It was no easy matter to decide what to do with the German women and children, some of whom had fled from Lindi and did not know what to do. A number of them had taken refuge in the planters’ houses, which were within range of the enemy’s guns. In view of the restriction of supplies and the difficulties of transport and accommodation, it was desirable that these women and children should be sent back to Lindi. Some were intelligent enough to see this. By means of a parley their transference behind the British lines was duly arranged, and they were able to leave for Lindi. For reasons unknown to me the English then refused to keep to the arrangement, and the women and children, as well as male non-combatants, gradually collected in the Catholic mission at Ndanda. A military convalescent home had been quartered there for some time and had developed into an important hospital. All the people who were brought here found good food and accommodation in the spacious buildings of the mission with its extensive gardens.
CHAPTER XI
IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY
WHILE at Narunyu there was a lull in the fighting for several weeks, the enemy had shown considerable activity in the section of Portuguese territory occupied by Stuemer’s force. Several English columns from the south-west and south had concentrated on Mwembe, and Major von Stuemer, not thinking himself strong enough to resist, had evacuated Mwembe. The different companies had then gradually retired on the Rovuma. North of this river Lieutenant-Commander Jantzen, who had been sent from Headquarters to Tunduru, and under whom the various companies of Stuemer’s force had re-formed, had taken over the command. Enemy forces were also advancing on Tunduru from Ssongea.
It was difficult to obtain detailed information about the enemy. My impression was that he wanted to bring our main force to a halt, invade our supply-area in the Tunduru-Massassi-Ruponda district with strong forces, and carry off our supplies. I did not then think it out of the question that we might score a success, and I, therefore, marched on the 10th September, 1917, with five companies, from our camps at Narunyu towards Massassi. From there Captain Goering immediately marched with three companies towards Tunduru; Jantzen’s division stood north-east of this place. I reconnoitred the road to Tunduru on a bicycle and feared that the difficulties of supply would be very serious. These fears were unfortunately realized. Supplies from the land could not be brought up and there was no time for a prolonged operation that would allow of additional supplies being obtained from Massassi.
The small English and Portuguese patrols which attacked our supplies and transport from across the Rovuma to the south did not cause us to hurry our movements. But the enemy from Kilwa, whom Captain Koehl’s heavy attack from Mbeo-Chini and a number of lesser encounters had not been able to stop, reached the neighbourhood of Nahungu. His flying columns, for the most part mounted, outflanked Koehl’s force, and pressed forward up the Mbemkuru river to Nangano. Communication with Captain Koehl by means of the telephone-line from Nahungu to Nangano was first interrupted for a few days, and then broken off completely. The supply dumps fell into the enemy’s hands and were destroyed. To provide against the interruption of the exposed telephone-line a new line had been laid from Ruponda, running north-east, but connection by messenger between this line and Koehl’s division took several days.
In view of the slow means of communication with Koehl’s detachment, it was not possible to get an accurate view of the situation in time, and as the intended success at Tunduru could not in any case be attained, I marched the five companies from Massassi to Ruponda at the beginning of October, and then further north-east, joining forces with Koehl’s force at Likangara. On receiving the report that enemy detachments were approaching Ruponda, I ordered the removal of the sick and the stores from Ruponda to Lukuledi and Mnacho. On 9th October, 1917, an enemy patrol was beaten off with some losses at Ruponda. On 10th October a considerable force of the enemy—the 25th Indian Cavalry Regiment was identified—assaulted Ruponda from several sides. The withdrawal of our companies had, therefore, unfortunately been rather premature; otherwise the enemy might have encountered some of our passing companies at Ruponda and perhaps suffered a serious defeat. As it was, there were no troops in Ruponda except a few of our patrols; most of the sick fell into the enemy’s hands, and also some 90,000 kg. of supplies. At Likangara there was no fighting worthy of notice. Some enemy patrols and weak detachments did appear, but our fighting-force, which was attacking the enemy’s main line of communication along the Mbemkuru river, firing on and destroying motor-transport, and capturing mails and supplies, led me to suppose that the strongest part of the Kilwa force was recuperating further west in the direction of Ruponda.
The increased enemy activity a few days’ march east of Likangara, where he established requisitioning stations, as well as the stories of the natives, made it seem probable that considerable enemy forces were marching from Nahungu towards the south, and therefore against General Wahle. Captured mails revealed the fact that in spite of his extensive intelligence and spy systems the enemy was groping in the dark. He did not know, for instance, where I was, although he seemed to place the greatest importance upon knowing. The knowledge of my Headquarters would tell him the probable position of our main force. While one letter thought that I was in the neighbourhood of Lukuledi, another professed to know that I was at Tunduru, and according to a third I was at Mahenge. The talkativeness of these Europeans, who, in spite of all warnings, cannot refrain from communicating to one another in their private letters their knowledge and their conjectures about the war situation, had in this case done good: there was so much gossip, the rumours were so contradictory, and even the most improbable things were so indiscriminately believed, that anything at all could be read into the German correspondence. In spite of this unintentional misleading of the enemy, it is difficult to understand how intelligent people can entrust to the post important matters, the knowledge of which must be kept from the enemy, knowing how unreliable the post is, and that the letters often fall into the enemy’s hands.
It was clear to me that the enemy’s obvious uncertainty about the situation would give me a great opportunity if it could be used quickly and decisively. I ventured to hope that the intended decisive blow might now be struck for which I had tried twice near Lindi and once at Tunduru, and the success of which at Narungombe had hung on a hair. The development of the situation on Wahle’s front seemed favourable for this attempt. His forces had gradually withdrawn from the Mtua district to Mahiwa. The enemy’s whole handling of the campaign suggested that his various columns would press forward with all their weight and try to crush us by a concentration from all sides. The enemy’s Lindi Division was advancing energetically with the rest. General Wahle’s nine companies, fighting stubbornly, had retired before them to Mahiwa. I had a fair personal knowledge of the country at Mahiwa. It was very probable that my march in that direction would not be observed by the enemy in time.