5392. Mr. W. Patten.] In that Act of Parliament, does the word “knowingly” apply to knowledge of the fact that the parties are slave dealers, or of the fact that the goods so sold are to be employed in the slave trade?—To the latter. The second clause of that Act declares that it shall not be lawful to ship, tranship, and so on, or to contract for the shipping or transhipping to be employed in accomplishing any of the objects or the contracts in relation to the objects, which objects and contracts have hereinbefore been declared unlawful; but by the 7th and 10th clauses penalties are imposed only upon a party upon its being shown that he “knowingly and wilfully” shipped and laded goods to be employed in the slave trade.
5393. It does not apply to his knowledge of the fact of the man being a dealer in slaves?—I am not aware that it does; a great deal may come under the general term of “aiding and abetting” the slave trade; but in all the penal clauses of that Act the words “knowingly and wilfully” are introduced.
5394. How do you account for the governor of a British colony commencing his proclamation with these words: “Whereas by the laws of Great Britain, and more particularly by the provisions of the Act of Parliament passed in the fifth year of the reign of his late Majesty George the Fourth, all British subjects are prohibited in the most express and positive terms, and under the most severe penalties, from aiding, abetting, or trading with, directly or indirectly, all or any vessels or vessel engaged, or about to be engaged, in the slave trade, or fitted with that view and purpose”?—The prohibitory clauses of the Act are very strong indeed; they would seem to comprehend every kind of dealing with slave traders; but it is the penal clauses which would prevent convictions.
5395. Chairman.] If you could convict the party selling the vessel to the slave dealer with a guilty knowledge of the purpose to which the vessel was to be appropriated, you have in the Act of Parliament all that can be required?—Yes.
5396. Mr. W. Patten.] Does the same observation apply to goods?—To every part of the Act. I believe in every instance where prohibitions are given in the Act the penal clauses referring to the prohibition contain the words “knowingly and wilfully.”
5397. Chairman.] Therefore those acts are all of them unlawful, but the difficulty is in proving the guilt?—Yes. You may possibly prove the guilty knowledge by letters found on board the vessel.
5398. If you could ascertain that any merchant at Sierra Leone sold vessels or goods to a party, knowing that such vessel was to be employed in the slave trade, he might be convicted under the Act of Parliament?—Yes; he would be prosecuted and convicted under the 5th of Geo. 4.
5399. Mr. W. Patten.] Should you imply that this was guilty knowledge, that the vessel should be sold to a notorious slave dealer on any part of the coast, who was perfectly known to have no legitimate traffic of his own?—That is a legal question which would be decided in the common law courts, whether a guilty knowledge might be implied from particular circumstances, though it could not be proved directly.
5400. Mr. Forster.] You have given an opinion upon the construction of the words “knowingly and wilfully” used in the Act of Parliament; upon what authority have you given that opinion?—The Act cannot be misunderstood; I think no person can read it without seeing the meaning of it, whether lawyer or not.
5401. To sell goods or vessels to Pedro Blanco, for example, would that, in your opinion, bring a party within the meaning of the Act?—No, not unless you could prove that he sold them knowing that they were to be applied to an unlawful purpose.