Curtis thought that, in view of our present minister's influence and our good relations with the Turkish Government, the Sultan under the circumstances might be prevailed upon to instruct the Mohammedans of the Philippines, who had always resisted Spain, to come willingly under our control. Secretary Hay said he would give me no advice or instructions, but would leave to my judgment what, if any, action I might deem it wise to take; that if I could succeed in getting the Sultan of Turkey to send a message to the Sultan of the Sulu Islands which would result in peaceful and harmonious relations between the Sulu Sultan and our officers, it would of course be a great accomplishment. The subject interested me greatly. I saw the possibility of rendering an effective service, and I was fascinated by the romance of the suggestion.
When I went to Turkey on my first mission, my father placed his hands upon my head, gave me his blessing, and a parting advice which sank deep into my consciousness: "When you have an important matter coming before you, don't act promptly, but sleep over it." My father's death in January, 1898, accentuated this advice in my memory, and when I received the Hay-Curtis letters I followed it. I knew very little about the Philippines. I doubt that our State Department knew much more. The library at Constantinople had nothing on the subject. I had a copy of the testimony taken by our commissioners at the Paris peace negotiations, but it contained only vaguest references. But one of my colleagues had the works of Jean Jacques Reclus, the French geographer. From this I learned that the Mohammedans of the Philippines were not Shiites, like those of Persia, but Sunnites, and therefore recognized the Sultan of Turkey as their spiritual head.
I thought about the problem for a few days, and then I sent a note to the Palace that I should like to have an audience with His Majesty, as I had some private communication to make to him that I believed might interest him, for it would enable him to render a great service to a section of his co-religionists. The audience was promptly arranged, and I gathered that the Sultan knew very little about the Sulu Mohammedans. He asked regarding their sect. I told him they were Sunnites. He asked whether they made pilgrimages to Mecca. I told him I thought they did, the same as those of Borneo.
Then a curious incident occurred. In order to be able to take up the matter very fully with the Sultan, I had anticipated all kinds of questions and armed myself with pertinent information. Among them I thought he might seek some assurance as to our Government's attitude toward Mohammedanism, and to reassure him I had come prepared with a translation into Turkish of Article XI of an early treaty between the United States and Tripoli, negotiated by Joel Barlow in 1796. It read:
As the Government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion; as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquility of Musselman; and as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the parties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.
When the Sultan had read this, his face lighted up. It would give him pleasure, he said, to act in accordance with my suggestions, for two reasons: for the sake of humanity, and to be helpful to the United States. He added that he hoped his services would be appreciated, and that when occasion presented itself a like friendly spirit would be shown to him. He knew I was a "gentleman" and would make known to my Government the spirit in which he met my suggestions. The Mohammedans in question recognized him as khalif of the Moslems and he felt sure they would follow his advice.
We discussed means of conveying his message to them, and finally decided to send a telegram to Mecca, where the Moslem pilgrims were then gathered, to ascertain if any Sulu chiefs were there. Before transmitting it, His Majesty's secretary read the telegram to me in translation.
Two days later the Sultan invited me to the Palace to inform me that he had received a reply that two Sulu chiefs were at Mecca. Another telegram was then formulated instructing the chiefs in the name of the Sultan that a definite understanding had been reached with the American Elchi Bey (American minister) that they would not be disturbed in the practice of their religion if they would promptly place themselves under the control of the American army; that because of the Sultan's deep concern for their welfare he advised and instructed them to return at once to their people to prevent any bloodshed.
Immediately I cabled Secretary Hay, that he might be able to advise General Bates, one of our commanders in the Philippines. The negotiation proved to be very important and valuable to us. Some three months later our Government received word from the Philippines that an insurrectionist leader, Aguinaldo, had sent emissaries among these Sulu Mohammedans, but they had refused to join the insurrectionists and had placed themselves under the control of our army, thereby recognizing American sovereignty.
Lieutenant-Colonel John P. Finley, who had been governor of the District of Zamboanga, Moro Province, of the Philippine Islands for ten years, wrote an article for the April, 1915, issue of "The Journal of Race Development" in which he refers to this incident: