The 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment advanced rapidly at first by frontal attack. North of it, the 15th Reserve Jäger Battalion under Captain Hameln worked forward across the deep marshes between the canal and the railway. The 202nd Reserve Infantry Regiment came under a heavy enfilade fire from the Yser embankment, and at 1.30 P.M. orders were issued for the Corps reserve under Colonel Teetzmann, consisting of a few battalions of the 43rd Reserve Division and of the 4th Ersatz Division, to be brought up into the line. Its task was to help carry forward the attack of the 202nd Regiment against the railway embankment, and to secure the left flank of the advance. The nearer the attack approached to the town, the more desperate became the resistance of its defenders. The gallant commander of the 201st Reserve Regiment, General von Seydewitz, always in the front line encouraging his men, was killed leading the attack just as his regiment and the Jäger entered the devastated town at about 3.30 P.M. Our well-directed artillery fire had cleared the front at the critical moment, and the enemy withdrew to the flanks of and behind Dixmude, but did not cease to offer resistance. He held the railway embankment south of the town with particular tenacity. Even when this had been finally stormed, the 202nd Regiment had to continue the fight, with heavy loss, among the burning houses in the southern part of the town, until the 201st Regiment by a wheel southwards were able to give assistance. Teetzmann’s brigade in its attack on the Yser embankment, to protect the flank of the division, had meanwhile reached the river. Thence it pressed on towards the bridges west of the town, so that the enemy’s retreat was threatened. In spite of this, however, he gave nothing up without a struggle, and every block of houses had to be captured: in fact the street fighting that ensued was hardly less bitter and terrible than at Wytschaete and Messines.
During the struggle in Dixmude, the French artillery fired into the place regardless of friend or foe, and both suffered alike. The fight was still raging among the houses at the northern exit, where von Beerst was only making slow progress with the advanced detachments of the 4th Ersatz Division, when our reserves were assembled in the market-square to deliver the final blow. The French infantry and Marine Fusiliers put up a desperate defence, but finally had to give way, for though not numerically superior, the offensive spirit of the German troops overcame all resistance. It was not until the west bank of the canal had been reached, that the mass of the enemy put up another defence.
Dixmude was captured, and the French had been driven back across the canal. A combined counter-attack by Belgians, Zouaves and French, which began during the evening and continued into the night, was unable to alter the situation, and though Dixmude in consequence was under the heaviest fire, our troops held their ground. Weak detachments of the 4th Ersatz Division were even able to cross the river north of the town under cover of darkness, though the extreme swampiness of the ground prevented them carrying their success any further. The enemy had prepared the bridges, west of Dixmude, for demolition some time before and had constructed strong positions along the west bank of the Yser. These were especially good, as the ground there is higher and overlooks that on the east bank. Our artillery had therefore to make another preparatory bombardment. The spoils taken at Dixmude were considerable, and in spite of the fact that the British assert that the Allies only lost a few hundred men, we took in prisoners alone 17 officers and 1400 men.[103]
Our allied enemies had also been driven back over the canal, south of Dixmude, on the 10th November. The XXIII Reserve Corps had made a successful attack on Noordschoote and through Bixschoote against Het Sas. A long and bitter struggle took place for the high ground south-west of Bixschoote; but by evening the canal had been reached along almost its whole length between Noordschoote and Bixschoote, whilst about a brigade of the 45th Reserve Division and weak detachments of the 46th had crossed it. The inundation had however gradually extended southwards as far as this district, and put any far-reaching extension of this success out of the question. The XXIII Reserve Corps took prisoner about 1000 men and captured a considerable number of machine-guns in this operation.
The reinforced III Reserve Corps had had a particularly hard fight on both sides of Langemarck. Throughout the 9th November and during the following night the French delivered heavy attacks there and had been everywhere repulsed. Rows of corpses lay in front of the III Reserve Corps, on the left wing of which the 9th Reserve Division, now affiliated to the Fourth Army, had been brought up into the line. Making every use of the element of surprise, General von Beseler had ordered the assault to begin at 6.30 A.M. Punctually at this moment, as dawn was breaking, the bugles sounded the attack. On the right wing the 44th Reserve Division pushed forward till close up to Het Sas, taking prisoner 14 officers and 1154 men. The official despatch, in reporting this advance, says: ‘West of Langemarck our young regiments advanced against the enemy’s front line singing “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,” and captured it.’ The left wing of the division hung a good way back, as the 5th Reserve Division on its left was unable to push on so rapidly. It had broken into the enemy’s first position, but its eastern wing was completely held up in front of Langemarck. The 6th Reserve Division had attacked the place from north and east, without being able to take it. Documents discovered afterwards prove that the enemy had concentrated strong forces here for a big attack that he himself intended to make on the 10th, and these were now defending every yard of ground with the utmost determination. The 9th Reserve Division had at first made good progress in the direction of St. Julien, but it came under a heavy cross-fire, and was thereby compelled to give up a large part of the ground gained. General von Beseler therefore decided to pull out the main body of the 9th Reserve Division, and move it to his right wing, where the 44th and 5th Reserve Divisions had had a decided success in the direction of Het Sas.
After the first line of trenches had been taken, the attack of the XXVI and XXVII Reserve Corps was very soon held up by wire entanglements which had not been destroyed by our guns, and by a second line of trenches provided with every modern device. The XXVII Reserve Corps spent most of the day in making such disposition of its forces as would enable it to give the utmost support to the Army Group Linsingen, which was getting ready to attack further south on the morrow.
In the Army Group Linsingen, however, the preparations of Plettenberg’s Corps for an offensive on the morning of the 10th were not sufficiently advanced to allow it to take place on that day. Further, the dense autumn mists prevented the necessary reconnaissances. With the concurrence of General von Linsingen, and after arrangement with the neighbouring troops, General Baron von Plettenberg therefore decided to attack on the 11th November. On the front of Deimling’s (XV) Corps the 10th November, up to four in the afternoon, was spent in a preparatory artillery bombardment; especially good work was done by means of heavy enfilade fire from the south, carried out by a massed group of artillery consisting of three batteries of heavy howitzers, three batteries of mortars, a battery of 10-cm. guns and a battery of long 15-cm. guns, all under the orders of Colonel Gartmayr, commanding the 1st Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment. After the bombardment both divisions of the Corps advanced to the attack and, in co-operation with the II Bavarian Corps fighting on the high ground of St. Eloi, were able to gain some hundreds of yards.