My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

After numerous minor engagements Major Kraut’s retiring divisions established themselves on the line of the Ruhudje and Ruaha rivers. In the fertile region round Mahenge the supplies were excellent, even after the evacuation of a large part of the rice-field west of the Ruhudje. On this river the enemy had established a strongly fortified camp at Mkapira. With our insufficient resources it was impossible to take this position by force, but there was a chance that by cutting the enemy’s line of communication with Lupembe, we might force him to evacuate the camp owing to shortage of food.

Major Kraut crossed the river with five companies and a light field gun, and occupied a position in a semi-circle of hills in the enemy’s rear and right across his line of communication. In the enemy’s front weak forces covered the river bank on the Mahenge side. Unfortunately the fortified positions of our companies were so extended that, owing to the difficulties of the country, there was no guarantee that support could be brought up in time. On the——, before daybreak, the 10th Company on the right wing was surprised by a heavy enemy attack. The enemy also cleverly took the company’s position in the rear and, after inflicting heavy losses, put the machine guns out of action. On the left wing Lieutenant von Schroetter’s company was also attacked from all sides, and had to cut its way out with the bayonet, losing the light field gun and a machine gun. In view of the heavy casualties of the enemy, Major Kraut would have been able to remain on the west bank of the Ruhudje, in spite of this partial disaster, but fighting could be heard from the direction of Lupembe, where the 25th Field Company was covering his rear. Major Kraut thought, wrongly, that there, too, a sharp attack had been made, and, therefore, retired again to the east bank of the Ruhudje. To his astonishment the enemy’s strong entrenchments at Mkapira were found to be evacuated a few days later, the enemy having withdrawn in the night. Closer inspection showed that he had suffered heavy losses in the recent fighting. This, however, was not enough to explain his withdrawal; this riddle was not solved until later, on the appearance of General Wahle, with whom no communication had been established.

In expectation of the opening of the big operations of 1916 the reinforcements that had been provisionally sent to Victoria Nyanza, Ruanda, the Russissi and the Tanganyika area were brought back and embodied into our main forces along the North railway. A single command for these minor theatres of war was required, and with this object a “western command” was established under Major-General Wahle, who for the most part co-ordinated and directed these operations from Tabora. In April and May, 1916, when the British main forces in the Kilima Njaro area had completed their march, and, after the rainy season, were beginning a fresh advance to the south, English and Belgians from Muansa, Lake Kiwu, the Russissi and Bismarckburg began to advance concentrically on Tabora through these minor theatres of war. Our weak divisions retired on this place.

Major von Langenn retired at once from Tschangugu to Issawi, followed by Captain Wintgens from Kissenji. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the pursuing Belgian brigades in successful rearguard actions. The German detachment later continued its retirement on Mariahilf. The danger to our district from the strong Belgian forces on our heels had been correctly estimated by Captain Gudovius. When in June, 1916, strong English forces advanced across the Kagera, he retired south from Bukoba with his division. Owing to the difficulties of communication and getting information, a part of his force unfortunately ran upon strong Belgian forces in Ussuwi district. Captain Gudovius himself was wounded in the abdomen and fell into the enemy’s hands. The engagement went badly for us and cost us heavy losses. Individual bodies of the detachment, however, managed to fight their way through to Muansa and Uschirombo.

In the middle of July, 1916, the English succeeded in effecting a surprise landing with about a brigade in the neighbourhood of Muansa. There, too, there was some skirmishing, favourable to us, and there the Commanding Officer, Captain von Chappuis, retired in the direction of Tabora. The troops from Muansa and those under Major von Langenn and Captain Wintgens established a new front, approximately on the line Schinjanga-St. Michael, and repulsed several Belgian attacks. Captain Zimmer had sunk the steamer Goetzen at Kigoma and blown up the Wami. He then retired slowly along the railway to Tabora. Captain Hering von Usumbura followed suit. The fact that the operations were nearing Tabora gave General Wahle the opportunity to bring up quickly part of the troops from the north of Tabora, to make a dash west by rail and retire again at once. In this raid the 8th Field Company completely routed a Belgian battalion west of Tabora, and Wintgens’ detachment brought off a successful surprise attack west and north of Tabora. These minor victories were often considerable, and on several different days of skirmishing the enemy losses amounted to hundreds; several light howitzers were also captured in these raids.

On 2nd June, 1916, the 29th Field Company was surrounded in its fortified position in the Namema mountains. In fighting his way through, the brave company commander, Lieutenant Franken, was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Lieutenant Hasslacher retired step by step on Tabora. In an affair of patrols south of this place he met with a hero’s death.

In this way the troops of the western command were actually assembled at Tabora, and the moment had come for a systematic retirement to the south-east. These last operations and the capture of Tabora were not known at Headquarters until long afterwards. There was no means of communication with the western command. Major-General Wahle was aware that this retirement of our main forces was of first importance for the Mahenge area. Accordingly he gave orders for the march. At first the railway could be used for supplies and transport. The eastern column, under Major von Langenn, marched on Iringa, the centre column, under Captain Wintgens, on Madibira, and the western column, under Lieutenant Huebener, on Ilembule. Major Wahle accompanied the centre column. In this way they came upon the line of communication between Neu-Langenburg and Iringa, and the enemy’s dumps along this line. Huebener’s detachment lost touch, and surrendered, being enveloped by a superior force of the enemy at Ilembule. Langenn’s detachment was most unfortunately surprised by a burst of fire while crossing a ford near Iringa and lost heavily. The subsequent attack on Iringa was also costly and without success.

Wintgens’ detachment surprised enemy dumps and columns near Madibira, and also captured a gun and some wireless apparatus. In spite of several days of stubborn fighting, they were unable to take Lupembe and the surrounding farms. The influence of Wahle’s advance immediately made itself felt in the Mahenge district. The apparently strong enemy troops, who from their fortified positions at Mkapira had carried out the successful raid against Major Kraut, now felt themselves seriously threatened in their rear. They evacuated their strong positions and retired on Lupembe. General Wahle took over the command of all the forces at Mahenge.

At the end of 1916 the troops of General Wahle’s western command were grouped round Mahenge. From here he directed the operations extending approximately to the line Ssongea—Lupembe—Iringa—Kidodi.