Lieutenant-General von Hartrott joined us at dinner. The distribution of the Iron Cross having been mentioned, the Chief observed: “The army doctors should receive the black and white ribbon. They are under fire, and it requires much more courage and determination to quietly allow one’s self to be shot at than to rush forward to the attack.... Blumenthal said to me that properly speaking he could do nothing to deserve the Cross, as he was bound in duty to keep out of danger of being shot. For that reason when in battle he always sought a position from which he could see well but could not be easily hit. And he was perfectly right. A general who exposes himself unnecessarily ought to be put under arrest.”
The Chancellor then remarked suddenly: “The King told me an untruth to-day. I asked him if the bombardment was not to commence, and he replied that he had ordered it. But I knew immediately that that was not true. I know him. He cannot lie, or at least not in such a way that it cannot be detected. He at once changes colour, and it was particularly noticeable when he replied to my question to-day. When I looked at him straight into his eyes he could not stand it.” The conversation then turned upon the conduct of the war. The Minister said: “Humility alone leads to victory; pride and self-conceit to an opposite result.”
The Chancellor, speaking of his friend Dietze, talked of his natural inborn heartiness—politesse du cœur. Abeken asked if that term was originally French, as Goethe uses it—Höflichkeit des Herzens? “It must come from the German, I fancy.” “It certainly does,” replied the Chief. “It is only to be found amongst the Germans. I should call it the politeness of good will—good nature in the best sense of the word, the politeness of helpful benevolent feeling. You find that amongst our common soldiers, although, of course, it is sometimes expressed rather crudely. The French have not got it. They only know the politeness of hatred and envy. It would be easier to find something of the kind amongst the English,” he added; and then went on to praise Odo Russell, whose pleasant, natural manner he greatly appreciated. “At first one thing aroused a little suspicion against him in my mind. I have always heard and found that Englishmen who know French well are not worth much, and he speaks quite excellent French. But he can also express himself very well in German.”
At dessert the Minister said: “I recognise that I eat too much, or, more correctly, too much at a time. It is a pity that I cannot get rid of the absurd practice of only eating once a day. Formerly it was still worse. In the morning I drank my tea and ate nothing until 5 o’clock in the evening, while I smoked incessantly. That did me a great deal of harm. Now, on the advice of my doctor, I take at least two eggs in the morning and smoke little. But I should eat oftener; yet if I take anything late I cannot sleep, as I only digest while awake. This morning, however, I got up early. I was waked by the firing just at the time when I sleep best, that is between 7 and 9 o’clock, and as it seemed to be near I sent to inquire if the King was going to the scene of the engagement. Otherwise he might start suddenly and go nobody knows where, or where nothing is to be seen.”
While at tea the conversation turned once more on the now constant theme of the postponement of the bombardment, and afterwards on the Geneva Convention, which the Minister said must be denounced, as it was impossible to conduct war in that manner.
“The principal reason why the bombardment is delayed,” said the Chancellor, “is the sentimentality of the Queen of England, and the interference of Queen Augusta.... That seems to be a characteristic of the Hohenzollerns—their women folk have always a great influence upon them. It was not so with Frederick the Great, but with his successor and the late King, as well as the present Most Gracious and his future Majesty. The most curious example is that of Prince Charles, who is anything but a good husband, and yet depends upon his wife, indeed he is thoroughly afraid of her and is guided by her wishes.... But it is somewhat different with these two (the King and the Crown Prince). They want to be praised. They like to have it said in the English and French press that they are considerate and generous. They find that the Germans praise them enough as it is.”
It appears that Delbrück has not expressed himself very clearly in his telegram respecting the prospect of the agreement with Bavaria being sanctioned by the Diet. It seems as if there were not sufficient members present to form the necessary quorum, and that it would be opposed both by the Progressists and National Liberals. The Chief observed: “So far as the Progressists are concerned, their conduct is consistent. They wish to return to the state of affairs which prevailed in 1849. But the National Liberals? If they will not have now what they were striving for with all their might at the beginning of the year, in February, and what it now depends upon them to secure, then we must dissolve. The new elections will weaken the Progressist party still more, and some of the National Liberals will also lose their seats. But in that case the Treaties would not be completed. Bavaria would reconsider the matter; Beust would put his finger in the pie, and we do not know what the result would be. I cannot well go to Berlin. It is a very uncomfortable journey and takes up a lot of time, and besides I am really wanted here.”
Proceeding from this point the Minister spoke of the position of affairs in 1848. “At that period the situation was for a long time very favourable for the unification of Germany under Prussia. The smaller Sovereigns were for the most part powerless and despondent. If they could only save their money, their domains and their appropriations they were prepared to consent to everything. The Austrians were engaged with Hungary and Italy. The Tsar Nicholas would not have intervened at that time. If they had only acted in a resolute way previous to May, 1849, and come to terms with the smaller States they would doubtless have carried the South with them, particularly if the Würtemberg and Bavarian armies joined the Baden revolution, which was not impossible at that stage. Time was lost, however, through hesitation and half measures, and so the opportunity was thrown away.”
About 11 o’clock another telegram arrived from Verdy respecting this morning’s sortie which was directed against La Haye. Five hundred red breeches were made prisoners. The Chief bitterly regretted that further prisoners should be taken, and that it was not possible to shoot them down on the spot. “We have more than enough of them, while the Parisians have the advantage of getting rid of so many mouths to feed, which must now be supplied by us, and for whom we can hardly find room.”
Wednesday, November 30th.—Wrote fully to Treitschke, giving him the reasons why the demands which he and those of his way of thinking consider absolutely necessary had not been made upon the Bavarians. Arranged to have a similar communication made to Schmidt.