[44] Of all the jettisoned loads, those containing water were the most spectacular. On one occasion, a CH-46 carrying plastic containers of water was forced to release the net about 200 feet above the ground. The containers broke open in midair and the contents cascaded on the hill below. The Company E, 2/26, commander, Captain Breeding, later recalled that it produced one of the prettiest waterfalls he'd ever seen.
[45] It is no exaggeration to say that MAG-36 helicopters played a decisive role in the battle. The maintenance of the hill outposts was imperative if Khe Sanh was to be held, and these units depended on the helicopters for survival.
[46] During one period of extremely bad weather, the platoon from A/1/26 which held positions on Hill 950 went without resupply for nine days and the water shortage became a major problem. Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson authorized the platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Maxie R. Williams, to send a squad out to a small stream which was about two hours march from the perimeter. In addition to finding water, the Marines surprised a group of North Vietnamese and killed nine of the enemy. One Marine was also killed.
[47] Bad weather occasionally precluded the immediate evacuation of casualties from the hill outposts.
PART VI SUPPORTING ARMS AND INTELLIGENCE
The amount of air and artillery support that the 26th Marines received during the defense of Khe Sanh was enormous. Few regiments ever had such an overwhelming amount of firepower at their disposal. The reason was that General Westmoreland gave SCOTLAND priority over all other operations in Vietnam. The well-publicized struggle had long since become more than just another battle; it was a symbol of Allied determination to hold the line in Vietnam. The stubborn resistance of the 26th Marines had generated an emotional impact that was felt not only in the United States but around the globe. Thanks to a small army of war correspondents and reporters, millions of people followed the battle day by day and, in essence, the military prowess of the United States was exposed to the world.
The agency at the combat base which was responsible for coordinating the vast array of supporting arms was the 26th Marines FSCC which was headed by the 1/13 commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hennelly. The FSCC, with its artillery and air representatives, was an integral part of the regimental staff and it planned and supervised the execution of all fire missions within the SCOTLAND area of operations. Subordinate to the FSCC, was the 1/13 Fire Direction Center (FDC), headed by Captain Lawrence B. Salmon, and the Khe Sanh Direct Air Support Center (DASC), under Major Charles D. Goddard. The FDC served as the brain of the artillery battalion where initial fire requests were received and transformed into numerical data for the gun crews. To speed up the process, Captain Salmon relied heavily on the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer or FADAC. The DASC had displaced to the KSCB on 19 January with the sole mission of handling the deluge of incoming aircraft. Requests for air support from the FSCC were channeled through the DASC to the Tactical Air Direction Center of the 1st MAW. Whenever the wing could not completely fill a quota, liaison teams within the DASC called on the other services for assistance. Once the schedule was met and the strike aircraft arrived on station, the Marine DASC, aided by an Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) from Seventh Air Force, coordinated all air operations within the Khe Sanh TAOR.[48] [(137)]