It has been said that all touch with General Wahle had been lost since July, 1916, until in October, 1916, his patrols joined up with those of Major Kraut south of Iringa.
It was not, therefore, until after the fighting at Mkapira that Major Kraut, and through him Headquarters, learned of General Wahle’s advance; the development of the situation made a very different impression on the enemy. He must have regarded the advance of General Wahle’s columns against the English line of communication from Iringa to Langenburg, and Major Kraut’s accidentally simultaneous threat to Mkapira, as a widely-planned joint operation, which was seriously endangering his troops at Mkapira, even after Major Kraut had withdrawn to the east bank of the Ruhudje. He avoided this danger by a hasty retirement from Mkapira in a westerly direction.
General Wahle’s columns at once concentrated in the Lupembe-Mkapira area. No news was received of Huebener’s western column. Its capitulation was not known until much later.
Welcome though this reinforcement of the forces in the west was, there were difficulties of supplies, and it became necessary to put under cultivation a considerable area, stretching almost to Ssongea. Major Grawert’s detachment advanced to Likuju on the Ssongea—Liwale road, that of Major Kraut to the Mpepo region and Captain Wintgens’ surrounded an enemy detachment in a fortified camp at Kitenda. The enemy quickly marched to the relief of this force, but the relieving troops were driven off with heavy losses. At the same time the position of Grawert’s detachment took a very unfavourable turn. The enemy had succeeded in driving off this force’s live-stock. As other supplies in the district were scanty, Major von Grawert, exaggerating the difficulties of supply, thought his position hopeless and surrendered in January, 1917. A transportable 8.8 air naval gun which had been brought to Lihuju with great difficulty fell into the enemy’s hands, as well as a number of good machine guns. In reality the position of Grawert’s force does not appear to have been so desperate as he supposed; at any rate, a strong patrol under Sergeant-Major Winzer, who refused to surrender, made its way south without being molested by the enemy, and, a few days later, found abundant supplies at small cost in the districts west of Tunduru. The conduct of this patrol gave further proof that there is almost always a way out, even of an apparently hopeless position, if the leader makes up his mind to face the risks.
Meanwhile General Wahle’s supply difficulties were increasing. Whether they could have been modified by ruthlessly reducing the number of non-combatants, as had been done on the Rufiji, or whether the material welfare of the western command could have been substantially improved by greater care in procuring and rationing the available resources, could not be decided from my position on Lake Utungi. The temporary telegraph to Mahenge was very inefficient and often interrupted, and it took several days to get a despatch through from General Wahle in Mahenge to the troops. This made it difficult for me to get a view of the situation from the incomplete information at hand. Suffice it to say that the difficulties of supply in Mahenge were regarded as so acute that it was not considered possible to keep such strong forces concentrated there, and part of them would have to be withdrawn.
Kraut’s and Wintgens’ forces were marched west to Gumbiro, whence they were to press on across the Ssongea-Wiedhafen road. It was thought that they would find adequate supplies in the mountains south of Ssongea. The report of this move reached me too late for me to interfere. From Gumbiro Captain Wintgens turned north and, near Lake Rukwa, successfully engaged an enemy column which had been following him; on nearing Tabora he got typhus and was taken prisoner. Captain Naumann led the force on until finally he surrendered to the pursuing enemy column near Kilima-Njaro towards the end of 1917. It is to be regretted that this operation, carried out with so much initiative and determination, became separated so far from the main theatre of war as to be of little use.
Major Kraut had separated from Captain Wintgens in Gumbiro, and, carrying out General Wahle’s orders, had marched south. There was no difficulty about crossing the line of communication Ssongea-Wiedhafen, but as the enemy had strongly entrenched and secured his supply dumps, no booty was captured. In the open little was to be found in March, 1917, the poorest season of the year, a few months before the new harvest. After some rearguard actions against English troops a success was scored in a surprise attack on the small Portuguese camp at Mitomoul, on the Rovuma. Major Kraut then followed the river downstream to Tunduru and himself came to Headquarters to report. Two of his companies remained at Tunduru to guard the fertile district. The other three marched further east and were temporarily taken over by Captain Loof at Lindi.