Since a cloud of military secrecy covers the functions of the Council, some notion of its operation and working authority may be found by analogy with the role of the Central Political Council, which it has displaced. According to the leading Chinese constitutional writer on the subject, the Central Political Council (also called [Central] Political Committee)—for which read Supreme National Defense Council today—acted as follows:
According to Article IV of the Principles Governing the Organization of the C. E. C. [of the Kuomintang] passed ... December 6, XXIV (1935), "the Central Executive Committee organizes a Political Committee, composed of a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, and nineteen to twenty-five members, appointed by the Central Executive Committee, from among the members of the Central Executive Committee and the Control Committee." ... "During a session of the Political Committee, the Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Central Standing Committees, the President of the National Government, the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five Yüan, and the President and Vice-President of the Military Affairs Commission should be present, while the leading members of the special technical committees under the [control] Political Committee, and other higher officials of the National Government may be notified if necessary to attend the sessions." [The author explains that, on the basis of actual experience, "may be notified" signifies "shall attend if matters relevant to their functions arise.">[ ...
It was originally fixed that the Political Committee should meet once every week, but since December XXIV (1935), it holds meetings either weekly or fortnightly. The number of members required to constitute a forum is not fixed, and resolutions have never been put in the form of motions requiring formal vote. Regarding the proposition of a motion, and the discussion of motions proposed ex-tempore, the Political Committee has never fixed any rigid regulations; moreover, even if a rule had been established at one time, it has not been followed closely later. Before being put to a decision, a motion is either studied and examined beforehand, or it is not. There is no definite rule as to whether every motion should be so studied or not, but the Committee possesses the power to decide this point ad hoc. The entire wording of a motion passed in a meeting is rarely fully read, and is then read in the following session as the minutes of the previous session. Hence the Chairman and the Secretary-General have a certain liberty in the framing of the wording of resolutions. Judging from above circumstances, important resolutions passed in the Political Committee must actually represent the opinions of the Chairman and a small number of influential members.... [Italics added in translation.][8]
Many of these features may reasonably be conjectured to have continued in the Supreme National Defense Council, although the regular meetings—whatever others there may be—seem to be considerably less frequent, occurring presumably about once in five weeks.[9] In the matter of authority, again, some continuity may be supposed between the earlier agency and the later. Wang Shih-chieh continues:
The authority of the Political Committee (or the Political Council) has undergone very few changes since its establishment. To speak concisely, the Political Committee is the highest directing organ of all governmental policies. Putting it in more detail, we may say that this Committee has the power to decide the basic principles of legislation, of governmental policies and their execution, and has also the power to appoint and dismiss governmental officials.... [A footnote adds the following detail.] According to the outlines of organization now being enforced, there are still five kinds of affairs that should be discussed and decided by the Political Committee: (1) the basic principles of legislation, (2) the general plans of executing government policies, (3) important plans concerning military affairs, (4) financial plans, (5) the appointment of officials of the Especially Appointed category and of other governmental officials, and (6) [sic] cases submitted for discussion by the Central Executive Committee. The first four may be collectively classified under the two names of execution and legislation.[10]
Only from such description by analogy may the foreigner penetrate to the inmost source of Chinese policy. This ambiguous and all-powerful agency, a Party organ which controls government, a committee constellated about its charismatic Chairman, is the heir both of the Grand Council of the Manchu Empire and of the soviets established by Nationalists during the entente with Soviet Russia. Should the fortune of war remove the Generalissimo from the scene, this Council would become the storm center of power; under his guidance and leadership, this agency above all others distinguishes China from an outright dictatorship. Chiang, unlike many other national leaders, has consistently shrunk from the regalia of arbitrary power. In the highest matters, and at the ultimate control, his action is veiled in the Supreme National Defense Council. The actual play of personalities and power is hidden from us, his contemporaries. Only the future may discover the exact degrees and modus operandi of his authority.
The President of the National Government
The term National Government (Kuo-min Chêng-fu) is employed in two senses. In the broad sense, it refers to the entire central government of China. In the narrow sense, it is a synonym for National Government Committee (Kuo-min Chêng-fu Wei-yüan-hui), commonly translated as Council of State. The highest governmental officer of China is the Kuo-min Chêng-fu Chu-hsi—literally, the Chairman of the National Government. Since this officer is the formal head of the National Government in both senses of the term, his office may with equal appropriateness be described as Chairmanship of the Council of State and as Presidency of the National Government. The latter has been most commonly accepted, although it obscured the clarity of the Chinese governmental pattern. It is essential to note, however, that in the National Government period there has been no President of the Chinese Republic; the highest officer has been the President of the National Government of the Chinese Republic, and as such the titular head of the Chinese state for international purposes. This officer possesses prestige rather than power, and is roughly analogous to the President of the Third French Republic.
In his official capacity, the President acts as chairman of the meetings of the Council of State, performs the ceremonial functions entailed by his office, and serves as the custodian of the symbols of continuity and legitimacy. Wang Shih-chieh writes: "... the Chairman more or less occupies a nominal position. At most, he can give occasional advice, only within certain limits, to the Executive or other Yüan, with no power at all to decide or to reject the policies adopted by the Yüan. As a matter of fact, from the end of the Year XXI (1932) down to the present, since the man filling the office of Chairman [President] of the National Government is very calm and law-abiding, he has never interfered in the activities or policies of the various Yüan."[11] This officer has been the veteran Kuomintang leader, Lin Shên, long a resident of the United States, a key man in overseas affairs of the Party, and a person of much dignity, charm, poise and prestige. With a long beard and a humane, scholarly demeanor, President Lin has fulfilled most admirably the requirements of his office.
Generalissimo Chiang regularly reports on government activities to Lin Chu-hsi, addressing him attentively and respectfully. This is no perfunctory sham, but appears to be a very real search for advice and guidance. The two men are close associates and have been such for many years; the Generalissimo gives every indication of regarding his venerable colleague with affectionate esteem. During the Chungking bombings, the President has commonly resided in a secure place outside the city. He is not needed for the daily prosecution of the war, but both the office and its incumbent are strongly stabilizing factors in the National Government. (The Japanophile Wang Ch'ing-wei, establishing his duplicate regime in Nanking, left the Presidency open for many months, pirating Lin Shên's name. Finally Wang gave himself the title, although he patently would have preferred Lin.)