On the 4th and 7th November the enemy made attacks on a larger scale along the coast. On the 4th, believing that we had left only weak outposts behind, even opposite Nieuport, when we retired to the eastern bank of the canal, two to three Belgian regiments advanced through Lombartzyde. At first they gained a slight success, but were shortly afterwards attacked by part of the 38th Landwehr Brigade from the east, and by the 33rd Ersatz Brigade from the south, and driven back. Detachments of the Marine Division pursued the fleeing Belgians. The second attack made by about five thousand French troops, which took place on the 7th, fared far worse; the whole of Lombartzyde was taken by our counter-attack, and the enemy losses were very heavy.[99]
On the 9th November the 38th Landwehr Brigade was relieved by parts of the Marine Division, for the 10th November was the day on which the new offensive was to be made with fresh troops against Ypres from the south-east.
[THE LAST PHASE]
When the 4th Division and von Winckler’s Guard Division were sent forward on the 9th November into the northern part of the fighting line, formerly occupied by the XV Corps, the II Bavarian Corps, from the heights of St. Eloi it had just stormed, was able to look right down on Ypres. The orders of the Sixth Army commander, dated the 7th and 8th November, had given all the necessary instructions for the employment of the new units. The 4th Infantry Division and von Winckler’s Guard Division were placed under the commander of the Guard Corps, General Baron von Plettenberg, and were to be called Plettenberg’s Corps. The XV Corps and Plettenberg’s Corps formed the Army Group Linsingen.[100]
The task set the troops of General von Linsingen was ‘to drive back and crush the enemy lying north of the canal (Comines-Ypres); the main weight of the attack is to be delivered by the left wing. The Army Group Fabeck is to maintain its positions west of the canal, its task being to continue pressing forward and at the same time to support the attack of the left wing of the Army Group Linsingen, by as powerful enfilade fire as possible from its right flank batteries.’ The decisive attack was to begin on the 10th November, when another strong reinforcement of engineers would have arrived. All the other units of the Sixth Army and the whole of the Fourth Army were also, according to arrangement, to attack on this day with increased energy, so that the enemy should be allowed no rest, and held to his positions along the whole front.
On the stroke of 7 A.M. the Fourth Army advanced to the attack. This tenth day of November was to be a famous one in its history. The sectors of attack for each of the Corps remained, generally speaking, the same, except that the left wing of the XXVII Reserve Corps had been closed in slightly to the north. Strengthened by the Guard Jäger Battalion, a Guard Machine-Gun Detachment[101] and the 9th Machine-Gun Detachment, this Corps was to advance towards the Polygon Wood.
The orders for the XXII Reserve Corps ran as follows: ‘The XXII Reserve Corps[102] in co-operation with the Marine Division will secure the Yser canal front, and will take Dixmude.’ Immediately north of Dixmude the 4th Ersatz Division was in position, with the 43rd Reserve Division to the east and south, the two divisions together making a semicircle of steel round the objective. This time our troops were determined to take the town so stubbornly defended by the French infantry. The enemy fully realised the importance of this bridge-head. Besides holding a strong German force always in the vicinity, it covered the canal-crossing nearest to Calais. On the 9th its garrison was further reinforced by the arrival of fresh French troops.
The rain of the previous days had made the ground over which the attack on Dixmude was to be carried out very heavy going. The Handzaeme canal, running east and west, divides it into two parts, the northerly one being particularly swampy and difficult to cross. The main attack had therefore to be made from the east and south-east on a comparatively narrow front. The town itself comprised both modern and obsolete fortifications, but the first strongholds of the defenders were the railway buildings and cemetery situated to the east of it. The railway embankment had been transformed into a very strong defensive position, and a heavy fire was expected from it when we advanced from the high embankments of the Yser. Under the cover of darkness the division was able to push its front line to an assault position within two hundred yards of the enemy, and at dawn on the 10th the artillery bombardment began. Our heaviest guns took part and countless shells from our Minenwerfer did their utmost to break down the enemy’s resistance. By 7.40 A.M. our first attempt to take the enemy’s advanced positions had failed, and another artillery bombardment against his obstacles and flanking posts was ordered. At 9.30 A.M. the advanced stronghold at the cemetery was stormed. Our infantry had scarcely got into position there before the artillery observers arrived to direct the fire of their batteries from the front line on to the next strong point. The artillery bombardment lasted throughout the morning until 1 P.M. when the general assault was ordered. The infantry, with detachments of sappers carrying hand-grenades and various material useful in an assault, had worked its way forward close up to the line of obstacles.