The offence, as I have told you, is put in these two shapes—the employing a vessel, and the loading goods for a purpose prohibited by the statute; that is, for the purpose of dealing in slaves. The charge is not, it does not necessarily import, nor is it necessary to support it, that it should be proved that the ship in question, the Augusta, was intended to be used for the conveyance of slaves from the coast of Africa. If there was a slave adventure—if there was an adventure of which the object was that slaves should be brought from the coast of Africa, that there should be slave trading there, and if this vessel was dispatched and employed for the purpose of accomplishing that object, although it was intended to accomplish that object otherwise than by bringing home the slaves in that vessel, that is within the Act of Parliament. So, if the goods were loaded for the purpose of accomplishing the slave trade—whether it was intended to bring back the slaves in the vessel in question, or that they should be brought away in some other vessel, or whether that was a matter left undecided at the commencement of the adventure, and to be determined according as matters might turn out to be convenient for the accomplishment of it—in any of these cases the crime charged in this indictment would be committed, the allegations in the indictment would be supported, and the prohibition of the Act of Parliament would be violated. The Act would have been very imperfect indeed, if it had prohibited slave trading and had not prevented any dealing of that description, except where the same vessel was to bring home the slaves; if, at all events, it went out for the purpose of carrying goods which were to be bartered for them. From one of the witnesses, who, in the course of his public duty was conversant with what takes place on this slave coast of Africa, we hear that it frequently happens that the slaves are got away by a different vessel from that which carries out the goods which formed the fund for their purchase. That is the nature of the offence.
Gentlemen, I do not think there will be any great difficulty in some of the preliminary questions you will have to decide upon this occasion. One is, whether the prisoner at the bar did at all dispatch, did at all employ this vessel, the Augusta, or did at all load any goods on board; because, though a person may employ a vessel and load goods—he may do that quite innocently—the fact, that he employed a vessel and loaded goods, is by no means conclusive of his guilt till you go further and show that he did it for the illegal purpose charged in the indictment. If it had not been shown that the prisoner at the bar did employ the vessel, or load the goods, the inquiry would have been stopped; for the purpose never could have been brought in question, and there would have been an end, or rather there would have been no beginning of this enquiry: but with respect to that branch of the case, there appears to have been no doubt made on the part of the prisoner that he did employ this vessel. He says he did it as the agent of Pedro Martinez & Co., and that he did it without knowing what the purpose was for which the vessel was employed, or whether it was employed in the slave trade; and that he did load the goods on board the ship—and there appears to be to the value of a good many thousand pounds, a considerable cargo (the value I get only from the cockets), a considerable quantity of goods. The vessel undoubtedly was dispatched with the knowledge of the prisoner and through his agency to carry goods to the coast of Africa. So much does not seem to be a matter in dispute.
Then the matters in dispute are two—one, whether this vessel was dispatched for the purpose of slave trading at all; if it was not, there is an end of all question. If it appears that there was no slave trading, or intention of slave trading, no person is guilty of the violation of the law charged in this indictment. There is no offence on the part of any one, if a slave adventure was not contemplated by the persons engaged in this transaction. Unless you decide that question in the affirmative, that is to say, unless you think there was such an adventure, there is no case made at all against the prisoner at the bar. It has been contended, and strenuously—not in a separate form, but mixed up with the other point in the case to which I will next draw your attention—it has been contended on the part of the prisoner, that there was no slave adventure, that the ship Augusta went to the Gallinas loaded in this way not for the purpose of dealing in slaves, or for any unlawful purpose, but that she went either for some lawful purpose, or else without any purpose of dealing at all: you will say whether there could be any such possibility. It has been contended that at any rate the ship did not go for the purpose of slave trading. If you are of opinion there was no slave trading contemplated, that that was not the object of the voyage, there is an end of that question; but, supposing you should think there was slave dealing intended, and the vessel went out for the purpose of slave dealing, then there is another important question—and that is the object of the evidence to character—whether, supposing there was a slave trading intended, the prisoner was cognizant of it?
It appears from the evidence, that the Gallinas is a place described by some witnesses of great experience—two captains in the navy, and Colonel Nichol, who was the governor of a district in the neighbourhood, whose employment was mainly to watch the slave coast of which the Gallinas forms a part, and to contribute to the putting down the slave trade—that the Gallinas is a place of slave trading, and of no other trade at all. It seems that the Gallinas is a river navigable for vessels of some size about twelve miles, that there were some barracoons for slaves which were destroyed by Captain Denman—destroyed, as it is alleged, by Captain Denman some time ago—there being about six establishments called barracoons, which seem to be very large buildings in which five or six hundred negroes may be confined, and are confined when brought from the country till they can be exported in vessels carrying on this trade. These barracoons have, by way of appendages to them, store-houses for the various stores that may be wanted for those negroes, and also some places of residence for the Europeans, who appear to be some thirty in number, who live there; there is nobody else living there, except that there are two or three negro villages or towns, not places of any trade, but inhabited by those uncivilised savages. The country produces nothing, and exports nothing but slaves—that is the description of the place given by that gentleman. It is said, and I think with great probability, that the Gallinas is not generally known as a slave trading place, in fact, it seems very little known at all; it seems to be a place where any other description of felons may resort to concert their schemes and hide their stolen goods, and which, of course, they do not make public, and which is not likely to be known by honest and true people. Except those employed as police or otherwise in aid of justice, as these captains were, of course it would not be spoken of at all. There might be slave traders in London knowing it very well, but they would be perfectly silent probably, and hardly mention it by name even in speaking one to another. It is very probable, therefore, that the place was not very well known; that when these persons spoke of the Gallinas, they might say the Gallinas on the coast of Africa; and a person might be very conversant with the geography of Africa in an honest way, who had not been active in putting down the slave trade, and yet might not know where it was, except that it was on the coast of Africa. It is important to show not only that it is on the coast of Africa, but that it is itself a slave trading place; and that fact appears to be very evident from the case on the part of the prosecution. Probably those honest persons, those honestly dealing persons who know best about it, are those who have been called upon by their public duty to ascertain it. Such persons have been called, and they give it this character and description, and they state that it is distinguished from other parts of the coast of Africa; for on other parts of that coast it is said slaves are sold as one article of export, but that other things, such as palm oil—I believe that is the principle thing—and ivory, and wood, and other things, are sold in immense quantities on the coast of Africa; but that that is not the case at the Gallinas. They might be carrying out goods to other parts of Africa, intending to bring home palm-oil or slaves, as might be most profitable; they might intend to bring home an honest commodity, and not have to do with this dishonest and perilous commodity; but it appears difficult to conceive what a person carrying a cargo of goods to the Gallinas could intend to do with it, unless he intended to have those goods employed in the slave trade. The prisoner might say they were to be employed by others in the slave trade; that would be plain and simple: it is wrong, but it is a plain and simple account of that which was intended to be done. It is a place, as it appears, without any trade; and if there be an obvious plain interest in a person carrying goods to that place, it appears to me that it may be taken that they were for the purpose of the slave trade. If that be the plain and obvious inference, it appears to me that might be the inference very properly drawn by Colonel Nichol, that this was a slave adventure, unless the contrary were proved.
It is possible that this might be an adventure, not slave trading; if so, nothing can be more simple than to prove it; Martinez & Co. might prove that it is an honest adventure. If it was a dishonest adventure, it could not be expected that Martinez & Co. should be called to give evidence at all; but if it were an innocent adventure it would be very easy for them to be called. It is true that persons are to be convicted, not by evidence they did not produce, but by evidence produced against them; not on suspicion, but on conviction; but where such evidence is offered of the trade being slave trading, as is offered here, namely, that the vessel was loaded with goods, that a cargo of goods was dispatched to a place where slave trading is the only known object for which vessels ever go, a slave mart and nothing but a slave mart, you have a case, though it is an answerable case; but if the answer, which if it exist could be easily given, is not given, it may very fairly be inferred that the vessel was proceeding on a slaving voyage, a voyage either for the purpose of bringing home slaves, or of landing those goods for the purchase of slaves. That, Gentlemen, is the first question you have to consider. You will say whether, considering the nature of this charge, and considering that the vessel is chartered to go from this place to the Gallinas, that being the place and the only place mentioned in the charter-party for the outward voyage, she might have been subsequently employed in voyages to the West Indies or Madeira, at the discretion of the charterers; but it will be for you to say whether, in your judgment, in your opinion, on this occasion the vessel did not sail for the purpose of her being employed, or the goods on board her being employed, for the trading in slaves. If you are not satisfied of that, it will be your duty to give a verdict of not guilty. You need not trouble yourselves to go further, but the prisoner must be acquitted.
Gentlemen, I have not read over to you the evidence which establishes these facts I have mentioned to you, namely, that the vessel was chartered. You have heard the charter-party, and you have heard what Mr. Zulueta says in his evidence, that he did dispatch the vessel, and that the house were the agents in sending the vessel abroad, and in putting the goods on board; and you have heard the remainder of the evidence. I suppose I need not read the evidence which the captains gave at such great length.
Foreman of the Jury. No, my Lord.
Mr. Justice Maule. These are facts not disputed, except that it is disputed that the vessel went out for the purpose of slave trading—that is an inference to be drawn or not from the evidence.
Then the next question, and an important question is, whether the prisoner at the bar, Pedro de Zulueta, is a person who was cognizant of that fact. It certainly is a very grave and serious charge, and one of a very highly penal nature. It is, however, a trade, which till a recent period was lawful for persons in this country, and many persons of very good character certainly did engage in that trade, and a great number of persons justified it. I suppose those same persons would now say it is not to be engaged in, because it is a prohibited thing—it is a regulation of trade enforced by very severe penalties made by this country—but that the dealing in slaves is in itself a lawful, right, good, and proper thing, which ought not to be prohibited. Those persons would now consider slave trading as a thing prohibited only by positive regulation. There is no one who does not at once perceive that practical distinction between them. There is no person who, in point of feeling and opinion, does not perceive the difference there is between a thing which is prohibited by positive law, and that kind of thing, against which, if there were no law at all against it, the plain natural sense and conscience of mankind would revolt. This trading in slaves, in the opinion of a great many persons, is itself an abomination, a thing which ought to be considered with the greatest horror, whether prohibited or not; but those who think it was right when it was not prohibited, probably do not think it so very bad if it be committed now, since it has been prohibited by law, only that it is to be avoided on account of the penalty to which it subjects the individuals engaged in it.
This has some bearing on the question of how far considerations of character would have weight with respect to such an offence; but it is necessary undoubtedly on the part of the prosecution that there should be a case made of knowledge on the part of the prisoner, of the purpose for which this adventure was meant. Now, with respect to that, it is taken partly from what he says before the Committee of the House of Commons, and partly what is given in evidence here, that the house of Zulueta & Co., (of which the prisoner appears to be an active member, and with the whole proceedings of which in this matter he appears certainly according to the statement he himself made to the Committee of the House of Commons to have been quite conversant)—and it is admitted that the house of Zulueta were the doers in this country of whatever was done with respect to this vessel, the Augusta—the Augusta had been called the Gollupchik, had been captured as a slaving vessel, and she was then fitted up with the apparatus fitted to that traffic; she was brought to this country and proceeded against, and ultimately sold, whether sold under a condemnation which turned out effectual or not does not distinctly appear. Some one has said that the Russian Government claimed her, and she was given up to the Russian Government. It appears, however, that she was sold at Portsmouth; I think she was sold to Mr. Emanuel, or some person for whom he acted, for 600l., and the expenses, which were about 30l. Then she was bought with money furnished by Zulueta & Co., the amount being 650l.—it does not exactly appear by whom—according to the testimony one would say, bought by Jennings, who was employed as captain on the voyage in question, a letter having been previously written by the prisoner’s house, stating to Jennings that they could not give more than 500l., but it appears that ultimately 660l. was paid for her. On the occasion on which that money was paid, the witness says, “I sold her to Jennings and Bernardos; Bernardos came with Jennings—they came together and paid the money.” Now, probably you must not take that quite to the letter. This was a ship sold, not by means of a written instrument as the subject of a British registry, but as any other British chattel might be sold, such and such a bale of goods, merely by agreement altogether verbally, that one should have the goods and the other the money, the article being handed over when it was so sold. All that the seller cares for is, that he shall have his money. Whether there are one or a dozen persons present he may very properly, as a matter of business, leave it to them whether one or all of them is to pay the money. The witness who is called, Mr. Emanuel, seems to have thought that Bernardos and the other bought the vessel; but it seems, according to the charter-party, that the other party, Jennings, is the only purchaser. According to a representation I think made at the bar by Mr. Kelly, the real purchasers were Pedro Martinez & Co., who wanted Jennings for some purpose to appear as colourable owner, and wanted Jennings to command the vessel. An Englishman could not by the laws of Spain command a Spanish owned vessel, and Jennings therefore, if he was to command her, should be apparently made the owner of her, and that is the reason suggested why Jennings was made the owner (if he was the owner) by the desire of Pedro Martinez & Co.