The attack, which the troops referred to as their "Easter Egg Hunt," was preceded by a deluge of supporting fire. Colonel Meyers, who flew to 881S by helicopter, observed the attack and personally ensured that sufficient supporting arms were employed. In addition to the artillery of 1/13 at Khe Sanh and the 175mm bases, 155mm and 8-inch batteries of the 1st ACD at LZ Stud were called on to help cave in the enemy bunkers. Strike aircraft worked over the hill with bombs, rockets, and napalm. The Marines who remained on 881S also provided heavy support. Besides the 60mm and 81mm mortars, these men had pooled all eight of the battalion's 106 recoilless rifles, the two remaining 105mm howitzers, and six .50 caliber machine guns which had been salvaged from downed helicopters or stripped off of trucks at the base. As the assault troops advanced, the weapons on 881S provided direct overhead fire which sometimes preceded the front ranks by no more than 50 meters. As usual, the recoilless rifles were extremely effective. One observer later remarked that when the lead elements approached a treeline, no chances were taken; the 106 gunners fired a broadside and the treeline was simply blown away.[(216)]
Because of the weight and speed of the attack, the enemy was never able to recover. Moving behind a wall of steel, the battalion clawed its way through the defenses between the two hills and prepared for the final push. Major Caulfield, who had worried about the Marines' weakened condition the night before, soon found the opposite was true--he was having trouble holding them back. At one point, a group of NVA soldiers who had been hammered senseless by the prep fires, broke from their positions and fled into the open. An airborne spotter directed the companies to hold up while he called in air and artillery. Scanning the front lines, Major Caulfield noticed that a handful of Marines with fixed bayonets were in hot pursuit of the enemy. The major contacted the company commander by radio and told him to collar his troops. The reply was, "Sir, I can't stop them...." Neither could the enemy.[(217)]
The men of 3/26 stormed the hill, swarmed over the crest, and killed anyone who stood in their way. At 1428, the objective was secured and the men signaled their victory in traditional Marine Corps fashion, as Colonel Meyers later described:
On Sunday, 14 April (Easter), I helicoptered to 881S and with Captain Bill Dabney, Company Commander of I/3/26, personally watched the U. S. Colors (which had been fortuitously carried in a squad leader's pack) hoisted again over 881N. This was the signal (visual) that Lieutenant Colonel John Studt's assault had been completed. I watched the jungle utility-clad Marine "shinny-up" a shrapnel torn tree whose limbs had been sheared from the intensive prep fires, and affix the Stars and Stripes.[(218)]
With the enemy either dead or gone, the hill again lost its value. Terrain wasn't so important in the fluid Vietnam war, but people were and, in that respect, Lieutenant Colonel Studt's men had completed a very successful operation--106 North Vietnamese were dead. In addition to the enemy dead on the objective, air strikes and artillery fire had completely blanketed three large groups of NVA fleeing from the hill but because of the dense vegetation and the approaching darkness, no bodies were recovered. Two slightly shot-up North Vietnamese, one of them an officer, were captured and flown back to Khe Sanh in Colonel Meyers' helicopter. Considering the strength of the enemy defenses, Marine casualties were surprisingly light--6 killed and 19 medevaced. Lieutenant Colonel Studt stated: "... stand off plastering with supporting arms ... prior to each assault was the key factor here."[(219)]
That night the battalion commander and his operations officer stood at the gate on 881S and slapped the men on the back as they trooped back into the perimeter. One Marine, a tall, lanky, slow-talking Kentuckian, held out a captured rifle for Lieutenant Colonel Studt's inspection--it was filthy. During the attack, the Marine had come face to face with the owner; both men raised their rifles simultaneously and pulled the trigger but only the M-16 barked out--the enemy's rifle jammed. The survivor's explanation was simply, "I cleaned my weapon last night, he didn't."[(220)]
The next morning at 0800, PCV terminated PEGASUS. The operation was very successful and all objectives were achieved; Route 9 was open, the enemy had been routed, and the base itself was relieved. The North Vietnamese had lost another 1,304 killed and 21 captured, while 41 U. S. Army troops, 51 Marines, and 33 South Vietnamese died. Air support again had played an important role. There were 45 B-52 Arc Light strikes and 1,625 tactical sorties conducted during PEGASUS. Of the latter number, 650 sorties were flown by Marines, 463 by the U. S. Air Force, 436 by carrier-based Task Force 77, and 77 by the U. S. Army and VNAF. From 31 March to 8 April, U. S. Air Force C-130 and C-123 aircraft delivered 843 tons of supplies to Khe Sanh by paradrop and the low altitude extraction system. On 9 April, the strip was reopened to C-130s and the supply level at the KSCB began to grow large enough so that the 1st ACD could draw from the 26th Marines stockpile.[(221)]
With the termination of PEGASUS, the 3d Marine Division again assumed responsibility of the Khe Sanh area. Task Force GLICK, comprised of the 26th Marines, the 1st Marines, and the 2d Brigade(-), 1st ACD, launched Operation SCOTLAND II at 0801, 15 April. The 26th Marines, however, did not remain in the operation very long. Three days later, the new commanding officer and two of his battalions were transferred to Quang Tri Base and, for the men who had taken 77 days of the best the NVA could offer, the defense of Khe Sanh was over.[74][(222)]
FOOTNOTES:
[70] It was around this time that PCV was formed and General Abrams departed I Corps. General Rosson then became a key figure in the planning of the operation.