Proceedings, Third National Conference Workmen's Compensation for Industrial Accidents

by National Conference on Workmen's Compensation for Industrial Accidents

The bill under consideration in this program was meant to be a bill that would accomplish the purposes when more elaborately worked out that we all feel should be had. The title is made broader than an ordinary legislative act, so as to allow a system of law that would repeal all other laws on the question, and substitute this remedy for those which exist and add it where there is none. We, therefore use the term "code" in order to cover a system of law. See Johnson vs. Harrison, 47 Minn., 575; Central of Georgia Railway Company vs. State, 104 Ga., 31, Section 1.

We have defined dangerous employment in this act with a view of covering every occupation which has accidents. This will give every person the opportunity to guard against the obligations that arise from injuries occurring in and growing out of the conduct of a business.

It is for the Legislature first to determine whether or not this is a proper classification, and if there be reasonable basis for declaring the employment to be dangerous, the courts will follow the judgment of the Legislature, even though their own judgment might not accord with that of the Legislature. See Lochner vs. N. Y., 198 U. S., 45; Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U. S., 365.

This definition of dangerous employment is studiously meant to be a broad one. It is not dependent upon classification of industries on the basis of manufacture, mining, railroading or other segregated employment. Its purpose is to so define dangerous employment that every employment which is, in fact, dangerous will be so defined exactly in proportion to the dangers that actually occur. Being a dangerous employment for each accident which it has, and not dangerous unless it has those accidents, the definition is especially equitable in two aspects. It induces those operating the same sort of employment to keep their accidents down; it makes those who have accidents liable exactly in proportion to the accidents which they have in fact.

We have not used the term "accident" in the law because of the uncertain meaning of that term throughout the state and federal courts of this country. We find that this term in some instances has been construed in the popular sense; in some instances it has been construed to mean that which has happened without the fault or intent of any one. We fear great litigation as to what it would mean if the term "accident" should be used. The terms arising out of, and in the course of, such employment have been sufficiently defined by the English courts under their act that they will need no further definition here than the words themselves would indicate.

Section 2:

It is the intention of this act to make the employer liable to pay compensation, and it would be the purpose probably to make the employe liable to stand a small amount of the carrying charges as specified in this act when worked out. Some argument has been produced in this convention to the effect that it would be difficult to hold the employer in case he had no fault, but fault is not necessarily the basis of liability in such cases. See Chicago, R. I. and Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Zernieke, 183 U. S., 582.

The man who put into operation the dangerous machinery of dangerous employment would be liable by reason of public necessity to be controlled under the elements of the police power for the protection of the general welfare. It has been intimated here that this rule would not apply except in the case of quasi public corporations, but this is not the law. Relations otherwise private may become public under public necessity if the State decides that the public needs protection. See State vs. Wagener, 77 Minn., 483; Harbison vs. Knoxvill Iron Co., 183 U. S., 13.

It has been urged that no man can have the right taken away from him to sue in the courts for injuries under such circumstances. Generally speaking, it is the rule that a party has no vested interests to a right of action at common law for a future injury. A tort action grows out of a breach of the duty which the State provides that one of its individuals owes to another, either by reason of the peculiar situation as between the parties, or by reason of a public burden which has a peculiar favor in it for the one who is injured. This direct liability the State has imposed by the implied adoption of the common law or by statute, both of which it has the power to repeal. It has repealed or has modified the common law or statutes every time it has imposed a new obligation or taken away an old obligation with respect to tort actions. See Martin vs. Pittsburg and L. E. R. Co., 103 U. S., 284; Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366; Snead vs. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 151 Fed., 608.

With respect to the remedy, we think that the remedy provided here is the appropriate and proper one. It would be so if it were fire insurance. See Wild Rice Lbr. Co. vs. Royal Ins. Co., 99 Minn., 190. Such a law, leaving the general question of liability to be determined and simply providing a reasonable method of estimating and ascertaining the amount of the loss, is unquestionably valid in both this country and Europe. See Hamilton vs. The Liverpool and London Ins. Co., 136 U. S., 242, and cases therein cited.