My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck

In order to get the force in hand ready for further action, some parts of it were withdrawn from the front line and mustered. I came to the conclusion that it would be expedient to remain where we were for the night, to be in readiness to renew the action on the following day, and especially to cut the enemy off from his water-supply, which must be somewhere outside the camp.

About midnight it was reported that one of our patrols had encountered a strong enemy force on the Nanungu-Mahua road. I was afraid that this force, which I took to be strong in view of its independent movement, would advance further on Nanungu and capture our company’s stores (ammunition, medical stores, supplies, etc.), which were on this road as well as the depot at Nanungu. I therefore withdrew during the night with the greater part of my force, via Makoti, to the Nanungu-Mahua road. Only strong patrols remained in front of the enemy, but these did not notice that the enemy, too, evacuated his position during the night and withdrew towards Mahua. On 6th May it became apparent that the report of strong enemy forces on the Nanungu-Mahua road, which had caused my retirement, was incorrect. There was no enemy there. Captain Müller, hearing the firing of the English trench-mortars, had, with admirable initiative, immediately begun a forced march from his camp north-east of Mahua, towards the sound and had apparently been taken for the enemy.

When he arrived on the battlefield he found that the enemy had retired. The enemy, consisting of four companies and a machine-gun company, and to judge from his fortifications a thousand strong, had been completely defeated by our force of little more than 200 rifles—we were 62 Europeans and 342 Askari. He had lost 14 Europeans and 91 Askari killed, 3 Europeans and 3 Askari taken prisoner. In addition, his hospital with about 100 wounded had fallen into our hands, and according to the natives he had taken other wounded with him. Our casualties were: 6 Europeans, 24 Askari, 5 other natives killed; 10 Europeans, 67 Askari and 28 other natives wounded.

While this gratifying success against the enemy’s western columns was being attained, Koehl’s detachment had been engaged in continuous fighting, often on a considerable scale, against the enemy divisions which were advancing on Nanungu from Port Amelia. At Medo the enemy, according to his own statement, suffered heavy losses in one engagement west of Medo. Captain Spangenberg, with his two companies, had succeeded in getting round the enemy, falling on and capturing from the rear his light field howitzer battery. Nearly all the men and horses of this battery were killed. Unfortunately it was not possible to remove the guns and ammunition. They were rendered useless. But in spite of this individual success, Koehl’s detachment had to retire. The moment was approaching when the timely intervention of my main force with Koehl’s detachment might bring about a decisive success against General Edwards. Once more, however, the question of supplies dragged our movements. The crops of the district had all been consumed, except the Mtama, which ripens much earlier in this country than in German East Africa. But it was not yet ripe. In order to avoid having to withdraw simply for reasons of supply, we ripened the Mtama artificially by drying it. This made the grain quite edible, and as there was plenty of it in the district everyone got as much as he wanted, and there was no want.

The condition of the crops prompted me to march with the main body of the force further south-west, in the direction of Mahua, and pitch my camp beside the Koroma mountain, not far from the Timbani mountain. I intended, if necessary, to march further south, to avail myself of the abundant crops in the fertile districts near the confluence of the Malma and Lurio rivers. West of the Timbani mountain the country was favourable for a decisive action against General Edwards, who was following Captain Koehl’s detachment south-west from Nanungu. The extraordinarily rocky and broken country near the mountain, and four miles north-east of it, as far as the place to which Koehl’s detachment had retired, was not favourable for the decisive attack I had in view. On 21st May smoke indicated fresh enemy camps west of the positions of Koehl’s detachment. I guessed that this new enemy would march on 22nd May to take Koehl’s detachment in the rear from the west. Unfortunately I omitted to give Koehl’s detachment definite orders to withdraw their main force immediately from the unfavourable country to the south-west of the Timbani mountain. Instead of a positive order I gave him instructions which left him too much freedom of action.

Thus it came about that Koehl’s detachment did not get their bearers with the ammunition and baggage on the march until the forenoon of the 22nd of May. Even then all would have been well if the Governor, who had attached himself to Koehl’s division, had not marched at their head. Not understanding the seriousness of the situation, he made a considerable halt in the middle of this unfavourable country, where he was exposed to a surprise attack from the enemy at any moment, without being able to put up an effective defence. The bearers of Koehl’s detachment, in spite of Captain Koehl’s orders, allowed themselves to halt likewise. During the morning of this day, I once more personally reconnoitred the very favourable country south-west of the Timbani mountain, and met, among others, Lieutenant Kempner, who had been wounded the day before with Koehl’s detachment and carried to the rear. From Koehl’s detachment itself, where, since the morning, several enemy attacks had been beaten off, sounds of distant fighting were to be heard. There was telephonic communication with Captain Koehl, and I returned about 11 a.m. to the Koroma camp without having any idea of the situation of his transport. At noon I had just entered the camp when suddenly there was a loud sound of firing, from a very short distance, of trench-mortars, beyond doubt between us and Koehl’s detachment. Immediately afterwards telephonic communication in that direction was broken off. There was no alternative but to march my whole force immediately from the Koroma camp against this new enemy. I secretly hoped that, in spite of the unfavourable country, we might perhaps succeed in taking him by surprise, and in inflicting a decisive defeat. Barely an hour later we reached the Timbani mountain and quickly threw back the advanced detachment of the enemy. A few scattered men reported that the Governor and Captain Koehl’s transport had been surprised by the enemy and all the baggage lost. The Governor himself had only just managed to get away; others said he had been taken prisoner. The enemy had opened a fairly lively fire with several mine-throwers, and was attacked by our companies from several sides. He had, however, taken up a good position, in which he entrenched himself and had hidden part of the captured baggage. Unfortunately we only recaptured a small quantity. But the enemy position was surrounded and subjected to a concentrated and gruelling fire. According to a dispatch captured later, the 1st King’s African Rifles alone lost about two hundred men.

Native Types (5).
(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)

Native Types (6).
(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck’s Adjutant.)