Trial of Pedro de Zulueta, jun., on a Charge of Slave Trading, under 5 Geo. IV, cap. 113, on Friday the 27th, Saturday the 28th, and Monday the 30th of October, 1843, at the Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London / A Full Report from the Short-hand Notes of W. B. Gurney, Esq.

by Pedro de Zulueta; William Brodie Gurney

5412. Mr. Forster.] Then you think that a British subject selling goods to Pedro Blanco, or any other slave dealer, with the impression on his mind, or, in fact, the conviction on his mind, that those goods would be employed in the slave trade, would come within the meaning of that Act?—Yes certainly; but the difficulty would be in the proof of the guilty knowledge. Such an act as that is certainly intended to come within the Act; not that I would recommend that those words, “knowingly and wilfully,” should be taken out entirely; I think it might be a dangerous thing to do so; but I am speaking of what, in my opinion, the meaning of the Act is, namely, that it is absolutely necessary in every case to prove the guilty knowledge, in order to bring the party accused within the penalties of the Act.

5413. In what way would you prove the mental impression upon the man’s mind?—There is the difficulty.

5414. Do you think that any British Act of Parliament would impose penalties for the mental impression upon a man’s mind?—I have stated that I am not prepared to say whether or not the words “knowingly and wilfully” might be advantageously omitted from the Act, but a guilty knowledge may be inferred from particular circumstances.

5415. Then you consider that that Act of Parliament is an Act against constructive slave trading?—No.

5416. Chairman.] You consider it to be an Act against aiding and abetting the slave trade in as many ways as the Act of Parliament can reach it?—Yes; there is no Act that I ever read that is so general and comprehensive in its terms; but unfortunately it is limited, as it must be limited, in its application.

5417. Mr. Forster.] Can you quote the authority of any British lawyer for the opinions you have expressed with respect to the construction of that Act?—Yes, I have heard opinions expressed on the subject from the Bench at Sierra Leone repeatedly, and by educated lawyers.

5418. In the case of a British merchant selling goods to a person who was known to have no other means of gaining his livelihood, except by the slave trade, the party selling the goods would in your opinion be liable to the penalties of that Act?—It is the same thing in that case; you must prove guilty knowledge, direct or implied.

5419. In selling goods to a man who has no other means of gaining his livelihood than by applying those goods for the purposes of the slave trade, there can be no doubt of the guilty knowledge?—I should think not; but if I were a juror I should have to satisfy my own conscience that there was a guilty knowledge. I am no lawyer; this is only the opinion of a private person.

5420. Can you conceive a stronger proof of guilty knowledge than such a transaction as that would furnish?—I think I should decide that there was a guilty knowledge, taking the case supposed, that the seller knew there was no other way in which the purchaser would employ the goods sold to him than in the slave trade; if I were a juror I think I should find him guilty in that case under the Act of Parliament; I should consider the guilty knowledge to be proved.

5421. Chairman.] You appear to be in favour of the proposal for taking bond from the person selling the vessel, that such vessel shall not be employed within a certain period in the slave trade?—That they should take bond that the vessel should not be immediately sold to a slave dealer; but the difficulty would be in following the vessel through successive transfers.