The Emperor Francis’ 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment attacked from Veldhoek against the corner of the Herenthage Wood, north of the Ypres-Gheluvelt road, and took its edge. The wood itself gave the infantry endless trouble, for it was impossible to see a yard ahead in its thick undergrowth, which was over six feet high.[107] Suddenly at a few paces’ distance, machine-guns would open on our troops from behind a bush or a tree-trunk. Thus the task set the Grenadiers proved to be an extremely difficult one, the more so as they had lost many of their officers and N.C.O.’s in the first rush across the open. Nevertheless, the defence-works inside the wood were quickly taken one after another, but more strong points protected by wire entanglements untouched by our artillery fire were encountered. The Fusilier Battalion forced its way through to the château of Veldhoek, which was surrounded by a marsh and an impenetrable hedge. The men were trying to work their way one by one through the latter by cutting gaps in it, when suddenly a deafening roar of rifle and machine-gun burst upon them. It came from the château on their right, from some flanking trenches on their left, and from trees behind the line. A number of the few remaining officers fell, and finally the battalion had to retire a short distance in order to reorganise. But it soon came forward once more, and the companies pressed on till they were close up to the château itself, when another annihilating fusillade was opened on them from all sides. Simultaneously the British made a flank attack along the hedge in order to cut off the men who had got through. Machine-guns firing from trees and from the château windows completely stopped any communication with them. Very few only of these foremost troops, who were commanded by Captain von Rieben, succeeded in getting away. Those who did were assembled by Captain Baron von Sell at the eastern edge of the wood and were, with part of the 1st Battalion, led forward again to the relief of the Fusiliers who were surrounded. The attack of Captain von Sell developed however into small isolated combats, and though the boldest followed their leader nearly up to the château again, they were received there with such heavy fire from right and left that it appeared that they would have to retire again and reorganise. Before this could be carried out, a British counter-attack was launched; but our men, disorganised and mixed up as they were, held fast to their ground and stopped the attack, although at first both their flanks were in the air.[108]
Queen Augusta’s 4th Guard Grenadier Regiment, advancing south of the main road, at once suffered such heavy losses that the first two attacks made no headway. When however part of the regiment near the main road pushed forward along it, echeloned behind its sister-regiment on the right, and then turned southwards, the advance made good progress, and a firm footing was gained in Herenthage Wood south of the road. The reverses met with by the Emperor Francis’ 2nd Grenadiers unfortunately enabled the British to bring such a heavy enfilade fire to bear on Queen Augusta’s 4th Grenadiers, that their advance had to be stopped.[109]
At 5 P.M. German Guard troops had a tussle with the British Guards. The King’s Liverpool Regiment made a counter-attack from the Nun’s Wood (Nonne Bosch) against the extreme left of the 1st Guard Foot Regiment and the northern wing of the 2nd Guard Grenadiers. The point of attack was well chosen, and took both the regiments in flank, for the 1st Guard Infantry Brigade was at this time heavily engaged, and held up in the woods (Polygon Wood and the eastern part of the Nonne Bosch), with its front facing north, and the 2nd Guard Grenadier Regiment, having spent all its energies against the château of Veldhoek, lay with its front facing west.[110] However, the British troops ran into their own artillery fire near the Nonne Bosch, and the attack broke up and came to a standstill in front of our thin and scattered lines. Any further advance on the 11th November by our Guard troops north of the road was now out of the question.
In the southern part of the Herenthage Wood the 4th Infantry Division pushed on, though here too great difficulties were encountered. Deep trenches, broad obstacles, and enfilade machine-gun fire combined to make our progress slow, especially on the right wing.
The XV Corps in close co-operation with the left wing of the Pomeranians gained ground in the woods near and around Zwarteleen; the capture of Hill 60 near Zwarteleen was of exceptional importance. From this elevation another direct view over the country round Ypres was obtained.
South of the canal the II Bavarian Corps with much thinned ranks stormed forward again. The bit of wood north-east of Wytschaete, which had already changed hands several times, was now taken by it. The heavy artillery again rendered invaluable services. Several strong hostile counter-attacks were held up chiefly owing to the way in which at the critical moment our guns always protected the infantry lines by a barrage.
In the area near Wytschaete, the 11th November was the day of the heaviest fighting. In the woods north of it, Bavarians and Hessians pressed forward together, slowly but surely. A French battery and four machine-guns were taken by the 168th Infantry Regiment at a farm about 150 yards north of Wytschaete, but the guns were so firmly embedded in the sodden ground, that they could not be got away by the infantry. When the buildings were evacuated again, owing to the heavy fire of the French on them, the guns, made unserviceable by us, remained as a neutral battery between the lines. It must be recorded here that in the fight for one single farm the Hessians took prisoners belonging to three different regiments, a fact that proves what masses the enemy had put in to the fight on the Ypres front, and to what an extent he had to concentrate his units to ward off our attacks.
On and to the west of the Messines ridge the line remained almost unaltered during the 11th November. The very severe effect of the enemy’s artillery fire from Mount Kemmel on this front and the enfilade fire of artillery and machine-guns from Ploegsteert Wood compelled our men to remain in their trenches.
Taken as a whole the operations on the 11th November were a great success. A series of brilliant feats, many of which it has been impossible even to mention in this short account, far less adequately describe, gave us unchallenged possession of positions from which any concentration of the enemy near Ypres could be seen, and immediately opened on by artillery. It is true, however, that no break through of the enemy’s lines had been accomplished: his numerical superiority and, more especially, the strength of his positions held up our offensive. The weather conditions, storm and rain, had also contributed towards the result.[111]
The furious character of the fighting on the 11th November did not abate on the following day, but on the whole the situation remained unaltered. The general character of the operations on the entire front of the Fourth and Sixth Armies was now changed, and sapping was eventually resorted to, though here and there successes in open warfare were gained. For instance the XXII Reserve Corps managed to strengthen its detachments across the Yser at Dixmude, and on the 12th the 201st Reserve Infantry Regiment, under Major Baron von Wedekind, stormed the enemy’s defences opposite it on the western bank of the Yser, and held them under great difficulties. Constant rain had filled the badly constructed trenches with mud so that our troops had to support the enemy’s bombardment and resist his counter-attacks lying in the open.