With these remarks we are led to the consideration of the subject with which we commenced this part of our Report, namely, The Magistracy, and their alleged complicity in the evil which we deplore, and which we would diminish for the sake of the miserable victims of temporary power, and for the sake of the credit of our community.
On all sides we hear the complaint of the character and conduct of the Aldermen of the city; many of them, it is stated, use their office to extort from the unfortunate poor, a portion of their hard earnings, and thus deprive the homes of the laborer of the little comforts of which they are susceptible. They entertain complaints, it is said, of acts which need not be construed into offence against the law, and thus encourage litigation, and perpetuate feuds among those whom it would seem to be their duty, as magistrates, to “keep at peace with all men.”
We have already enumerated and repeated the classes of cases which most encumber the dockets of the Aldermen, and which are made of more importance than they deserve by the effects on the income of the magistrates which these causes produce. But the enumeration and repetition alone of these would not be a part of the duties of this Society, or form a portion of this Report, if they did not suggest a call for remedy. It is not the evils of prisons that constitute the object of this Society, but the melioration of those evils.
Taking, then, the existence of the evils, as we have only hinted at them, and admitting (as we are free to do, and as we do with pleasure, because it is just) that while the cry against the magistracy is universal, the fault is really found in only a part of them, the inquiry is, “how shall all this be remedied?”
“Elect better Aldermen,” say those who wish for a better state of things. “Elect suitable men, and the evil is at once remedied.”
Undoubtedly the plan is good; but is it practicable? For many years the Aldermen of Philadelphia have been elected by the people, and in many instances the choice has been judicious, but in others either the official conduct of the magistrate has deteriorated into the grossest kind of improprieties, or he has been compelled to give place to some greater favorite of the voters of his ward, who would begin his descending march some grades below that at which his predecessor closed his career. So large a portion of the duties of the Alderman who has most to do as a police magistrate, are beyond the knowledge and sympathy of the respectable portion of the community, that little interest is taken in his election by those who feel a sense of shame at the improprieties of a functionary connected with the administration of justice; and in many parts of the city the knowledge and sympathy of that class would avail nothing towards the election of another person.
The Grand Jury recently inquiring for the city and county of Philadelphia, made the following severe strictures upon Aldermen:
“It has been a matter of exceeding regret that the law has not clothed this body with discretionary power to tax the magistrates, before whom the cases were heard, with the costs, as a proper rebuke to that avarice which seeks to convert litigation and contention into a source of gain,—which offers a premium for crimes, by making the ministers of the law the transgressors, and prostituting the province of peace-makers to that of a common barrator.”
As the Grand jury did not, of course, desire to be directly personal when they were not about to find a bill, they let their censure take a general course. They set forth an evil, and that, perhaps, was enough, till some special case of wrong should be laid before them.
But the alleviation of the evil—the remedy. It is evident the remedy is not in the ballot-box—the root of the evil lies far back of that; nor is it in the statutes of the Commonwealth. The Constitution of the State is in fault; and until that is modified, or till some act of the Assembly can be passed superseding the Aldermen in their special police duties, we cannot hope for any diminution of the evil. The Aldermen of the city are elected by the voters of their own wards, and he who can command the most votes, can, if he desire it, be chosen Alderman. No man of wealth seeks the place,—no man of business habits asks for a nomination. The rewards of the office are, at best, below that of ordinary business; and the distinction which the place confers is not that which gratifies the wishes of the ambitious. But the place is coveted and obtained, its emoluments spring from the fees paid by those who come or are brought before the magistrate. If his business is multiplied, his profits, of course, are increased; and as he sought the place for the means of a living, he must avail himself of the capabilities of the place to augment those means. If people will “sue and be sued,” if people will fight and go to law, if neighbors will quarrel, and then drag each other before the magistrate, it may seem, to the functionary, rather a thankless exercise of his ability, to recommend such an adjustment of the case as will deprive him of the fees of office, by which he lives. And while most philanthropists would applaud the magistrate who sat to reconcile rather than to punish,—who dispensed with his fees while he dispensed kindness and affection rather than justice,—it is probable that the family for which he was bound to provide would have to look to some other means of support than those supplied by the man who looked to the peace of the neighborhood rather than the augmentation of fees. And it may as well be added, that the magistrate who should thus employ his functions, would soon fail of objects, provided another alderman could be found who would grant to passion its first demand. For it is evident that most of the complaints that come before our aldermen are brought by those who seek to gratify personal animosity and a sudden desire of vengeance rather than any wish to punish the wrong-doer for the sake of right. We must take men as they are, not as we could wish them to be. We must recognize in the office of an alderman the means of support for the incumbent and his family; and while all around us, men are exercising their talents and taxing their ingenuity, to gain wealth by the advantages which the law allows, we must not suppose that the alderman is to sit in magisterial quiet, and suffer the vails of office to escape his grasp, when they are the fruits of a labor sanctioned by law or warranted by official custom.