The conclusion, then, seems compulsory that the subconscious processes in many conditions, particularly those that are artificially induced and those that are pathological, are coconscious processes.
There are other phenomena, however, which require the postulation of a subconscious process, yet which, when the subconscious is searched by the same methods made use of in hysterical phenomena, do not reveal explicit evidence of coconsciousness. An analysis of the subconscious revelations as well as the phenomena themselves seems to favor the interpretation that in some cases the underlying process is in part and in others wholly unconscious. The only ground for the interpretation that all subconscious processes are wholly conscious is the assumption that, as some are conscious, all must be. This is as unsound as the assumption that, because at the other end of the scale some complex actions (e. g., those performed by decerebrated animals) are intelligent and yet performed by processes necessarily unconscious, therefore all actions not under the guidance of the personal consciousness are performed by unconscious processes.
If some subconscious processes are unconscious they are equivalent to physiological processes such as, ex hypothesi, are correlated with all conscious processes and perhaps may be identified with them. In truth, they mean nothing more nor less than “unconscious cerebration.”
We can say at once that considering the complexity and multiformity of psycho-physiological phenomena there would seem to be no a priori reason why all subconscious phenomena must be the same in respect to being either coconscious or unconscious; some may be the one and some the other. It is plainly a matter of interpretation of the facts and there still exists some difference of opinion. The problem is a very difficult one to settle by methods at present available; yet it can only be settled by the same methods, in principle, that we depend upon to determine the reality of a personal consciousness in other persons than ourselves. No amount of a priori argument will suffice. Perhaps some day a criterion of a conscious state of which the individual is unaware will be found, just as the psycho-galvanic phenomenon is possibly a criterion of an effective state. Any conclusions which we reach at present should be regarded as provisional.[[79]]
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE SUBCONSCIOUS
As one of our foremost psychologists has said, the subconscious is not only the most important problem of psychology, it is the problem. But of course it involves many problems of practical and theoretical interest. Among them are:
First of all the evidential justification of the postulation of subconscious processes in general.
Second; the intrinsic nature of such processes. In other words and more specifically, whether the neurograms of experiences after becoming active subconscious processes continue to be devoid of consciousness, nothing but a brain process,—i.e., unconscious; or whether in becoming activated they become conscious (monism), or acquire conscious equivalents (parallelism), notwithstanding they are outside (dissociated from) the content of the personal consciousness.
Third; the kind and complexity of functions a subconscious process can perform. Can it perform the same functions as are ordinarily performed by conscious intelligence (as we commonly understand that term); that is to say memory, perception, reasoning, imagination, volition, affectivity, etc.? If so, to what extent?
Fourth; are the processes of the conscious mind only a part of a larger mechanism of which a submerged part is a subconscious process?