The third item in my instructions, the Treaty of Naturalization, I had to drop. The Porte refused to negotiate this question because of the failure of our Government to accept the terms I had obtained during my previous mission, and for this I could not blame them. As during my earlier mission, when matters involving questions of naturalization arose I succeeded in securing the rights of the persons concerned on the merits of each individual case.
Lastly there was the question of indemnities due missionaries at Harpoot and Marash for property, real and personal, plundered and destroyed during the massacres. This was a delicate matter, because the Americans were not alone in making claims for such damage; also the Government was very poor. At first the Porte denied all liability and refused to pay. I started the negotiations in November, 1898, and the process proved a long and tedious one, lasting over a year. But step by step progress was made. By December the Sultan admitted the claims and promised to pay as soon as the amount was fixed. By February, with the amount still unfixed, he had decided how payment was to be made: he would buy a cruiser in America, to the cost of which the indemnities could be added, enabling him to make payment "behind a screen," which he preferred. He said arrangements were being made for loans through a bank in Paris to begin installments on such a contract. By early September the iradé for the purchase of a ship from some American builder had been given, and plans were being studied to determine the type of ship. By the end of the month the Sultan again assured me that the subject was receiving his attention and would be settled in a month or two.
The state of the Turkish finances was, of course, deplorable, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that the Government was planning to apply to the purchase of the ship, money coming due in two months upon the conversion of some loans. And there were claims from England, France, Germany, and Italy, none of which the Sultan had recognized or promised to pay.
Even so, I planned that if His Majesty showed a disposition to deny his promise I should offer to arbitrate and thus bring matters to a head. That would put him upon one of two horns of a dilemma: if he accepted, it definitely and authoritatively exposed to all the world the horrible details of the massacre; if he refused, it put him in the position of having declined the only peaceful method of adjustment. Tewfik Pasha, however, in the name of the Sultan continued to make promises of payment, and the matter dragged along a few months more.
Having settled all other problems that were irritating the relations of the two Governments, I asked for leave to visit the United States. I planned this trip so as to accentuate our displeasure at the procrastination of the Ottoman Government in settling the indemnities, and notified the Minister of Foreign Affairs that as my Government had been patient for over a year I should now return home for consultation regarding the delay.
Upon my return to the United States I carried on the negotiations through the Turkish minister at Washington and prepared the instructions for our chargé at Constantinople through the State Department. This finally resulted in a contract with the Cramp Shipbuilding Corporation, with an additional amount of ninety-five thousand dollars to pay the indemnity claims, though actual payment was not made until June, 1901, under the incumbency of John G. Leishman, my successor.
During the course of the indemnity negotiations I succeeded in obtaining the Sultan's iradé for the rebuilding of college and missionary buildings at Harpoot which had been injured or destroyed during the massacres.
Among the interesting episodes during these fifteen months at Constantinople was what might be termed a diplomatic romance. In the spring of 1899 I received a letter from Secretary Hay enclosing a communication from William E. Curtis, Washington correspondent of the "Chicago Record," and one of the best-known syndicate writers of the time, who was well informed regarding what was going on in both official and unofficial circles at Washington. Curtis reported a conversation with an important official of the Turkish legation wherein he learned that since the Turko-Greek War the Sultan had regained authority and respect among Mussulmans throughout the world, and his advisers thought the time propitious for him, as the religious head of Islam, to make known his authority to the Mohammedans of the Philippines, Java, and neighboring islands. The official had gone on to say that our victories over Spain had surprised the Sultan beyond description, and he was anxious to cultivate the friendship of a government whose navy could sink the enemy's fleet and go round the world without the loss of a man.