The Ministers of the Mikado are very naturally somewhat alarmed at the thought that their country may soon be the only one in the whole world inhabited by a non-European race that maintains its independence, and they cannot forbear asking themselves how long this independence may be allowed to last, all the more so since Japan is in immediate contact with, numerically speaking, the most powerful State in the world, the colossal Russian Empire, which borders upon China. Might not Japan under these circumstances be constantly menaced by so formidable a neighbour? Doubtless she would be able to resist an invasion, but at a terrific sacrifice—for to conquer Japan it would be necessary to exterminate many millions of Japanese. In any case Japan’s foreign influence would be at an end, especially in Korea, which she has several times conquered, and upon which she still cherishes pretensions that date over 2,000 years. Even from the purely economic side she would suffer greatly; for her principal commercial outlet, China, might be closed to her for good.
These are the principal reasons which oblige the Japanese to remain the devoted friends of the Chinese Empire, and at the same time the adversaries of Russia, who, they believe, wishes to absorb China, and thereby dominate, if not the whole, at least the north, of the Asiatic Continent, and which compel them to throw in their lot with England. This latter Power does not aim at the political annexation of China; she only wishes to obtain additional facilities for her commerce and concessions for public works, and has therefore no intention whatever of surrounding the Celestial Empire by a formidable ring of Custom-houses. Undoubtedly Japan has had good reason to seek an alliance with England, and we need not be surprised at her distrust of Russia, which, having deprived her of the fruits of her continental conquests in 1895, three years later annexed them herself. As to England, her interest in obtaining the co-operation of Japan is so self-evident as only to need a passing allusion. Through her friendship with Japan she could obtain what she wants, not only in the Far East, but elsewhere, a large and well-organized army that, owing to an unquestionable supremacy on the sea, the result of the combination of two formidable fleets, could be easily and safely transported to the neighbouring continent.
May there not, however, be certain other reasons which might eventually induce not so much Great Britain to break off her Japanese alliance as Japan to sever her side of the compact and ultimately extend her hand to Russia? There is ground for the belief that such a proposition does exist, since there are Russophiles at Tokio and Japanophiles at St. Petersburg. Is it not, moreover, rather imprudent to oppose the progress the Tsar’s Empire is making on the continent? It is, after all, an irresistible force resulting from the very nature of things, and therefore it were perchance wiser to be rather with Russia than against her. Then, again, it should be remembered that Russia displayed her goodwill towards Japan by leaving her a free hand in Korea, not, however, until after she had seized Port Arthur. True, the situation created in Korea by the compact of April, 1898, was precarious; and possibly, when once her position in the Far East is consolidated by the completion of the Trans-Siberian line, the Tsar’s Government may rescind the concession which it has signed and occupy the peninsula. But even if we admit that this contingency is a possible one—and it is by no means absolutely certain that Russia does entertain any such project—Japan may still hope for compensation elsewhere in the centre or south of China round the province of Fu-kien, where she has already made her influence felt, as also at Borneo. Russia might also give certain tariff guarantees, and might it not be to her interest, less urgently, perhaps, than in the case of England, to secure the co-operation of Japan in case of conflict? And, finally, is Great Britain a very safe ally? May she not be simply using Japan for her own ends, thrusting her forward only perhaps to abandon her when she is committed? Will she lend assistance to a commercial rival?
These are arguments which are not without their influence at Tokio, where the difficulty of opposing a solid and durable barrier against the encroachments of Russia on the continent is fully appreciated, and where there certainly exists a feeling of distrust, not only of the English, but of all other Europeans. Political and military interference in continental affairs has never resulted otherwise than in weakening an insular power, and much as the subjects of the Mikado may desire Korea, it should not be forgotten that, however great Japan’s interests may be in that direction, she may easily renounce her pretensions on terra firma if she were offered some material and tangible compensation elsewhere. It has been said that Japan had cast a longing eye on the Philippines, and certain signs led many to think that at one time she had played with the rebels in those islands much the same part enacted by the United States in Cuba; but now America has seized upon these islands, and has also annexed Hawaii, another spot coveted by Japan. Unfortunately, Japan has come too late into the world to possess colonies, and must therefore content herself with the solitary Formosa, which, however, is a possession by no means to be despised.
Still, even now, Japan does not lose all hope of eventually obtaining a footing upon the continent; but, providing that others do not handle China too roughly, she has no intention of interfering with her neighbour, certainly not to menace her integrity. She wishes only to consolidate her by augmenting at the same time her own influence, and would not intervene even if she thought the Celestial Empire were in danger. From the point of view of international politics, Japan is certainly a conservative element; but in the day of struggle, should it ever occur, she is destined to weigh very heavily in the scale, not only in the solution of the question of the Far East, but also in the problem which rises behind it—that of supremacy in the Pacific, which will one day be fought out, not between the Whale and the Elephant, but between the Elephants of the Old and the New Worlds—that is to say, between Russia and the United States. But whatever may be the events which will eventually transpire, Japan apparently does not wish to precipitate a struggle, provided only that the maintenance of the status quo is not threatened by others.
CHAPTER X
THE FUTURE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION IN JAPAN—RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPANESE AND FOREIGNERS
Questions which are raised by the recent evolution in Japan—Can the Japanese assimilate the civilization of peoples of a different race?—Precedents and analogies—Up to what point does Japan wish to resemble Europe?—Character and degree of the changes which have taken place in Japan from the social, political, and economical point of view—Adaptation of Western institutions in Japan—Feeling of the Japanese towards foreigners—The revision of treaties with foreign Powers—The absolute necessity for Japan to enter into intimate relationship with the rest of the world if she wishes to retain her newly-acquired civilization.
To one who has studied Japan on the spot, a very serious question presents itself for solution, one of vast importance, not only to the inhabitants of that island Empire, but to the entire human family, i.e., Will the evolution which this country has undergone prove permanent and not likely to collapse at a given moment, bringing with it the ruin of the State? In a word, the question is, whether it be possible for a people so suddenly to assimilate the old-established and elaborate civilization of another race. Let us, to begin with, remember that the Japanese have already afforded precedents proving that they possess powers of assimilation in a rare degree. From the third to the sixth century of our era they introduced Chinese civilization into their dominions, and from the ethnographic point of view, whether the Japanese belong to the Mongol or to the Malay family, they are not so far removed from the Chinese as the whites; nevertheless they are quite as distinct from them as are the Aryans from the Semites, and as the French or the Germans from the Arabs. The example of Russia is perhaps less marked, because more intimate affinities unite the Slavs to the Western races, and yet the Russians are the least Slav of any of the Slavs, being in reality for the most part Finns who have submitted to Slav influences. The Finns are related to the Mongols, and Muscovy, moreover, was under the Tatar yoke for three centuries, a dominion which has left a very profound impression on the race. Peter the Great’s enterprise was therefore not an easy one. The principal objection, however, which can be brought against the example of Russia is that her evolution was never completed, and did not influence the lower strata of society sufficiently for it to become completely Europeanized. Hungary offers a better field of investigation in this direction, for the peoples who originally invaded her were distinctly Oriental, but now this country has become absolutely European, the result probably of an intimate connection between its inhabitants and their neighbours. But beyond these facts, there is one point which we should not overlook. Our own civilization is not the monopoly of one race, but was constructed by the concurrence of many people. It results directly from Roman and Greek civilization, and through these from Phœnician and Egyptian. The Egyptians, needless to say, were a branch of the Hamites, the most degraded white race of our time; the Phœnicians, on the other hand, were Semites, and it was another Semitic race, the Arab, that during the Middle Ages held the light of civilization, and transmitted to us the inheritance of antiquity, after having widely extended its scientific uses. The whole history of our civilization, therefore, protests against its having ever been at any time monopolized by the Aryan branch of the white race.
Modern ethnography, based upon recent linguistic and anthropological discoveries, has shaken to its foundations those notions concerning the white races which were universally accepted in bygone times. We no longer hold that it was from the high plateau of Asia that swept those tribes who eventually peopled Europe, but that they radiated from the centre of Europe herself. Far from forming the majority of the inhabitants of the Continent, the Aryans, if that term still preserves its meaning, are but one of its elements. They have mingled everywhere in variable quantities among the different hordes of Finnish and other races who have overrun our continent. The varied formation of the skulls which has been observed among the different inhabitants of a single country corresponds with the predominance of one or other of these original elements, with the result that the unity of race which has hitherto been imagined to exist among all Western peoples is now proved to be chimerical.
Whatever truth these theories may contain, they are nevertheless subject to frequent modification, but it seems impossible with the present facts to sustain à priori that one race cannot assimilate the civilization of another. No doubt the Japanese differ more completely from the Europeans of the West than do the Russians, or even the Arabs, or than they themselves do from the Chinese; but once the unity of the human race is admitted, this becomes a mere question of degree of parentage. Must we, therefore, draw a line of degree between peoples beyond which the transmission of the civilization of the one cannot penetrate to the other, even as the French law fixes a limit to the transmission of inheritance? Nothing short of experience can solve the question. For the matter of that, the phenomenon is constantly taking place before our eyes, and if there be a people who might attempt it with hope of success, it is surely the Japanese, who to exceptional intelligence and remarkable powers of assimilation add a great spirit of enterprise and an uncommon energy.