The American Government at this time was at a disadvantage in not participating in the negotiations directly; the American ambassador at Paris was invited from time to time to hear what the conference of premiers cared to tell him, but the proceedings of the conference were apparently not transmitted to the American Government. The British press at the time quite generally expressed great dissatisfaction with the methods followed by the diplomats. The Westminster Gazette wrote: “The whole of both peoples is acutely concerned in the result. We must, therefore, register a protest against the manner in which the negotiations are being conducted. They are being carried on in secrecy, only broken by unreliable rumors, by the three principal governments. The peoples have a right to know what is being done in their name, so that they may be able to protest, if need be, against decisions which may affect their future relations.” The Times protested: “We are not going to stand by and have our friendship and relations with America jeopardized by the proceedings of a triumvirate sitting behind closed doors. The American democracy, we imagine, will not be less resolved to assert their rights and stifle this effort at secret diplomacy.”

At this time Mr. Bonar Law, the government spokesman in the House of Commons, denied absolutely that a harsh and uncompromising reply had originally been drafted to President Wilson’s despatch, and that it had subsequently been changed through the influence of Viscount Grey and Lord Robert Cecil. The Times characterized this denial as “an example of verbal quibbling which inferior intelligences mistake for diplomacy,” and maintained that “though it may be verbally true, it conveys and is designed to convey what is untrue”; and the Daily Mail stated that the country owed a debt of gratitude to Lord Grey for his activities in the matter. This all illustrates on how insecure a foundation, and with what chances of confusion, public opinion has to work in matters of foreign affairs where the practices of the old diplomacy are followed.

The American people at this time very nearly lost patience with the entire business, and turned away from European affairs with complete disgust. This is the most outstanding effect produced by the secret diplomacy of Europe as far as the American people are concerned. The danger now is that their feeling of disgust and confusion, and their impatience with the selfish and shortsighted manipulations of European diplomacy, will over-emphasize the desire of America to live by and for herself alone. If such a mood and temper should prevail, it would be a great loss to America and to the world. At no time has the world needed America more than at present, not so much from the point of view of direct economic assistance, as on account of the fact that American experience, principles and ideals constitute at the present time the hope of the peoples of the whole world; and America could, if she desired, exercise an enormous influence in making the popular desire for such action active, vital and fruitful.

But even aside from the general confidence which is felt by the peoples of Europe and Asia in the character and ideals of the United States, there are a great many specific contributions which America could make to the solution of European problems. No matter how much we shall desire during the next decade to hold aloof from Europe and to concentrate on our own affairs, nevertheless, should European affairs go radically wrong through a constant denial and deception of the hopes and aspirations of the people for honest and sensible solutions, America in the end will again have to share the burden thus laid on the shoulders of mankind.

The fundamental American principle that treaties have the force and status of law contains in itself the promise of solving some of the worst troubles of the world, if it could be generally applied. America should continue, for her own safety and that of the world, to use her whole influence for making that principle a part of the universal public law. No international engagement shall be binding unless ratified by a representative body, and published to all the nations. Otherwise it shall be absolutely void, and shall not give rise to any rights or obligations; in fact, an attempt to make an agreement contrary to these conditions shall be considered an act hostile to the peace of the world. That should be the recognized law.

Nothing shows so clearly how human development has halted at this point, as the fact that it should still require an argument to show the necessity of publicity and lawfulness with respect to the most essential interests of the vast populations that make up the international family.

The record and constant practice of the United States, as well as her great actual and potential power, fit her above all others to be a leader in the establishment of this principle. The American nation possesses a great moral capital in the confidence and trust that the peoples of the world repose in it. No matter if unsympathetic chanceries should plot to prevent America from making her influence felt in the affairs of the world, no matter how European diplomacy may occasionally sneer at American idealism, the peoples themselves, great and small, including particularly those areas so immensely important—Russia and China—would willingly look to America for leadership and guidance, with complete trust and confidence. When this is fully realized, we shall also be able to judge how vitally what America stands for in the world will be strengthened by a constant adherence to open and straightforward methods in international intercourse.

But America herself, it will be said, cannot fundamentally change the spirit that animates foreign policies, and bring about the universal use of honest and open practices. We are living under a system which is the result of historic forces that have not yet fully spent themselves and which put the potential enmity among nations in the foreground.

I do not believe that it is necessary to shut our eyes to reality and to seek recourse in a Utopian policy, in order to escape the menace inherent in current international practices. If America will only not fall in line with the absolutist tradition in diplomacy, but will emphasize at all times, with all her influence, those principles of international conduct which our natural freedom from entanglements has permitted us to develop as of actual experience, America will contribute in a most potent manner to the realization of that new spirit which must surely come to deliver humanity. That spirit is not a mere ideal,—it is fortunately already present in much of international practice; but it needs constantly to be followed up and supported in order that it may become the customary and instinctive guide, superseding such prejudices as are still current which favor tortuous manipulation and perpetuate an uninformed and confused state of the public mind.

In order to fulfil this promise and destiny the United States would have to rely in the first place on the inherent merit of her ideals and principles of action, and on the support which they will receive from the approval of the peoples of the world. As far as organized governments go, as distinguished from the people, some will be more inclined than others to coöperate with the United States in a reform of international practice. There is no question but that the great majority of governments will thus coöperate, though some of the most important may for a time be left on the other side.