In order to give the public an opportunity of informing itself concerning the conduct and development of foreign affairs, the United States Government has from an early date published an annual collection of diplomatic correspondence. Since 1861, this publication is known as Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. It was formerly published within two or three years of the year to which it related, but during the war this interval was considerably extended. The precedents and principles elaborated in the diplomatic correspondence of the United States have been collected, codified and published in a very important and useful compendium by Francis Wharton, under the title of Digest of International Law. This work was expanded, amplified and brought down to date by Prof. John Bassett Moore, under the same title, in 1906. It is of the highest importance, not only as a repository of diplomatic and legal precedent, but as a definite and public record of the position taken by the American Government on all international questions that had arisen up to the date of its publication. The preparation of such digest on the part of other governments is highly to be desired for the purpose of clarifying international law and policy, and for giving them a sound basis of reason and experience upon which the people and governments may rely. The fact that a precedent reported in this digest, might be cited against the American Government as an admission, does not imply a disadvantage which would at all offset the benefits resulting in general from public knowledge.
With respect to the details of negotiation, there are confidential relationships which have always been observed by the American Government. Ordinary considerations of courtesy require that those who may speak to us frankly in confidence shall not be made to suffer by being quoted and thus perhaps be exposed to misunderstanding and criticism. On our part, in preparing a sound basis of action, favorable as well as unfavorable matters have to be considered; yet there is ordinarily no need of publicly advertising the shortcomings of individuals and governments as set forth in reports on such unfavorable matters. Such considerate action is not based on a desire to mislead or to take advantage, but to save unnecessary irritation. For the purpose of permitting complete freedom of discussion and of criticism without the risk of giving offense, the United States Senate, as a matter of its ordinary procedure, goes into secret session when discussing a treaty submitted to it. There have, however, been several exceptions. Thus, for instance, the debates on the Bayard-Chamberlain Fisheries Treaty of 1888, on the Taft arbitration treaties of 1912, and on the Nicaragua Treaty of 1916, were carried on, and concluded, in open session. Many senators are in favor of making this the common practice.
Before the war, as Prof. John Bassett Moore, whose knowledge of the records is unequaled, said to me, the State Department had no secrets whatsoever, with the exception of personnel reports. We, too, however, can depart from a well-established tradition, as is shown by our diplomatic history during the war. I do not believe it will ever be charged that in any matter big or little the American Government sought narrow, selfish advantages. Secrecy due to such motives, there was none. There was no American policy or enterprise that needed concealment, apart from military policies and strategy during a war. When I glanced over at the end of my mission in Peking the extra-confidential cable correspondence, I was inwardly amazed by the entire lack of anything that really needed concealing, in that closely guarded dossier.
Yet American diplomacy did during the war fall somewhat under the spell of the traditional methods still in vogue in Europe. We were not a party to any secret engagements for the division of spoils after the war, although from the time of the peace conference on, the influence of the American Government was exercised mostly in secret, and the agreements subsidiary to the general settlement were secretly signed. These did not contain any apportionment of advantage to the United States, but on the contrary were supposed to contain the nearest approach to the equitable ideas of American policy which was, under existing conditions, obtainable. But throughout this trying period the conduct of American diplomacy did not rest on the foundation of a continuous, frank appeal to the public opinion of our own nation or of the world.
Even before the armistice some very important matters were dealt with in this fashion. Though the permanent importance of the Lansing-Ishii note as affecting in a concrete and specific way the definition of rights and policies in the Far East is very doubtful, yet in its immediate effect under all of the circumstances of the time, this was certainly a noteworthy document to issue from the American foreign office. Yet, its conception and execution was absolutely surrounded with secrecy so that not even the high officials normally consulted in such matters, with the exception of the Secretary of State himself, were informed as to what was coming. This secrecy worked entirely in the interest of the Japanese government. By privately giving out the agreement in Japan and in China before the date when its publication had been agreed upon, the Japanese government succeeded to a certain extent and for a time, in giving this matter the appearance of a great Japanese diplomatic victory and of a highly important concession on the part of the United States.
It is not necessary to recall the general disillusionment that came about when President Wilson agreed to the policy of secrecy at the peace conference. Undoubtedly this decision was based on the motive to secure, with a promptness required by the stress of the times, a settlement which would in general commend itself to the sense of justice of the world, although it might necessarily contain details which, if published by themselves, would cause lengthy public discussion and delay the final solution. If such an expectation was entertained, it was not as a matter of fact fulfilled in the results of these secret consultations. The method adopted did not favor the broad and permanent view, but rather the more shortsighted bargaining in which the old diplomacy excels. In their solutions neither the consultations of the peace conference, nor the subsequent diplomatic negotiations among the Allies, got beyond the old methods of bartering the destinies of small and weak peoples, which had been used by the Congresses of Vienna and of Berlin with disastrous results. The various conferences of 1919 to 1920 recorded a complete return to the system of secret diplomacy, to such an extent that it appeared constantly as if the plenipotentiaries feared to let their doings be known. Even when there was no reason from any point of view for concealment, information came out in a roundabout fashion which left the public mind confused; as for instance in the giving out of a decision regarding the fate of Constantinople, and in the reports concerning the text of President Wilson’s Adriatic memorandum which were current before its publication.
From the entanglements of this procedure American diplomacy did not keep itself free, nor did it, at this time, assist the world in finding a more straightforward method more in accord with American political experience.
The disadvantages of secret methods of transacting public business have been brought home to the American people through several incidental matters of no small importance. It evidently was the intention of President Wilson to reserve American rights as to the Island of Yap which is a vital link in the chain of cable communication between America and the Far East, and a reservation of this kind is indicated by references in the official minutes, though not by a written protocol. Without the knowledge of the United States, the Council of the League of Nations later disposed of the mandate for all of the North Pacific Islands. As this action was secret, it could not be known whether the American interest bearing on Yap Island had been safeguarded or not. It was stated as late as January 26, 1921, that the American Government was not in possession of the greater part of the minutes of the Peace Conference. Notwithstanding the protests of the United States, Japan based her claim to the North Pacific Islands on the secret treaties made during the war.
The secrecy of the peace conference, and the revelations before and during its sessions, concerning the secret treaties for the division of the spoils, produced a great disillusionment in the public mind. The fact that the United States though asked to make enormous sacrifices in the common cause had been kept in the dark concerning at least some of these treaties, and particularly of those which affected its own interest, did not inspire the American public with any confidence in the general conduct of affairs among the nations.
After the adjournment of the conference the American President and Government still continued to take a part in the various attempts to settle outstanding questions, particularly with respect to the Adriatic. When President Wilson towards the end of February, 1920, addressed a note to the allied powers concerning the Adriatic settlement, the documents and negotiations which had gone before were entirely unknown to the public. On December 9, 1919, an agreement had been signed by Great Britain, France and the United States, Undersecretary Polk signing for the latter. On January 9th, the British and French premiers had agreed with the Italian premier on a modified plan of settlement. On February 10th, the American Secretary of State wrote a note containing President Wilson’s objections to the plan of January 9th. The allied premiers replied to this note on February 18th. All these agreements and this correspondence were kept secret, nor was President Wilson’s final answer given out for some time; only more or less accurate prognostications appeared in the press.