We must then endeavor to establish our peace and quiet on our own reformation and on the moderation of our passions. We cannot dispose of the minds or the tongues of others ... we are enjoined to work on ourselves and to correct our own faults.
There is nothing more useful than to suppress one’s complaining and resentment. It is the surest way to appease differences at their birth and prevent their increase; it is a charity we practice towards ourselves by procuring to ourselves the good of patience ... it is a charity we do to others in bearing with their foibles, in sparing them the little shame they have deserved, and the new faults they might commit in justifying themselves.
But it is not possible for us to observe outwardly such discretion, if we allow our resentment to work inwardly in all its force and violence. The outward complaints come from the inward, and it is very difficult to hold them back, if one’s mind is full of them; they always escape and break through some opening or other.... We must, therefore, also quench the complaints which the soul engenders.
Among the subjects of complaint which other men give us, and which should be treated with contempt, Nicole points out particularly:
“False judgments, slander, rudeness, negligence, reserve, or want of confidence, ingratitude, disagreeable tempers, etc.”
Let us merely repeat what he says of the unfavorable judgments of others regarding us:
“There is a ridiculous oddity in this spite which we feel when we hear of the unfavorable judgments and remarks made about us; for one must have very little knowledge of the world to suppose it generally possible that they would not be made. Princes are talked against in their ante-chambers; their servants mimic them. There is nothing so common as to speak of the defects of one’s friends and pride one’s self in pointing them frankly out to others. There are even occasions when this may be done innocently.... It is, therefore, ridiculous to expect being spared ... for there is no time when we may not be generally sure either that people talk or have talked about us otherwise than we should wish.... We show annoyance at these judgments when they are expressly reported to us ... yet the report itself adds next to nothing to the matter, for before it was made we ought to have been almost sure that we and our faults were unpleasantly commented on.... If this resentment were just, one would then have to be always angry, or never so, because it is unjust. But to keep very quiet, as we do, though we should know that there are people laughing at us, and to be disturbed and upset when we are told what we already knew, is a ridiculous foible.”
63. Social virtues—Kant’s advice.—Kant has also treated the duties of kindness towards men, under the title of Social Virtues.[48]
“It is a duty to one’s self as well as to others to carry the commerce of life to the highest degree of moral perfection; not to isolate one’s self; not only to have the happiness of the world in view ideally, but to cultivate the means which indirectly lead to it; urbanity in social relations, gentleness, reciprocal love and respect, affability and propriety, thus adding the graces to virtue, for this also is a duty of virtue.
“These, it is true, are but external and accessory works, presenting a fine appearance of virtue, which, however, deceives no one, because every one knows how much to think of it. It is but a sort of small coin; but the effort we are obliged to make to bring this appearance as near to the truth as possible, helps the sentiment of virtue greatly along. An easy access, an amiable mode of speech, politeness, hospitality, that gentleness in controversy which keeps off all quarrel—all these forms of sociability are external obligations which put also the others under obligation, and which favor the sentiment of virtue in rendering it at least amiable.