At Bixschoote the enemy again attempted strong counter-attacks, but they were stopped largely by the muddy state of the country. On the 14th November there was a recrudescence of severe fighting. Owing to the misty weather our relieving troops occupied a reserve position instead of the original front line; by the time the error was discovered, our watchful opponents were already in the front German position. Our men, however, gave them no rest there, for their honour would not suffer the surrender in this manner of their success of the 10th November. Without waiting for any orders from higher authority or for reinforcements they attacked and retook the strong position on the rising ground south-west of Bixschoote. On the front of the Sixth Army Herenthage Wood was completely taken by the Guard on the 14th November after severe hand-to-hand fighting.[112] After the artillery had prepared the way as far as was possible in that difficult and wooded neighbourhood, the infantry, whose fighting spirit was by no means damped by the events of the 11th November, advanced to the assault. In the château of Herenthage a large number of British snipers surrendered. The XV Corps had another success in the wooded district of Zwarteleen after being reinforced by Hofmann’s composite Division. A strong system of trenches and dug-outs were taken, as well as a large number of prisoners.
On the 13th November the Park of Wytschaete was captured from the French by the Pomeranians and Bavarians. A counter-attack, in which the French advanced against our positions shouting, ‘Don’t shoot,’ in German, cost them heavy losses; and the Bavarians, whose tempers were roused by this treachery, drove them back to their original positions.
On the 20th November the farm 150 yards north of Wytschaete, for which such a severe fight had been made on the 11th, was finally captured by us. We thereby obtained a position in the Wytschaete salient which, although overlooked from Mount Kemmel, gave us such a commanding view of all the ground between Mount Kemmel and the Wytschaete-Messines ridge that surprise attacks by the enemy in this district were now out of the question.[113] On the rest of the Flanders front only small fights took place, and on the 17th November the commander of the Fourth Army decided to give up any idea of continuing the offensive; a decision to which he was compelled by the low fighting strength of his troops and the bad autumn weather, which was affecting their health.[114] The frequent downpours of rain during November had caused a constant rising of the water-level, and it became urgently necessary to provide regular reliefs for the troops, for they were worn out by the constant fighting under such bad weather conditions. Clear signs of exhaustion in the enemy’s ranks on the front opposite the Fourth and Sixth Armies were also noticed. This permitted our gallant Fourth Army gradually to construct a good line of trenches and erect wire entanglements. As soon as these were completed rest-billets were allotted further to the rear and the men found quiet and pleasant quarters in the villages of Flanders untouched by war, with a not unfriendly population. The German General Staff fully concurred in the decision of the commander of the Fourth Army made on the 17th November. They at the same time expressed the hope that the Army would be prepared to hold its positions even against superior hostile forces. This expectation was completely fulfilled by the Fourth Army, and although at that time there were four and one-half French Corps, as well as the 25,000 Belgian troops, opposed to the forces of Duke Albert of Würtemburg, they never obtained a success of any consequence.
The threat against our right flank ceased soon afterwards. British monitors appeared a few times towards the end of November off the roadstead of Ostend. They bombarded the canal exit and our positions near by: but their fire was as ineffective as before. The ‘glorious’ activities of the British Grand Fleet along the Flanders coast came to a speedy end as soon as our ill-famed sea-rats, the U-boats, began to put in an appearance there.[115]
The developments on the front of the Sixth Army during the second half of November 1914 were similar to those of the Fourth Army. For some time the sapping was continued, but from the 20th onwards strong detachments were taken from it and entrained for the Eastern Front, where General von Hindenburg was able, in the fighting round Lodz, to bring the Russian steam-roller to a standstill, and finally make it roll back again.
From this time onwards the line of demarcation between the Fourth and Sixth Armies was the Comines-Ypres canal.
[CONCLUSION]
As the November storms passed and frost and icy winds heralded to the mild climate of Flanders the approach of winter, the unbroken defensive lines of both sides were being slowly strengthened. The effect of artillery fire compelled them to make cover in good trenches and behind thick breast-works. As the armament in use became more and more powerful, artificial shelter, where the surface water allowed it, had to be made deeper and deeper in the earth. At first passive defence was little understood by the German troops, as instruction in the offensive had dominated all other in their peace-training, and in the short period available after they were called up the volunteers had only been trained in the principles of attack. Their sense of superiority over their opponents did not let them rest content with merely holding positions. The high sense of duty in each individual was of assistance, and the methods of defensive warfare were quickly learnt. The continuous bad weather in the autumn and winter in this water-logged country caused great suffering; and the troops sent off to Russia to fight under the great victor of Tannenburg were much envied. The despatch of men eastward showed those left behind that any hope of a final decision at Ypres had disappeared.