the progress of the International, upon which considerable stress was also laid in the Press, was used as a further argument for the combination of the conservative Powers against the republican and socialistic propaganda. This time the representations in question met with more success in Vienna.
Tuesday, September 13th.—In the course of the forenoon I was called in to the Chancellor six times, and wrote as many paragraphs for the press. Amongst them were two for the local French papers, which also received some information from us yesterday. Arrangements were made to secure the insertion of the portrait and biography of General von Blumenthal in the illustrated papers with which we entertain friendly relations, a distinction which he has well deserved. “So far as one can see,” said the Chief, “the papers make no mention of him, although he is chief of the staff to the Crown Prince, and, next after Moltke, deserves most credit for the conduct of the war.
“I should like a grant to be made to him. He won the battles of Weissenburg and Wörth, and afterwards those of Beaumont and Sedan, as the Crown Prince was not always interfering with his plans, as Prince Frederick Charles did in 1866. The latter fancied that he understood a great deal about these matters.”
In the evening the Count sent for me once more. It was merely to show me a telegram, which he handed to me with a smile. It was a message from the Grand Duke of Weimar to the Grand Duchess, couched in the style of the King’s despatches to the Queen, in which the Duke reported, “My army has fought very bravely.” Greatness, like murder, will out. But still there are cases in which imitation had better be avoided.
On the 14th of September, shortly before 10 o’clock, we started for Château Thierry, and reached Meaux on the next day.
Before dinner we heard that a parlementaire has arrived from Paris, a slight dark-haired young gentleman, who is now standing in the courtyard before the Chief’s house. From his language he would appear to be an Englishman. In the evening he has a long conversation with the Chief over a bottle of kirschwasser, and turns out to be Mr. Edward Malet, an attaché of the British Embassy in Paris. As I had to pass through the antechamber I noticed the attendant, Engel, with his ear to the keyhole, curious to know what they were talking about. He had brought a letter from Lord Lyons asking whether the Count would enter into negotiations with Favre as to the conditions of an armistice. The Chancellor is understood to have replied: “As to conditions of peace, yes; but not for an armistice.”[8]
I see from the letters of some Berlin friends that many well-meaning and patriotic persons cannot bring themselves to accept the idea that the conquered territory is not to be annexed to Prussia. According to a communication from Heinrich von Treitschke, of Freiburg, it is feared that Alsace and Lorraine may be handed over to Bavaria, and that a new dual system may thus arise. In a letter to the Chief he says: “It is obvious that Prussia alone is capable of once more Germanising the Teutonic provinces of France.” He refers to a “circumstance to which too little attention is paid in the North—namely, that all sensible men in South Germany desire to see Alsace handed over to Prussia;” and declares that “it is a great mistake if it is thought in the North that the South must be rewarded by an increase of territory and population.” I cannot imagine where Treitschke can have heard such erroneous views. So far as I am aware they are held by none of our people. I fancy it is thought here that the South will be sufficiently rewarded in being at length secured against French lust of conquest. Other ideas of the writer can only be regarded as sound in certain circumstances. Our Chief’s plan, to which I have previously referred, is unquestionably more just and better adapted to the existing situation—namely, to make those provinces the common property of all Germany. By taking that course the conquered territory would not become an object of envy and a cause of dissatisfaction to Prussia’s allies; but, on the contrary, would serve as a bond of union between North and South.