My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

On the 10th October, 1917, trusting in the fortune of war, I crossed the Linkangara mountains to Mnacho with five companies and two mountain guns. I arrived there at dark and left again at daybreak on the 15th. On the narrow mountain paths the force got very scattered. The guns were left far behind, and the pack-animals gave trouble. Askari and bearers came to the rescue, and again and again Sergeant-Major Sabath rose superior to the difficulties and brought his guns forward. It surprised me that we were unable to get any information from Mahiwa, but the rifle and machine-gun fire indicated that fighting was in progress. Before dark I reached Lieutenant Methner’s company, which was in reserve behind Wahle’s left wing. The enemy seemed to be attacking this company with a view to enveloping it. His fire had the unfortunate effect of causing the disappearance of my bearer, with my dispatch-box, containing most important dispatches and maps: he did not return for two days. The first two companies to come up were immediately thrown against the enemy’s enveloping movement, and the enemy was thrown back. The companies then dug themselves in. On the morning of the 16th I went to reconnoitre, and found that the enemy had also entrenched himself immediately in front, at a distance of sixty to a hundred metres. When Lieutenant von Ruckteschell offered me a cup of coffee, care had to be taken, as the enemy was keeping a fairly sharp look-out, and shot with tolerable accuracy. I thought the opportunity favourable for a determined surprise attack. It was decided to launch the attack at noon, on the left (north) wing, and try to turn the enemy’s flank. Goering’s detachment was to lead the attack.

After we had eaten our midday meal undisturbed, I went at once to the left wing, where Captain Goering had just begun his advance with his two companies. When he had crossed a wide depression in the ground, to my surprise he changed direction still further to the left. The companies were soon in action. Only gradually I realized the significance of this surprising move. Captain Goering had come unexpectedly upon a new enemy who had come from Nahungu and was now attacking from the north. The force consisted of several battalions and two guns of the Nigerian Brigade who knew nothing of our arrival at Mahiwa and were expecting to smash General Wahle’s force by an attack on his left flank and rear, while his front, facing east, was vigorously attacked by a division. The Nigerian Brigade was as much taken by surprise as Captain Goering and was not so quick to adapt itself to the new situation. Captain Goering, closely supported by the reserves, threw himself so vigorously against the enemy in the bush that he ran through some of his detachments, threw them into confusion, and finally put them to flight. An enemy officer in command of an ammunition column took our men for his own, with the result that we captured about 150,000 rounds of ammunition. A gun with ammunition was taken by assault, and the killed did not consist wholly of Nigerian Askari. On Captain Goering’s right, where two companies under Lieutenant von Ruckteschell and Lieutenant Brucker, wounded in this action, were fighting, the enemy was also thrown back some way into the bush.

While this fighting was going on on the flank, and on the following day also, the enemy attacked Wahle’s force with all his strength. Here the enemy was in great superiority; wave after wave of fresh troops were thrown against our front. There was a danger that General Wahle’s front would give way, and the fighting was very severe. There was also serious danger that our enveloping movement, in the very difficult swampy ground of the bush, would be held up so long by weak enemy forces that a defeat would be inflicted upon our front before it could make itself felt. In that case the battle was lost. I thought it expedient to increase the disadvantages that the enemy was bringing upon himself by his costly frontal attack and used all my available strength in such a way that the enemy by the increasing fierceness of his frontal attack was bleeding himself to death.

The original intention of enveloping the enemy’s left wing was not developed further on the following days, but, on the contrary, every available company was withdrawn from the left wing to stiffen General Wahle’s front. In this way we not only succeeded in holding our ground, but, by immediately taking advantage of the enemy’s moments of weakness to make heavy counter-attacks with our reserves, we were able to inflict a real defeat. My, perhaps surprising, tactics were prompted by the personality of the enemy commander. I had learned in the engagement at Reata (11th March, 1916) that General Beves threw his men into action regardless of loss of life and did not hesitate to try for a success, not by skilful handling and small losses, but rather by repeated frontal attacks which, if the defence held its ground and had anything like adequate forces, led to severe losses for the attack. I guessed that here at Mahiwa he was carrying out the same tactics. I think it was by taking advantage of the enemy leader’s mistaken tactics in this way that we were able to win this splendid victory. Until the 18th October, for four days therefore, wave after wave of the attack broke on our front, but my own observation told me that the weight of the attack here on the right wing was diminishing and that the enemy’s defeat was absolute.

On the evening of the 18th October we had, with some 1,500 men, completely defeated a whole enemy detachment at least 4,000, and probably not less than 6,000, strong. With the exception of Tanga, it was the most serious defeat he had suffered.

According to a high English officer the enemy lost 1,500 men; but I have reason to believe that this estimate is much too low. Our casualties were: 14 Europeans and 81 Askari killed, 55 Europeans and 367 Askari wounded, 1 European and 1 Askari missing. Considering the smallness of our forces these losses were for us very considerable, and were felt all the more seriously because they could not be replaced. We captured a gun, six heavy and three light machine guns, and 200,000 rounds of ammunition.

The situation, unfortunately, did not allow us to take full advantage of our victory; in our rear was the enemy who had occupied Ruponda on the 10th October, advanced in strong force further south and on 18th October attacked Major Kraut at Lukuledi. It must be remarked in passing that our troops which had fought under Lieutenant-Commander Jantzen near Tunduru had gradually retired north-east to the upper Mbenkuru and had reached Headquarters above Ruponda before the occupation of that place by the enemy on the 10th October. Two of these companies had reinforced the company which was guarding our supplies near Lukuledi, and it was these three companies, under the command of Major Kraut, which were attacked by a superior enemy from the north on the 18th October.

The enemy, believed to be six companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, was driven off, but in order to protect our supplies and material lying at Chigugu and Chiwata, Major Kraut retired to the first of these places. As well as Chigugu and Chiwata, Ndanda, where we had large stores of war material, was also threatened by the enemy, who had doubtless, in my opinion, been reinforced at Lukuledi. The enemy from Lukuledi might at any moment attack our lines of communication, capture our stores and supplies, and so put us out of action. We had no means of protecting our lines of communication locally, for the few thousand men we had were required for fighting. As, however, the force had to be kept alive, the danger had to be overcome in some other way.

There was only one way: to beat the enemy decisively at Lukuledi. It was necessary therefore to lose no time at Mahiwa, and, hard though it was, I had to abandon the idea of an annihilating pursuit. When, early on the 19th October, a few scattered detachments of the enemy were seen and fired on, I had already begun my march with six companies and two guns. On the next day at two o’clock we entered Lukuledi from the east, and on 21st of October at dawn we attacked the enemy, who was apparently taken completely by surprise. North of Lukuledi, on the Ruponda road, Major Kraut’s column surprised the camp of the 25th Indian Cavalry Regiment, which, with transport harnessed, stood ready for the march on Massassi; the camp was taken by storm and the regiment lost almost the whole of its transport horses, altogether 350. Whilst I was engaged with the detachments of Koehl and Ruckteschell in a fairly serious action against the enemy entrenched at Lukuledi, I waited in vain for the intervention of Kraut’s force. An attack on the camp without the advantage of surprise had little hope of success. When the force began to come under the fire of the enemy’s mine-throwers on the flank, I withdrew the greater part from the zone of the effective cross-fire, after beating off a strong enemy attack, in order to avoid unnecessary losses. A fresh enemy, in the shape of a company of King’s African Rifles (English East African Askari), who appeared unexpectedly from the bush, was quickly driven off. In this engagement Lieutenant Kroeger fell at the head of his company. The action was then broken off. No news came of Major Kraut until night; thinking he could no longer attack successfully at Lukuledi, and hearing no sounds of fighting, he had made a détour and then approached Lukuledi from the south.