Lieutenant von Scherbening, who with his patrol had taken the Boma Malema, reported that this neighbourhood was very productive. As a specimen he sent us a captured pig to Nanungu. As it refused to walk it was carried the 500 km. Unfortunately it turned out eventually not to be a European pig at all, but a Pori pig, like those we frequently shot in the bush.

Once more a time had come when it was difficult to obtain news of the enemy, but a good deal could be conjectured from the incomplete maps at our disposal. I could have no doubt that the imminent enemy operations would be launched from the neighbourhood of Port Amelia with their main force from the coast. The appearance of strong enemy forces at Mtende, as well as the report, unconfirmed it is true, that troops were on the march from the south-west towards Mahua, showed me that other troops from the west were going to co-operate with the approaching attack of the enemy main force. A situation seemed to be developing in which I could make use of my inner line to attack one part of the enemy singly. The enemy’s position with regard to reserves and supplies made it obvious that the columns marching from the west could not be over strong. This seemed to be the chance I had so long been awaiting. I, therefore, remained with my main force at Nanungu and also recalled Captain Otto’s detachment from Lurio. With these forces I intended to assume the offensive in a westerly direction. Captain Koehl, whose detachment was assembled at Medo, was charged with the duty of holding up the enemy’s main force advancing from Port Amelia and retiring gradually on my force.

Captain Müller, who, after years of work at Headquarters, had taken over an independent detachment of two companies, was sent on from the neighbourhood of Nanungu to Mahua to harass the enemy as far as possible. He passed round Mahua and surprised, south-west of this place, the fortified supply depot of Kanene. The defending English European troops saw that all the stores were lost. To prevent this, at least to some extent, they fell upon the stores of liquor in the camp and were captured in a thoroughly intoxicated condition.

For myself, I, likewise, advanced in the middle of April in the direction of Mahua, and during the march could hear from afar heavy sounds of firing. At Koriwa, north-east of Mahua, Captain Müller had attacked an enemy battalion under Colonel Barton, which had been making a reconnoitring expedition and was at once attacked by our troops on the march. In spite of the fact that on our side scarcely 70 rifles took part in the action, our troops succeeded in enveloping the enemy’s right wing, and from a large ant-hill poured upon him such a vigorous and effective machine-gun fire that he fled wildly. He lost over 40 men in this action. Lieutenant-Commander Wunderlich, who had received a severe wound through the abdomen, had to be taken to the hospital at Nanungu, two days’ march distant, and died shortly afterwards.

The blow which I had intended to strike with the main force had already been successfully carried through by Müller’s weak detachment. I, therefore, turned with my main force to the district west of Nanungu. A large force of the enemy had arrived meanwhile on the Msalu river and had crossed it with several patrols. My calculation that I should be able to surprise a strong body of the enemy immediately after crossing the river was not fulfilled: the reports received had been incorrect. However, in a whole series of minor engagements on the Msalu river and further west our fighting patrols inflicted, gradually, severe losses on the enemy and his patrols soon evacuated the east bank of the Msalu. On 3rd May our supply patrols, whose duty it was to obtain further supplies from the direction of Mahua, surprised, in the neighbourhood of Saidi, strong enemy detachments which were seriously threatening our field hospital and supply depots at Makoti.

Part of our stores had been brought to Makoti in readiness for the operations planned to be carried out further west. Our fighting patrols, which were sent out immediately, had several encounters with the enemy near the Kireka mountain at Makoti. I thought at first that these were only enemy patrols, so sent Captain Schulz there with a strong patrol as a reinforcement, and myself marched on the 4th of May, with the main body, to the Nanungu-Mahua road. From here I expected to be able to carry out a swift attack on the enemy forces, which were trying to surprise us somewhere in this neighbourhood. The general situation was made clear when it was known that patrols had, in the course of the day, encountered a new enemy near the Kireka mountain. An enemy detachment had been thrown back and it was probable that strong forces were in entrenched positions in the rear. In the morning of the 5th May I marched from my camp to Makoti. During the march I hoped sincerely that the enemy would spare us the necessity of making the attack on his fortified positions and that, as in view of the general situation was not improbable, he would emerge from his entrenchments and offer battle in the open. If this happened, and we succeeded in attacking with our main force before the enemy was aware of our arrival, a considerable success was probable.

At eleven o’clock in the forenoon I arrived at the Kireka mountain and went on ahead to see Captain Schulz who, with his patrol, had occupied some rocky grottos in the copse. As soon as I had arrived a sol (native Sergeant-Major), who had just returned from a patrol expedition, reported that the enemy was advancing in great force and must soon appear at close quarters. I passed on this report to Lieutenant Boell, who had just brought up his company in the rear of Schulz’s detachment, and instructed him to go up at once in case of an enemy attack. I then went back and ordered the advance of our companies which were gradually arriving. Meanwhile the fighting in front began. The enemy, advancing in close order, had quickly thrown back our patrols out of the grottos, but had then been completely taken by surprise by the effective machine-gun fire of Boell’s company and partially driven back. Goering’s detachment, coming up at that moment, began an enveloping movement on the right, completely surprising the enemy, who was rapidly driven back with very heavy losses.

After several miles of hot pursuit we reached the enemy’s entrenchments. On our left wing, where two more companies had been sent into action, the fight wavered, and it was difficult for me in the thick bush to distinguish friend and foe. It was, therefore, some time before I could get a clear idea of the situation on the left wing, and it was not until I received a report from Major Kraut, whom I had sent to investigate, that I realized that, in advancing, our left wing had come under a withering enemy fire in a clearing which had brought it to a standstill. A counter-attack by the enemy, which had brought him very near to the position of our Headquarters, looked very dangerous. Fortunately for us, however, just at this moment Lieutenant Buechsel, whose company had been detached from the main force and so arrived late, came upon the scene of action and was able to avert the danger.

Meanwhile, on the right wing, Captain Goering had realized that a frontal attack on the enemy entrenchment offered no prospect of success. He had, therefore, sent Lieutenant Meier with a strong patrol round the enemy’s position to fire on the enemy mine-thrower from the rear and if possible to capture it. This capture was not brought off, for the enemy had at his disposal unexpected reserves which were able to keep Meier’s patrol at a distance.

The action thus came to a standstill. When it had grown quite dark we were close in front of the enemy. Shots were still being exchanged from both sides, but only occasionally. The clerical work—even in Africa there was writing to be done, though not as much as is usually the case—was postponed during the fighting. A number of charges and other tiresome details had to be written up. I was able from time to time to talk personally with the company leaders, and called them together for this purpose. I changed my own position as little as possible to avoid difficulties and annoying delays in the dispatch and receipt of messages. A meal was cooked further in the rear, where the dressing station had also been established. We at Headquarters had our meal prepared as usual by our black servants, who brought it up to the firing-line.