Mesopotamian Archaeology / An introduction to the archaeology of Mesopotamia and Assyria

by Percy S. P. Handcock

Ordinary arable land was let at a fixed rental, the rent being paid in corn, but the owner was entitled to a deposit, and non-payment of the rent was a legal debt. The code contains two special provisions, the effect of which must have been to make the tenant postpone the payment of his rent as long as possible. The one enacted that if the rent had not been paid, or if the land had been lent on the share-profit principle and the crops were destroyed by a storm, the damage done was shared either equally or proportionally by landlord and tenant. If on the other hand the rent had been already paid, the tenant could claim no compensation. The share-profit system was very common, and in such cases the landlord generally received a half or two-thirds of the crop. But the inequalities calculated to arise from such a system were obvious, for though it safeguarded the tenant to some extent, it left the landlord without remedy in the event of his tenant being an idler, and to provide for such a case a clause was inserted to the effect that the negligent small owner should pay an average rent “like his neighbours.” Often the landlord further secured himself by stipulating in the contract for the erection of a cottage on the land, or insisted on the tenant renting a cottage already built there, the cottage to be vacated on the termination of the lease.

The tenant was empowered to sub-let his ground, the principal landlord’s consent apparently not being necessary. The landlord was of course legally entitled to the rent agreed upon in the contract with his immediate tenant, but provided that was forthcoming, and the ground properly cultivated, he could raise no objection. Sometimes the landlord found the seed, the necessary tools, and also the oxen, and in addition paid a wage to the farmer; in this case the status of the tenant somewhat resembled that of a gardener in his cottage on an estate to-day. The seed, the oxen, and everything belonged to his master, and the penalty for any embezzlement of the same on the part of the tenant was the amputation of the latter’s hands. Again, if a tenant of this kind were a rogue, he might hire out the oxen, purloin the provender he had received from his master for the said oxen, and at the same time produce no crop: in this case he was liable to a heavy fine, and if he were insolvent, he was torn to pieces by the oxen on the field which he had neglected to cultivate.

The laws and regulations which applied to agricultural land-tenure, applied for the most part to the leasing of plantations and gardens as well. Thanks to the extraordinary fertility of Babylonian soil the owners of land became very wealthy; this notwithstanding, the money-lender was not without clients. Unforeseen disasters occurred, which crippled the landowner, and but for the money-lender he would not be able to tide over the trouble. As security for the loan he frequently mortgaged his land, but the code enacted that he should at all times reap the crop himself, and pay off the debt and the money-lender’s expenses from the produce. Moreover the money-lender was legally bound to accept such produce or corn in settlement of the debt, and could not insist on being paid in money, unless, as was frequently the case, he had stipulated in the contract that the loan was to be repaid in the same form as that in which it had been received. As a further safeguard for the unfortunate money-borrower it was made illegal to exercise distraint for rent or anything else upon a working ox. This was a humane law, for the watering of the ground, as well as the ploughing of the soil and the threshing of the wheat, was largely done by oxen.

The laws regulating the irrigation of the land were stringent owing to the disastrous consequences resulting from negligence on the part of any concerned. Once the canals had been made, it was the bounden duty of each landowner, whether small or great, to keep that part of the canal which passed by or through his land in good repair. If that part of the bank of the canal for which he was responsible gave way, and the water thereby flooded his neighbour’s land, he had to pay damages in full, and if he were insolvent he could be sold up. He was entitled to open a runnel to water his field, but if the water swamped the adjoining fields through some inadvertence or negligence on his part, he had to give full compensation.

The wages, presumably the minimum wage of the labourer, was fixed by law, as also was the hire-price of oxen and wagons. The hirer of animals was under a legal obligation to take proper care of them, and omission to do so involved a penalty. But if an accident occurred which the hirer could not be expected to foresee or prevent—such as an attack by a lion—the owner had to bear the loss. This was also the case if the person in charge of the animal was a shepherd or herdsman in the owner’s employ, the principle being the same in both cases. Wilful negligence was not to be condoned, but on the other hand, the consequence of unforeseen and unavoidable accidents was not to be visited upon either hirer or employee.

The larger half of the working population in Khammurabi’s time were probably engaged in agricultural pursuits while the remainder were occupied in trade or commerce. Now the expansion of trade depends upon the existence of an adequate means of transport, whereby exports can go out and imports come in. Before the invention and introduction of locomotives, water was the unrivalled medium for conveying large quantities of goods from one place to another, and even to-day with our interlacing networks of railways we still find use for the canals of primitive days. It was undoubtedly the two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, that were accountable for the development of the trading faculty of the Babylonians, a faculty which ultimately made them the great commercial people of the Oriental world. We are accordingly not surprised to find that already, even in the time of Khammurabi, shipping was an important trade. A sure and certain indication of this fact is to be found in the number of laws directly concerning ship-builders and boatmen in the Code. The ship-builder, or rather the boat-builder,—for ships properly so-called were a very much later invention,—was absolutely responsible for his workmanship, and was required to give a year’s guarantee to the purchaser; if it proved faulty during that time he had to provide another. As in the case of the agricultural labourer,the hired boatman was responsible for the boat and cargo in his charge, and any negligence on his part was penal. If a ship collided with another ship riding at anchor, the colliding ship was liable for all damages.

Business was carried on largely by means of agents as it is with us to-day. The agent gave a receipt for the goods or money he received from his chief, and then went off to trade with them. The agent generally appears to have received an ordinary commission, which on his return he was expected to repay with a reasonable profit, the profit sometimes being a definitely fixed sum, at others, a prearranged share of the actual proceeds. As in our own day, some merchants were speculators, and all the uncertainty incidental to any kind of speculation seems to have surrounded the prospects of the agent, who doubtless at times scored well, while on other occasions he lost heavily. But any loss resulting from an untoward event which the agent could neither foresee nor prevent, had to be borne by the merchant. Thus if an agent were robbed in the course of his travels, he could clear himself from all liability in the matter by taking an oath to that effect. But this law might clearly lead to sharp practice on the part of a dishonest agent; and accordingly any false claims on his part had to be repaid threefold, but a false claim by a chief in regard to the goods entrusted to his agent had to be repaid sixfold. All business transactions had to be drawn up in writing to make them legal.

The obvious advantages of partnership were soon recognized by the commercially sagacious Babylonians, and business-partnerships were well known in the time of Khammurabi. In arriving at the dividends, the usual arrangement was for the partners to withdraw their capital and interest, and then receive equal shares of the superfluous profits. The dividends were made yearly and the withdrawal by each partner of his capital virtually dissolved the partnership, which could of course be renewed from time to time if desired.

As in all commercial enterprises, capital was the one essential, and the need of immediate cash was supplied by the money-lender. The rate of interest charged in Khammurabi’s time is not known, but the rate charged on loans of corn was often as much as forty per cent. Such loans were however generally in demand at seed-time, and if repaid at harvest, no interest seems to have been charged. A debtor could repay his loan either in the form of corn or sesame, and the value of each was fixed by law. If a debtor was insolvent, he could hand over a servant to his creditor to work off the debt which was due. The ownership of such a servant was, however, still vested in the debtor, and the servant was protected by law against maltreatment at the hand of the creditor. If he were a free man, the creditor had to restore him to his original master at the termination of three years, and the same rule applied if a wife or child of the debtor were the pledge or surety.

Distraint was not unknown, but it was the last expedient which the creditor was entitled to adopt after all other means had failed. Distraint on corn without the previous consent of the debtor was illegal, and illegal distraint ipso facto forfeited the right of any further claim on the part of the creditor, while the execution of a distraint where no claim had been substantiated was penal, and the theoretical creditor had to pay a fine. As before-mentioned no distraint could be levied on a working-ox, and indeed distraint of any kind could apparently only be issued subsequently to the consent of the debtor. In short, the interests of the humbler and poorer members of the community were safeguarded in every way possible. Not only were the small farmers protected, but even the working-classes received the attention of the legislators of Khammurabi’s time. Thus at harvest-time there was evidently a tendency to put up the price of beer, and accordingly a clause in the code enacts that drink was to be sold at a cheap rate in spite of the increased demand.