Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 - Morris J. MacGregor

Table 21—Percentage Distribution of Navy Enlisted Personnel by Race, AFQT Groups and Occupational Areas, and Length of Service, 1962

AFQT Group and Occupational Area[1]	0-12 Years		12 Years & Over
AFQT Group and Occupational Area[1]	White	Negro	White	Negro

Groups I and II
Electronics	35.7	29.5	25.6	21.1
Other technical	11.4	25.9	10.4	10.5
Admin. & clerical	8.5	10.9	14.6	14.0
Mechanics & repairmen	37.5	26.1	33.1	22.5
Crafts	6.4	5.4	12.9	10.3
Services	.6	2.2	3.5	21.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Group III
Electronics	10.3	9.1	8.8	4.2
Other technical	7.1	12.3	6.2	3.0
Admin. & clerical	9.7	12.9	12.4	8.2
Mechanics & repairmen	56.7	42.2	36.7	16.5
Crafts	13.2	11.1	25.2	16.9
Services	3.0	12.4	10.8	51.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Group IV
Electronics	5.3	1.4	2.9	.5
Other technical	3.7	1.7	2.9	.4
Admin. & clerical	6.9	8.1	7.0	2.5
Mechanics & repairmen	60.8	44.2	35.8	7.3
Crafts	16.4	13.5	32.5	9.5
Services	6.9	31.1	19.4	79.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Tablenote 1: Excludes personnel not classified by occupation, such as recruits and general duty seamen.

Reporting on promotions, the Defense Department group found that the relatively limited advancement of black officers was caused chiefly by their disadvantage in point of time in service and grade, branch of service, and educational background (Table 22). Although the difference in grade distribution among black and white enlisted men was much smaller, it too seemed related to disadvantages in education and service occupation. Again, for Negroes entering the services since 1950, the grade distribution had become similar to that of whites. The Navy's experience illustrated this point. In the case of those entering the Navy since the Korean War, the grade distribution of whites and nonwhites within the first three mental categories was nearly identical (Table 23). The divergences were much wider among the more senior men in the service groups, but this was probably due at least in part to the concentration of senior black servicemen in relatively overmanned specialties, such as food service, where promotional opportunities were limited. With this exception little evidence exists that whites enjoyed an advantage over blacks in the matter of promotions in the enlisted ranks.

Table 22—Percentage Distribution of Blacks and Whites by Pay Grade, All DOD, 1962

Grade	Black	White
Officers
O-1 to O-2	35.9	34.5
O-3	47.7	30.2
O-4	12.1	18.0
O-5	4.0	12.0
O-6 to O-10	.3	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0
Enlisted Men
E-1 to E-3	45.5	46.9
E-4	23.1	19.6
E-5	20.1	16.1
E-6	8.2	10.0
E-7 to E-9	3.0	7.5
Total	100.0	100.0

Table 23—Percentage Distribution of Navy Enlisted Personnel by Race, AFQT Groups, Pay Grade, and Length of Service, 1962

Pay grade	0-12 Years		Over 12 Years
Pay grade	White	Negro	White	Negro
	AFQT Groups I & II
E-1 to E-3	50.0	50.4	0.1	0.5
E-4	22.5	21.8	1.0	5.3
E-5	17.8	18.6	6.6	16.8
E-6	8.3	8.5	30.8	33.9
E-7 to E-9	1.4	.7	61.5	43.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	AFQT Group III
E-1 to E-3	60.6	60.5	0.5	3.5
E-4	20.7	20.4	4.4	14.7
E-5	13.1	14.2	19.3	28.8
E-6	5.1	4.6	40.1	33.7
E-7 to E-9	.5	.3	35.7	19.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	AFQT Group IV
E-1 to E-3	77.1	61.2	2.2	12.2
E-4	13.0	23.3	14.9	32.6
E-5	7.9	13.0	34.0	29.9
E-6	1.9	2.4	32.4	19.3
E-7 to E-9	.1	[a]	16.5	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Tablenote a: Less than .05 percent.

All these figures could be conjured up when the services had to answer complaints of discrimination, but more often than not the services contented themselves with a vague defense of the status quo[20-82] Such answers were clearly unacceptable to civil rights leaders and their allies in the administration, and it is not surprising that the complaints persisted. To the argument that higher enlistment standards were a matter of military economy during a period of partial mobilizations, those concerned about civil rights responded that, since marginal manpower was a necessary ingredient of full mobilization, the services should learn to deal in peacetime with what would be a wartime problem.[20-83] To pleas of helplessness against off-base discrimination, the activists argued that these practices had demonstrably adverse effects on the morale of more than 9 percent of the armed forces and were, therefore, a clear threat to the accomplishment of the services' military mission.[20-84]