Annals of the Turkish Empire, from 1591 to 1659

by Mustafa Naima

Immediately after these things, the khán of the Tátárs, and the serdár of the Moslems, and other great men in the army formed themselves into a council of war, and took into consideration whether they should proceed onwards and desolate the country, or stop where they then were and endeavor to vanquish the fortress of Warad. The whole council were unanimous in thinking the latter plan the most advisable. So important and so strong a place, and so very near the frontiers of the Ottoman dominions, and which at once formed a key to Germany and Transylvania, they unanimously considered ought not to be allowed to remain in the hands of the enemy, and they therefore determined at once on reducing it.

On the first of Rabia II., therefore, the army entered the suburbs, the houses of which were well-built and handsome, and instead of preparing themselves trenches, took possession of them. With the three pieces of ordnance which they had brought along with them, they began battering the fortress; but they found, when it was too late to rectify their mistake, they had commenced a work far beyond their strength, and one which they had not maturely considered. They discovered their rashness, but not in sufficient time to correct their mistake. The object of the expedition into the country, at the commencement of their operations, was to lay it waste, and therefore they did not encumber themselves with many cannon, that they might the more conveniently traverse the territories of Transylvania, and thoroughly chastise the inhabitants. They had no more cannon, therefore, than the three now mentioned: neither were they provided with any apparatus for carrying on a siege. This want they now began to feel when it could not be easily and speedily remedied; and to subdue a place of such great strength as Warad possessed, would require, they saw, an immense length of time. The serdár was most sensibly touched when he discovered his error, and was seriously affected by the mistake he had committed. He now began, though too late, to reflect, that this same fortress, in former days, had withstood, for the space of forty-five days, the utmost efforts of one of the earlier kings, without being vanquished. Seeing he had no chance of succeeding without a sufficient number of cannon, he wrote to Súfí Sinán Páshá, beglerbeg of Agria, to join his camp, and to forward without delay ten pieces of ordnance and other apparatus from the fortress of Agria. In consequence of remissness or fraud, however, this order was not complied with; or if complied with, was too late to be of any use to the besiegers. All the powder and ball which could be found in Gula and in the palankas round about, were expended without making any impression on Warad. Two mines were also sprung, but with no better effect.

The Tátárs, at this time, requested permission to range the country, and commit what devastation they could, but the serdár refused to give his consent; saying, he hoped to God they would yet take Warad, and they would afterwards proceed together. It happened also, in the mysterious providence of God, that for the space of forty days it rained successively, and the rain which thus fell ran in torrents through the plains and valleys. The ground everywhere round Warad became soft, and in several places marshes were formed. The ditches which the Janissaries had prepared were all filled with water and clay, and the Janissaries themselves were forced to retire to their tents. The whole of the army in these adverse circumstances became completely discouraged, particularly the officers. The stream which issued from the city swelled to such a degree as to become unpassable. In fact, it was at last impracticable to go from one tent to another. The winds also rose so awfully high as to tear away the very poles of the tents out of the ground, and the cattle sunk to their bellies in the mud. The troops also were for several days without meat, but this want was supplied by a great number of sheep which had been driven to the plains of Warad. The most of these sheep were sent thither by the peasants of Solnuk, and nearly filled the whole country round Warad. The cursed prince of Transylvania, they were also informed, had secured himself in inaccessible mountains.

The Moslem army were thus exposed to all the inclemency of the weather, and to every possible hardship, and distressed and annoyed by the water which ran in torrents through their camp. In short, all this accumulation of adverse circumstances completely overcame the spirit of the Moslem troops: they became totally heartless, and could do nothing. In the midst of all these indescribable distresses they were informed by messengers from Buda that no fewer than 80,000 of the enemy had attacked and destroyed Old Buda, and that at that very moment their large cannon were employed in battering Buda itself. They added, that if immediate aid were not afforded, Buda could not fail to fall into the enemy’s hands. They had heard at an earlier period of the same day on which this news was brought them, that a heavy body of the enemy had passed through Yanuk and Wáj, and had gone to Old Buda. The persons who brought the above intelligence maintained it was of no use to send one or two thousand men; it was absolutely necessary, they said, that the serdár should go in person with his whole army.

These sad and unwelcome messengers astonished and confounded the afflicted serdár and his suffering army by the intelligence they brought him. But his misfortunes were only increasing. The very adverse circumstances in which the Moslem army were placed, and the advance of the enemy against Buda, afforded a favourable opportunity to the treacherous Michael, of cursed memory, to cross the Danube, to attack the vezír Háfiz in Nicopolis, causing him to seek his safety in flight; and to commit the most dreadful depredations. This information became no sooner public, and its truth confirmed, than it increased, of course, the embarrassments of Satúrjí Mohammed Páshá, the commander-in-chief. But they had still to increase: Tata, Besperim, and Papa also fell into the hands of the hateful infidel enemy. These things were more than sufficient to confound all judgment. They were awful, terrible, and afflictive beyond expression: nevertheless, the serdár still bore up under all the misfortunes of the campaign. He determined, notwithstanding his perilous condition, to afford what aid he could to the quarter above mentioned. Yet in a council afterwards held, and in which the khán and the other magnates of the army were consulted, the difficulty of sending foot soldiers became quite apparent. Not only the distance but the difficulty which such troops would have to encounter in crossing rivers like seas, the Danube, and the Tise (Tibiscus), was clearly discerned to be beyond the power of any but horsemen to accomplish. It was therefore agreed that a party of some thousands of the Tátár rangers should be despatched without any further delay as far as Pest, where they were to spread a report that the khán and the serdár would soon appear with their respective troops, and afford them effectual aid. This measure, it was conjectured, would have the effect of strengthening such as had not fallen into the hands of their enemy, and of discouraging, if possible, the latter. The Tátár detachment proceeded.

In the meantime, the commander-in-chief was still looking in vain for the arrival of the cannon from Agria. But, alas! he was disappointed. Súfí Sinán Páshá arrived in the camp empty-handed. On being interrogated why he did not send the ten pieces of cannon as commanded, he returned for answer the senseless excuse, that no buffaloes could be had to transport them. It can easily be imagined what was the grief and affliction of the Moslem army, but it cannot be described. The whole of the provisions which they had been able to find in the vicinity of Warad was consumed, and the Tátárs were obliged to bring from a great distance to the camp what flour or grain they were able to find. A keil (measure) of barley was sold from three to five pieces of gold.

The serdár, it must be acknowledged, was the cause of the long delay of the Moslem army before Warad, and of course, at least in some degree, of the evils to which they had been subjected. We have already observed how he refused to allow the Tátárs to go on a predatory excursion through the country, saying he hoped God would give him the victory in a day or two. He was miserably mistaken in his hopes, and accomplished nothing; at least nothing good, as we have seen. The weather now became so very cold that the men could keep neither hands nor feet warm. Perceiving, therefore, that Warad was not to be subdued by the means which he possessed, and as he had caused it to be reported about Pest that he had raised the siege and had gone to Solnuk with the view of succouring Buda, the serdár began to retreat. In consequence, however, of the rivulets every where having swollen into rivers from the late rains, the páshá of Temiswar, Ismael Páshá, was instructed to advance and erect bridges for the army; but he did not erect even one; the army had therefore, in consequence of this neglect, to do the best they could. They crossed no fewer than twelve rivers, three of which, however, had bridges over them, of the above description, by means of rafts, and underwent immense difficulty and danger at every one which they crossed. Numberless poor animals perished in these waters, and the troops suffered most severely from the cold. The flour which they carried along with them was spoiled and caused disease among the men, and they were therefore obliged to throw it away. Their three pieces of ordnance they succeeded in getting across these rivers by means of strong ropes, and Khoja Murád Páshá, who was beglerbeg of Diárbeker, Mohammed Páshá, beglerbeg of Haleb, and Súfí Sinán Páshá, in order to encourage the troops, put their own necks into yokes, and helped to drag them onwards. The distance between Warad and Gula was about three days’ journey, but required twelve days on this occasion to accomplish it, during the whole of which time they suffered a thousand difficulties. Hundreds of men were left on the road by reason of the cold or hunger, or sunk into the mud.

The army was met by Iskander Beg, who was afterwards created páshá, and the ketkhodá of Teryákí, Hasan Páshá, in the plains of Gula, who confirmed the intelligence they formerly had received that Besperim, Polata, and Tata had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and earnestly requested the serdár to send off, as soon as possible, what succours he was able to the aid of those places which had been enabled still to hold out. The serdár gave him fine promises and sent him away next morning.

The army moved from Gula (Julia) to Solnuk. At both these places they were obliged to pay a piece of gold for a loaf of bread. They expected that at the latter place, where they halted a whole day, boats with provisions would have been waiting for them; but in this also they were grievously disappointed. When the troops saw that no boats with provisions had arrived by the river Tise (Tibiscus), they were roused into rage and commenced a tumult. Some of the Janissaries rushed upon the serdár’s tent and pulled it down about his head. Each of them had taken a piece of wood in his hand, with which they so belaboured the poor commander-in-chief that he lay half murdered. They broke his skull with their bludgeons and his arm with a stone, and afterwards commenced the work of spoliation in his kitchen. It is certain that if some of the other officers had not come to his assistance, they would have cut him to pieces. The tent of the treasurer, Etmekjí Zádeh, shared the same fate: it was not only thrown down but robbed, and he himself only escaped with his life, which was entirely owing to the intervention of some of their superiors. They now abandoned the idea of proceeding to Buda. Towards evening the serdár was seen stepping round the tents, and seemed as if afraid and ashamed to enter his own.

In consequence of all these disastrous events and distressing circumstances, the strong fortress of Buda was committed to God, and the Moslem army marched towards Segdin. Here they fortunately fell in with a number of boats loaded with provisions on the Tise, when a distribution of provisions immediately took place, which refreshed and recruited the much-weakened strength of the army, at least in some degree.