At the end of the charter-party there is a recital, that whereas the owner, Jennings, is indebted to the charterer in a certain sum of money, as appears by an acknowledgment elsewhere, he consents that the earnings of the vessel shall be a lien for the money. Now that refers you see to another document, which other document, if we had it, would throw some light upon the transaction, but it is not called for or produced. The circumstance of Jennings being the commander, and made owner for the purpose of being the commander in apparent consistency with the law of Spain, may account for that which has been put very powerfully on the part of the prisoner as having been inexplicable on the supposition that any slave trade was intended; for, they say, if the slave trade was intended, why not have a Spanish captain; because then, though perhaps within the terms of the treaties there might be a power of search on the part of British cruizers, no power was given by foreigners which was not watched by those who gave that power, and such power might be exceeded by those who exercised it, who were not lawyers or special pleaders; and it is said it would be much more convenient in case of search to have that difficulty thrown in the way than the total absence of all difficulty which exists when a ship professes to be British owned. But if Jennings was an adventurer, if he were, as suggested, a very clever and intelligent person, and very conversant with every thing to be done on this occasion, a competent master of the vessel, supposing the slave trade to be intended, a thing which requires qualities one is sorry to see exercised so ill—a great deal of courage, sagacity, and presence of mind, and an unscrupulous readiness to employ them for the commission of this felony, not to be found in every body—a man of such a description would be the paramount object of a slave trader, whose aim would be, whoever the owner may be, to elude all search, so to manage the thing as that the cruizers of any country shall not stop him. Probably, if the adventure succeeds, it must succeed by such means; so that one sees a perfectly good reason why, consistently with this being a slave trading voyage, it may have been English owned.
The sale is negotiated in the first instance by Zulueta & Co.; they say they do it for Martinez. The vessel was bought by Bernardos or Jennings. I do not know whether I called your attention to that, that Bernardos was the man who commanded the vessel on an undoubted slave voyage when she was seized and brought into Portsmouth. Whether Pedro Martinez or the captain bought the ship, or however it was bought, that transaction appears to have been managed by Zulueta & Co., and through the intervention of Jennings.
Then there comes the transaction of chartering. The vessel was chartered subject to this proviso at the end of it, and the charter-party is negotiated entirely by Zulueta. Whatever Pedro Martinez & Co., supposing there were such persons (and it may be taken that there were such persons, though the evidence of there being such persons is, that Mr. Zulueta says so in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, and it is a fact the negative of which could easily have been proved, but it has not been proved); you may fairly assume, therefore, that there are such persons as Pedro Martinez & Co., for that observation of the learned counsel for the prisoner on the statement of Mr. Zulueta before the Committee is as far as it applies to that particular part of the evidence well founded, namely, that if it were not true the contrary might be proved; but that is not true in the generality to which Mr. Kelly applied it, for there might be a great many statements in that evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons which were not true, but which the prosecutor would not be allowed to prove were not true—I mean those not connected with this particular transaction. There are many things stated in that evidence, which I apprehend, if false, the prosecutor would not be entitled to prove the falsehood of; but I apprehend that does not apply to the existence of Pedro Martinez & Co. But they appear to have existed and to have employed as their agents in this country Pedro Zulueta & Co., and whatever is done in this country by Pedro Martinez is done by Pedro Zulueta & Co. just as much as if they had done it themselves; they knew as much about the matter as the parties themselves; they negotiated this charter-party, and they dispatched the vessel and put on board all the goods. The goods appear by the cockets to have been entered in the name of Captain Jennings; I do not know that that is a circumstance of any suspicion; it is not proved to be out of the way, and I do not see any good reason for suspecting the integrity of the transaction arising out of that particular circumstance. It seems to me, therefore, that Zulueta & Co. do stand in a very different situation from that put a considerable number of times to you by the learned counsel for the prisoner, namely, the situation of a person who is simply the manufacturer or dealer in goods, and who has those goods ordered, such a weight of gunpowder, and who inquiring, “Where shall I send it?” is answered, “Send it on board the Augusta, now lying at Liverpool.” It would be a strong thing from that circumstance to infer that a person sending that gunpowder had any thing to do with slave trading: but that appears not to be the nature of this transaction. In regard to there being a slave trading, all that is done, is done by Zulueta & Co. It is not merely that they had goods sent on board the ship, but they chose the number of the goods to be sent on board the ship—goods which they had bought, for which they had negotiated, and they made out such charter-party, and that charter-party provides that the ship shall proceed to Gallinas, on the coast of Africa.
Gentlemen, that is I think pretty nearly all the evidence that there is in the case. You have the evidence of the captains on the subject. If you think that this was a slaving voyage, you will consider the conduct of Zulueta & Co. in buying, and chartering, and loading it, and dispatching it. Now, Zulueta & Co. are shown to be merchants with very extensive connexions and concerns, and the prisoner particularly is a person of great knowledge and education, and generally speaking one would say that as merchants, though that is a matter for you to consider, I do not know that I can put it higher than this, that they are persons of great skill and great experience. The prisoner had the whole management and direction of the voyage to a particular place to carry goods to that place, that being a place not without suspicion; the vessel itself also being a vessel which had been used for the slave trade, though it might be innocently used afterwards; but, still your attention has been directed to that circumstance, and it has been particularly directed to the circumstance that every thing applicable to slave apparatus was ordered to be removed before the vessel was dispatched. That would be a thing of course to be done, whether the vessel was going on a slave expedition or not, for as has been suggested, the officers of Government always examine a vessel, particularly on going to the coast of Africa. With a view to this, I should think it would be quite a matter of course, even if the vessel was intended to be sent to promote the slave trade, that she should not go out with shackles or leagers, or any thing of that kind on board, for if they are on board, the vessel would be at the mercy of any Custom-house officer; it would be quite advertising the adventure. And there being found these shackles and these leagers on board the vessel at Portsmouth, and their being so dealt with, I do not think at all helps on the case for the prosecution, for the vessel undoubtedly had been a slave vessel, it had been fitted up with these things, and would naturally have them on board her, and as naturally, whether she was intended to be sent out on a slave expedition or not, these things would be taken from on board her; and you find that they were taken from on board. The fact of their having been on board, when the schoolmaster and the cooper saw them on board, does not appear to me to be any thing against her, for she had been a slave vessel. On the other hand, the circumstance of their being taken out and landed before she sailed on her voyage does not appear to be any thing for her, for both these circumstances would have taken place whether the voyage was an innocent or a guilty voyage; those circumstances, in my opinion, have no bearing on the question. Whether the vessel was intended to be engaged in slave trading or not, that is a point I have already put to you in considering whether the voyage was a slave voyage, or for the accomplishment of the slave trade. I did not before advert to the circumstance of these things being on board, and I mention it now only, as it has a sort of colourable look, to show why it is I do not lay any stress upon it.
I was observing that though people in general might not be well aware of this trade being intended to be carried on, yet persons not extremely simple, but skilful people, may be fairly taken to know what the object is with which a voyage is undertaken when they themselves are the agents, supplying, chartering, loading, and dispatching a ship for the voyage. It may be that the object may be concealed from them, or that they may not know that this voyage to the Gallinas was a slaving expedition. A simple person, who knew nothing about these matters and had not some special acquaintance with the trade, might know nothing at all about it, they might not know the nature of the trade carried on at this place. The mention of Gallinas on the coast of Africa would not convey to the mind of an ordinary person that it was to a mere den where this traffic and nothing else was carried on; but this vessel is sent to the Gallinas by these gentlemen, who are very skilful persons, who negotiate the whole transaction. Now, it may very generally be taken that people know what they are about, unless they can show there was some particular concealment, some hinderance to their knowing to this extent that this was a place connected with the slave trade, and so exclusively engaged in the slave trade as it really seems to be; but, supposing that a case is made which requires an answer, if it is shown that there was a slave trade, and that a person did employ a vessel in that business, and did load it for that business, that certainly is a case raising some degree of presumption against the person who has been engaged, and one would be very glad if the case were of a description in which it had been met by a decisive answer in point of fact.
It is said on the part of the prisoner, first, that this was not a slaving voyage. Now, if it had been a slaving voyage—it is possible that there might be a case, which unless fairly answered would lead to the presumption that that was the object—in which an answer might exist, but where it would be impossible for the prisoner to get it, you would feel a difficulty in acting on such a case; but in the present case, supposing that this was not a slaving expedition, the answer exists, and the answer might be given with the greatest ease. There appears to me no reason why it should not be given. The house of Martinez & Co. have a house at Cadiz, and a house at the Havannah, and if they did not send this vessel for the purpose of the slave trade, and they were quite innocent in this matter, any one of them or their clerks might with the greatest ease be called. There is no deficiency of funds here, and it would put an end to all question if they could say, “This was not for the slave trade; these goods were to be employed for—and then they might fill up the blank, I do not know how, but by some words expressing an innocent purpose, and that would be a full answer; but there is an absence of all answer that bears on the question whether there was slave trading intended or not.
Now, supposing you should be of opinion that there was no slave trading intended, there is an end of the case. I think you may perhaps be of opinion this vessel was intended for slave trading. Supposing you are of that opinion, then you come to that which is the anxious and important question, namely, whether the prisoner was cognizant of that fact. It is alleged that the prisoner is not the exclusive manager of the concerns of the house; it is not very likely he should be; he appears to have been fully cognizant of this particular matter; and, supposing that considering the exclusive part taken by these gentlemen in this transaction of dispatching the vessel, supposing you should think that a case requiring an answer, then you will consider whether it should not have an answer, if one exists. Now, it appears that the prisoner is not exclusively cognizant of all the transactions of this house. There are two other partners; there are—though it is not in evidence, but it may be presumed that there are—clerks and persons employed in the house of Zulueta, all or any of whom might have been called. It is alleged that the profit on this transaction would be extremely small. I do not think that the petty gain of this one transaction is the matter, for it appears that Pedro Martinez & Co. do a great deal of business, and it is possible that whenever persons have a large and valuable business to conduct, there is some small portion that the correspondent and agent would willingly get rid of if he could; but he is not allowed to pick and choose, but he must take the whole. That is one of the grounds they put; the other is as to character.
Now, inasmuch as there are two other partners, and it is probable there might be some other persons in the concern, there arises this consideration. It is true, supposing that there were a case made, but that the prisoner was innocent of it, that he could not call Martinez & Co. on that supposition as he might on the supposition of there being no slave trading, for Martinez & Co. would not be innocent persons, and they would not be willing to come into this country and say, “We carried on the slave trading, but it was disguised from our correspondent Zulueta & Co.” If you think there is a case requiring an answer, the question then is, would there have been any difficulty in the prisoner calling his two partners and others conversant with the business of the firm, and proving that Zulueta & Co. knew nothing at all about this, that they had not the least suspicion, that Martinez & Co. never communicated the fact to them, and that the illegal purpose was utterly unknown to them, for some reasons which the prisoner cannot give, but which his partners could? It would be extremely desirable they should do it, if the defence existed in point of fact.
Supposing the case made to require an answer, there are two modes of answering a charge. The one is, that of calling a great number of persons to prove that it was unlikely, from the high character of the firm, that they should engage in such a transaction; that is one. Another mode, is calling three or four persons, who if he were guilty must know it, and who will prove that he was not. The former of these modes has been adopted on this occasion. You have, however, the case before you. I do not think it necessary to go any further into the evidence, having, I conceive, stated the effect of it sufficiently. If you are satisfied that there was a slave trading, you will consider whether Zulueta, the prisoner, was cognizant of it, and shipped these goods, and dispatched the ship for the purpose of accomplishing the object of slave trading; and then, in considering that, you will consider the observations, as far as they are entitled to attention, and the evidence of the very high character of the prisoner—a character I should say very strong indeed, and almost conclusive, supposing the case were one that did not admit of an answer in point of fact. If he has the means of showing that he did not do that with which he is charged, and he only says, I will prove that I am extremely unlikely to do it; I do not say how far you should give weight to that sort of evidence. You ought to be well satisfied of a fact of this sort, before you find him guilty of such a charge as this.
Foreman of the Jury. We beg to retire, my Lord.