CHINA BREAKS WITH GERMANY
The time came for the United States to sever relations with the German Kaiser's government. I had taken advantage of the clear sunshine and mild air on Sunday, February 4, 1917, to visit Doctor Morrison at his cottage outside of Peking near the race-course. After lunch a messenger came from the Legation, bringing word that an important cablegram had arrived and was being decoded. I returned to town, and at the Legation Mr. White handed me the decoded message which said that the American Government had not only broken off diplomatic relations with Germany, but that it trusted the neutral powers would associate themselves with the American Government in this action of protest against an intolerable practice; this would make for the peace of the world. I was instructed to communicate all this to the Chinese Government.
After a conference with the first secretary, Mr. MacMurray, and the Chinese secretary, Doctor Tenney, I made an engagement to see the President and the Premier on that same evening. I felt justified in assuming that the invitation to the neutrals to join the United States was more than a pious wish and that there was some probability that the European neutrals would support our protest. As to China I had already informed the Government that we could reasonably expect support there. I therefore considered it to be the policy of the Government to assure a common demonstration on the part of all neutral powers, strong enough to bring Germany to a halt. So far as my action was concerned, I therefore saw the plain duty to prevail upon China to associate herself with the American action as proposed by my government.
I found President Li Yuan-hung resting after dinner in his palace and in an amiably expectant mood. With him was Mr. Quo Tai-chi, his English secretary. He was plainly startled by the prospect of having to consider so serious a matter, and did not at first say anything, but sat silently thinking. His doubts and objections were revealed rather through questions than by direct statements. "What is the present state of the war, and what the relative strength or degree of exhaustion of the belligerent parties?" "Could the Allies, even with the assistance of the United States, win a decisive victory?" Finally, he said: "The effect of such a far-reaching international act upon the internal situation in China will have to be carefully considered."
The President's secretary appeared strongly impressed with the favourable aspects of our proposal, so that he began to argue a little with the President. On my part, I pointed out the effects which a positive act of international assertion in behalf of a just cause and well-disposed associates would have upon China by taking attention off her endless factional conflicts. When I touched upon the ethical phases of the matter, the President fully agreed with me. I had particularly impressed upon him the need of prompt action in order that counsels might not be confused by adverse influences from without.
We next drove to the residence of the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, who was then playing an important part in the politics Of China. I recalled my first interview with him when he had received me in a dingy room, himself wearing a frowzy long coat and exhibiting a general air of tedium and lack of energy. There was no suggestion of the military man about him. The qualities upon which General Tuan's great influence is founded become apparent only upon a longer and more intimate acquaintance. Despite his real indolence, his wisdom, his fundamental honesty, and his readiness to shield his subordinates and to assume responsibility himself have made this quiet and unobtrusive man the most prominent leader among the Chinese militarists. His interest centres chiefly in the education of military officers. He is no politician and is bored by political theory. He is always ready to turn over the handling of affairs to subordinates, by whom he is often led into a course which he might not himself have chosen. This, coupled with extraordinary stubbornness, accounts for his influence often tending to be disastrous to his country. His personality, however, with its simplicity and pensiveness, and his real wisdom when he lets his own nature guide him, make him one of the attractive figures of China.
Though in himself the principal influence in the Government, Tuan left all details to his assistants, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin and General Hsu Shu-cheng. He preferred to play chess. He was, however, always ready to shoulder responsibility for what his subordinates had done. Often when he was deep in a game of Chinese chess, his mind focussed on the complexities of this difficult pastime, General Hsu would approach him with some proposal. Giving only half an ear to it, the Premier would respond, "All right" (How how). When, later, the results of the action thus taken turned out to be bad and the Premier asked for an explanation, he was reminded that he had himself authorized it. He would then faintly recollect, and would make a gesture toward his shoulder, which indicated that—very well—he took the responsibility.
But on this occasion General Tuan was all attention. He had with him Mr. C.C. Wu of the Foreign Office, who continued throughout these negotiations to act as interpreter. The circumstance that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, was ill and had to be represented by his son, and that in all important interviews both the Premier and young Mr. Wu were present, greatly facilitated the business and saved time which would have been needed to carry on parallel conversations in the Foreign Office and with the Premier. General Tuan was far from accepting the proposal at first sight. "It would be wise for Germany to modify her submarine policy," he stated, "because in land warfare she could press her opponents so seriously that her absolute defeat would be difficult unless the United States entered the war." He appeared to contemplate the possibility of China taking so unprecedented a step as the breaking of relations with a great power with less concern than did the President. We arranged for a longer discussion on the following day.
Far into that night I was in conference with the legation staff, and with certain non-official Americans and Britishers of great influence among the Chinese. These men looked with enthusiasm upon the idea of an association with the United States, aligning against Germany the vast population of China. While the energies and resources of China were not sufficiently mobilized to be of immediate use in the war, yet by systematic preparation they might bring an enormous accession of strength to the Allies if the war should last long. We felt, also, that through positive alliance with the declared policy of the United States, China would greatly strengthen herself internally and externally.