General Reille’s name again brought up the question of Napoleon’s surrender. “The King thought,” said the Chancellor, “on reading Napoleon’s letter, that it meant more for us than it did. ‘He must at least surrender Metz to us,’ said the King to me. I replied, ‘I do not know, your Majesty; we are not aware what power he still has over the troops.’ The Emperor should not have needlessly surrendered himself as a prisoner, but have made peace with us. His generals would have followed him.” The Minister then again related the incident of the letter Weimar wished to write to the Emperor Alexander; and it appeared that the day before yesterday the Chief had, in a moment of irritation, represented the expressions which he had used in speaking to the Grand Duke as stronger than they actually were. According to the present account, Weimar said, in conclusion, that his only object was a patriotic one. He (the Minister) replied he quite believed that, but it would not make the letter any more useful. The letter has probably not been sent off.
The question of the bombardment then came up, and, in connection therewith, the intrigues which are now being carried on by Bishop Dupanloup, and the part he played in the opposition at the Vatican Council. “Women and freemasons,” said the Chief, “are chiefly responsible if our operations against Paris are not conducted as energetically as they should be. Dupanloup has influenced Augusta.... He also wrote me a pile of letters, and took me in to such an extent that I sent them to Twickenham.” (The Chancellor must have meant Chislehurst). “He must be packed off when our people get to Orleans, so that Von der Tann may not be swindled by him.”... “That reminds me,” continued the Chief, “that the Pope has written a very nice letter to the French Bishops, or to several of them, saying that they should not enter into any understanding with the Garibaldians.”
Somebody having expressed anxiety about some matter which I was unable to catch, the Chief observed: “A more important question for me—indeed, the most important—is what will be done at Villa Coublay; that is the main point. The Crown Prince said recently, when I mentioned the matter to him, ‘I am ready to give up the command for that purpose.’ I felt like replying, ‘And I am prepared to assume it.’ Give me the post of Commander-in-Chief for twenty-four hours, and I will take it upon myself. I would then give one command only: ‘Commence the bombardment.’”
Villa Coublay is a place not far from Versailles, where the siege park has been collected and still remains, instead of being placed in position. Bucher tells me that the Chancellor has appealed directly to the King to hasten the bombardment. The Chief continued: “The assertion of the generals that they have not enough ammunition is untrue. They do not want to begin because the Heir Apparent does not wish it. He does not wish it because his wife and his mother-in-law are against it.
“They have brought together three hundred cannon and fifty or sixty mortars, and five hundred rounds of ammunition for each gun. That is certainly enough. I have been speaking to artillerymen, who said that they had not used half as much ammunition at Strassburg as they have collected here; and Strassburg was a Gibraltar compared to Paris. It would be easy to fire the barracks on Mont Valérien, and if the forts of Issy and Vanvres were properly shelled so that the garrisons should be compelled to bolt, the enceinte (of course we know it) would be of little importance. The ditch is not broader than the length of this room. I am convinced that if we poured shells into the city itself for five or six days, and they found out that our guns reached farther than theirs—that is to say, 9,000 yards—Paris would give in. True enough the wealthier quarters are on this side of the city, and it is a matter of indifference to the people at Belleville whether we blow them to pieces or not; indeed, they are pleased when we destroy the houses of the richer classes. As a matter of fact, we ought to have attacked Paris from another direction; or still better, left it altogether alone, and continued our forward march. Now, however, that we have begun, we must set about the affair in earnest. Starving them out may last a long time, perhaps till the spring. At any rate, they have flour enough up to January.... If we had begun the bombardment at the right time, there would have been no question of the Loire army. After the engagement at Orleans, where Von der Tann was obliged to retire, the military authorities (not I) regarded our position in Versailles as critical. Had we begun the bombardment four weeks ago, we should now in all probability be in Paris, and that is the main point. As it is, however, the Parisians imagine that we are forbidden to fire by London, St. Petersburg, and Vienna; while, on the other hand, the neutral Powers believe that we are not able to do so. The true reason, however, will be known at a future time. One of its consequences will be to lead to a restriction of personal rule.”
In the evening I telegraphed to London that the Reichstag had voted another hundred million thalers for the continuation of the war with France, eight social democrats alone opposing the grant. Also that Manteuffel has occupied Amiens. Several paragraphs were afterwards written for the Norddeutsche, including one (on the directions of the Chief) in which the moderate demands of the Chancellor in the negotiations with Bavaria were defended as being not only right and fair, but also wise and prudent. I said that the object was not so much to secure this or that desirable concession from the authorities at Munich as to make the South German States feel satisfied in forming part of the new organisation of united Germany. Any pressure or coercion for the purpose of obtaining further concessions would, in view of the circumstance that they had fulfilled their patriotic duty, be an act of ingratitude; while, in addition, it would have been, above all things, impolitic to show ourselves more exacting in our demands upon our allies. The discontent which would have resulted from such an exercise of force would have far outweighed half a dozen more favourable clauses in the Treaty. That discontent would soon have shown the neutral Powers, such as Austria, where to insert the thin edge of the wedge in order to loosen and ultimately destroy the unity which had been achieved.
At dinner I suggested to Bucher that it might be well to ask the Chief’s leave to hint in the press at the real cause of the postponement of the bombardment. He agreed with me that it would, and added: “I myself have already vehemently attacked Augusta in the newspapers.” On the Chancellor sending for me in the evening, I said: “May I venture to ask your Excellency a question? Would you have any objection if I made a communication, in an indirect way, to non-official organs respecting the causes of the postponement of the bombardment, in the sense in which they have repeatedly been discussed at table?” He reflected for a moment, and then said, “Do as you like.” I accordingly wrote two paragraphs—one for the Vossische Zeitung, and one for the Weser Zeitung, which I had copied out by another hand in Berlin, and forwarded to their destination.
One of these paragraphs ran as follows:—
“Versailles, November 29th. It has been asserted here for some considerable time past that the real cause of the postponement of the bombardment is not so much a scarcity of ammunition for the siege guns that were brought here weeks ago, nor the strength of the forts and ramparts of Paris; in short, that the delay is not due to military considerations, but rather to the influence of very highly placed ladies, and—can it be credited?—of freemasons. I can assure you, on very good authority, that these rumours are not unfounded. I have no reason to apprehend a denial when I add that the interference of one of these ladies has been prompted by a well-known French prelate, who took a prominent part in the opposition at the Vatican Council. For the moment we would only ask a few questions: Is it true humanity to let masses of gallant soldiers fall a prey to the hardships of the investment by postponing an artillery attack merely in order to save a hostile city from damage? Is it good policy to let the impression produced by Sedan upon the neutral Powers be frittered away by such a postponement? Is that true freemasonry which troubles itself with political questions? It was thought hitherto that politics were not permitted to enter into the German lodges.”
Tuesday, November 29th.—In the afternoon I sent off another article on the Treaty with Bavaria, which is to be reproduced and circulated in Berlin. It is becoming more and more difficult to satisfy the people there.