Fifth; to what extent can and do subconscious processes determine the processes of the conscious mind and bodily behavior in normal and abnormal conditions?
These are some of the problems of the subconscious which for the most part have been only incompletely investigated.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of these introductory lectures to discuss with any completeness the evidence at hand bearing upon these problems or to even touch upon many of the points involved. We may, however, study more deeply than we have done some of the phenomena with which we have become familiar with a view to seeing what light they throw upon some of these problems, particularly the first three.
1, 2, and 3; Actuality, Intrinsic Nature and Intelligence of Subconscious Processes.—As to the first question, whether subconscious processes can be established in principle as a sound induction from experimental and clinical facts and not merely as a hypothetical concept, I have already pointed out that many manifestations of conservation already cited in the exposition of the theory of memory are of equal evidential value for the actuality of such processes. Let us now consider them in more detail from the point of view, more particularly, of the second and third questions—the intrinsic nature (whether coconscious or unconscious) and intelligence of the underlying processes at work. In any given case however the actuality of the subconscious process must always be first demonstrated.
If we leave aside those conditions (hysteria, coconscious personalities) wherein specific memory of a coconscious process can be recovered, or such a process can be directly communicated with (automatic writing and speech), the conditions required for the valid postulation of a subconscious process underlying any given phenomenon are: first, that the causal factor shall be positively known; second, that it shall be an antecedent experience; and, third, that it shall not be in the content of consciousness at the moment of the occurrence of the phenomenon. If the causal factor and the phenomenon are both known, then the only unknown factor to be determined is the process, if any, intervening between the two. If this is not in consciousness, a subconscious process must be postulated.
Obviously, if the known causal factor is immediately related to the caused phenomenon, the subconscious process must be the causal factor itself. But if the known causal factor is not immediately related to the caused phenomenon, there must be an intervening process which must be subconscious, perhaps consisting of a succession of processes eventuating in the final phenomenon. For instance, if the causal factor is a hypnotic suggestion (for which there is afterwards amnesia) that the subject when awake shall automatically raise the right arm, a subconscious process which is the memory of that suggestion immediately provokes the automatic phenomenon. If, however, the suggestion is that of a series of automatic actions involving complicated behavior, or if it is a mathematical calculation, the intervening process which provokes the end result must not only be subconscious but must be a more or less complicated succession of processes.
When, on the other hand, the causal factor is not known but only inferred with greater or less probability, the justification of the postulation of a subconscious process may be invalidated by the uncertainty of the inference. If for example a person raises his right hand or has a number come into his head without obvious cause, any inferred antecedent experience as the causal factor must be open to more or less doubt, and, therefore, a subconscious process cannot be postulated with certainty. This uncertainty seriously affects the validity of conclusions drawn from clinical phenomena where the antecedent experience as well as a subconscious process must be inferred and perhaps even a matter of guesswork.
Let us examine then, a few selected phenomena where the causal factor in the process is a known antecedent conscious experience, one which can be logically related to the succeeding phenomenon only by the postulation of an intervening process of some kind. By an analysis of the antecedent experience and the caused phenomenon into their constituent elements we shall often be able to infer the functional characteristics of this intervening process. Then, if the subject is a favorable one, by the use of hypnotic and other methods we may be able to obtain an insight into the intrinsic nature of the subconscious process and determine how far it is conscious and how far unconscious. Necessarily the most available phenomena are those experimentally induced. We can arrange beforehand the causal experience and the phenomenon which it is to determine—an hallucination, a motor automatism, a dream, a conscious process of thought, or the product of an intellectual operation. The number of observations we shall examine might be made much larger and the types more varied. Those I have selected have such close analogies with certain experiences of everyday and pathological life that what is found to be true of them will afford valuable fundamentals in the elucidation of these latter experiences.[[80]]
Subconscious processes in which the causal factor was antecedently known.—I. The evidential value of post-hypnotic phenomena ranks perhaps in the first place for our purpose as the conditions under which they occur are largely under control. Among these showing subconscious processes of a high order of intelligence are:
(a) The well-known subconscious mathematical calculations which I cited in a previous lecture (p. 96). There is no possible explanation of this phenomenon except that the calculation was a subconscious process and done either coconsciously or unconsciously. That it may be done, in some cases, by coconscious processes of which the subject is unaware is substantiated by the evidence.[[81]] In other cases this does not appear to be wholly the case if we can rely upon hypnotic memories. We will examine this process in connection with: