If we would remedy the evils about which so much has been justly said, and concerning which the Grand Jury has spoken so plainly, we must do something more than talk and complain.
We have already said the evil finds its source and sanction in the Constitution of our State. The change of the whole mode of supplying the magistrates and judicial officers, that was wrought by the present Constitution, may have corrected some evils: the general question is one which we are now not called upon to discuss; but we may say, that experience shows that nothing has been gained with regard to the administration of justice in the magistrates offices of our city. Twenty-five years experience shows that none of the evils complained of in this department have been diminished, while most of them have been augmented, and new ones added to the list. This seems almost a necessary result of the system, and thus calls for prompt, effective remedy.
What is required in Philadelphia, is a class of Police Magistrates, with a salary that shall secure and compensate the services of competent men, who shall have no pecuniary temptation to commit any person brought before them, and whose character and condition shall give weight, no less to their decisions than their recommendations. Placed by the tenor and fixed reward of their office above dependence upon those who shall demand justice in others, or receive it in themselves, they shall not shrink from their duty to condemn, more than from their sense of propriety to discharge.
Of legal qualifications we have little to say. The layman, fitted by character and ordinary education for the place of police magistrate, might soon become sufficiently learned in the law and requirements of his place, to discharge with fidelity and success the duties thereof. A considerable number of those now holding the office of Alderman, and as such elected occasionally as Police Magistrates, show themselves competent to all the duties of their office, and worthy of the position which would be opened to them, should the reformation that we suggest ever be made. It is not always the man,—it is the circumstances in which he is placed; it is the necessities of nomination, the demands of the election, and the condition into which the office has been brought, that hinder some in their attempts at good, and deprive the city of benefits from the services of those who, under other circumstances, would promote public order, and acquire honor by their administration of justice and their exercise of humane powers.
And while so much freedom has been exercised in censuring the official conduct of some of the Aldermen of our city,—a freedom that is suggested and can be sustained by facts,—it is due to the cause of truth and justice to repeat emphatically what is readily admitted above, that many of the magistrates are eminently deserving of commendation, as well for the abilities they possess, as for the use to which those abilities are applied in the discharge of their vexatious duties. And it may be added, that some of those who have been most censured, have shown themselves possessed of good feelings, and amenable to the requirements of courtesy and humanity. The system is in fault; and till that is changed for the better,—reformed altogether,—we cannot look for any considerable improvement in the administration of justice in police offices. For it is a lamentable fact, that such is the want of confidence in some of the magistrates, that the decisions of the able and the good are treated with a distrust most dangerous to public order.
Our judiciary, from the lowest offices to the highest, was derived from England. The names of the officials, the cause of their proceedings, the rules of their action, are all from the parent country. If we have not derived from these all the benefits which might be expected, and all we see England enjoy, it is worth while for those interested to inquire what has disturbed public opinion, what has weakened public respect, what has augmented the law’s delay, or what has strengthened the general opinion of its uncertainty. So far as such feelings, if any such exist, may connect themselves with the “courts of record” of our State, it is not the object of the present Report to discuss the cause, to point to their extent, or suggest a remedy. But we have legitimately before us the evils of a bad system of minor justice, and we are therefore right in suggesting a remedy.
The progress of society abroad suggests remedies for evils which it is the duty of the people of this country to consider. And the mode of administering justice in police courts in London, eminently deserves the attention of those who deplore the deficiency and seek for a substitute in Philadelphia. It is simple, easy, practical. Magistrates of established character are appointed, to hold office during good behavior. They have a salary ample to maintain themselves and a family. Their office has with it something of the character of the Court of Sessions, and thus there attaches to their persons an idea of judicial dignity, which is to be respected on the police bench, and which respects itself when in the world. These officers are not tempted, by inadequacy of income, to augment the business of their office, that they may profit by costs or compromise. Those who are compelled by business or misfortune to appear before them, feel that respect is due to the administration of justice in its incipient stages, and a large portion of those who are charged with the violation of law, appeal with confidence to those magistrates for summary proceedings, (which the law there allows,) in preference to the delay which would attend a reference of their case to a jury. Such a power on the part of the police magistrate is found most advantageous to justice in London, resulting in great saving to the city and county, without lessening the terrors of the law,—rather augmenting them by the promptness of punishment.
Should the Legislature of the State be disposed to remedy the existing evils in this city, by providing for an alteration in the Constitution, by which the mode of acquiring, and the terms of holding, office by the Aldermen shall be changed, it is possible that an enlargement of power, such as we have noticed in the London magistracy, would be granted, so that justice would be promptly as well as carefully administered.
We have, in this chapter, touched upon one disturbing element, and we have done it with no view to cast indiscriminate odium upon any citizen. The evil to which we have adverted, exists. The great cause, however, of the evil, we have shown to arise out of the Constitution of the State, or from a deficiency of legislation. We lack no talent in this city for judicial or magisterial place; but we have failed in attempts to call those talents into the best exercise, and to insure to them the highest public respect.
There is, however, another disturbing cause, which we must look at steadily, if we would understand its bearing on society, its influence on morals, and especially its connection with the subject of prison occupation and prison discipline. And especially ought we to present the subject in immediate connection with a consideration of the Magistracy. It is Intoxication that crowds the police office and the alderman’s tribunal. Hourly is the magistrate called to commit or fine the violator of the law of temperance. The miserable wretches come into his presence without power to discriminate between right and wrong, with no command of their own movements, and no sense of propriety with regard to conduct or conversation; and complaints are sometimes made that these creatures are not treated with suitable consideration. Let us, when we consider the duties and conduct of magistrates, not overlook the disgusting materials to which they are to administer justice, nor blame them if they sometimes suffer the prisoner to hold the rank which he assigns to himself.