5402. Chairman.] The difficulty, then, is not in understanding the purpose and object of the Act, but in proving the offence?—Yes; the difficulty is in proving the guilty knowledge, and that is the only difficulty.
5403. Sir T. D. Acland.] Was not the principal design of that Act to prevent persons from aiding in fitting up vessels for the direct and notorious purpose of engaging in the slave trade, and for no other purpose?—Yes, it was one object.
5404. Therefore, would not any person selling shackles, or any thing else that was notoriously employed in procuring slaves, or in exchange for slaves, be brought under the Act?—If you could prove that at the time he made them he contemplated that they would be employed in the slave trade, he would be brought within the purpose of the Act.
5405. If he sold shackles to vessels engaged in the slave trade?—I should think he would be brought within it then, because the guilty knowledge would be properly inferred in that case; but shackles may be made in England, and kept on board merchant vessels to be employed on the crew.
5406. Mr. Forster.] You do not think, then, that the intention of that Act was to prevent British subjects and British capital from being engaged in partnership, or having an interest in the slave trade itself, and nothing beyond that?—Yes, I think the intention of the Act was to prevent such engagements.
5407. Do you think that it goes beyond that?—I think that is all we require, that they should have no connexion with the traffic.
5408. How would you bring the party within that Act who sold goods, having no interest or partnership in the transaction to which they were subsequently applied?—In that case I think the Act would not reach him.
5409. What becomes, then, of the guilty knowledge of which you have spoken so much?—No guilty knowledge can be proved against the party in the case you suppose.
5410. Chairman.] But it may exist?—Yes, it may exist; but unless you can prove it, the penalties of the Act would not reach him.
5411. Do you conceive that the act of selling a vessel or goods that may be hereafter employed, or that shall be, to the knowledge of the person selling them, employed in the slave trade, falls within the meaning of the Act, unless that person is to have a share in the profits of the transaction?—Yes, I believe it does include that; I think that it forbids aiding and assisting in every way, even as servants, or employed in boats.