M. Laurent Eynac, under whom the Commissariat for Petrol had been re-established, without mentioning the Agreement which bound him to the British, replied by putting all the blame on the inevitable delays of official inquiries, which were "the same for everybody."
But a few days afterwards, Le Temps published an incomplete summary of the San Remo Agreement; it did not give the official text till July 25th.
The United States now understood the reasons for the attitude of silent hostility which France had adopted towards American oil companies. The San Remo Agreement aroused grave anxiety in Washington. President Harding displayed very clearly his intention not to tolerate such a policy. He made representations to the British and French Governments and protested against the exclusion of America from the Franco-British partition of the oil of Asia; he declared firmly that the British monopoly countersigned by France at San Remo was not to be tolerated, and that United States citizens were not to be ousted through the complacency of France towards the imperialism of London. The Washington Post wrote as follows: "Oil is indispensable to America, and American companies only provide inadequate quantities at excessive prices. The complacent arrangement between France and Britain for the partition of the oil resources of lands which are not in their possession is subject to revision upon the request of the United States, intent on the pursuit of their naval policy."
By subservience to British policy in the East, France was to reap the enmity of the United States. Its effects were soon felt, for, at the Brussels Conference in the following October, the "unofficial" delegate of the American Government declared that his country would not participate in any international loan for the capitalization of the German indemnity. This was one hope definitely lost, upon which France had long been relying. The same thing happened with the repayment of the French debt to the United States: France fondly hoped that the Americans would renounce what they had lent her during the War, just as Louis XVI renounced the millions which he advanced to their infant Republic, but when President Harding was sounded indirectly upon the subject, he returned a pointed refusal.
The French Government recognized somewhat tardily the mistakes which it had committed, and, when Mr. Bedford came to Paris in the autumn to found the Standard Franco-Américaine, it allowed M. Jules Cambon to accept the presidency. To get round the eviction order which has been served upon them in the Near East and the French colonial empire, the United States adopted the ingenious method of founding a French company, which will have just as good a right as the Société pour l'Exploitation des Pétroles to share in any concessions reserved to France. Abandoning the high-handed policy, which played the game of its opponents, the Standard, upon the advice of Walter Teagle, decided to employ the insinuating methods of the Anglo-Dutch trust. In France, the Royal Dutch relied upon the Banque de l'Union Parisienne, the Banque Bénard, the Banque Rothschild, and also, it is said, the Crédit Lyonnais. The Anglo-Persian had the support of the Banque Transatlantique and the Banque de la Seine. The Standard now allied itself with the Banque de Paris, the most powerful of the commercial banks in Europe.
51 per cent. of the capital of the Standard Franco-Américaine (20 million francs) was subscribed by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, and 49 per cent. by the American Trust. And in the constitution of the Board, the Standard acted much more prudently than the Royal Dutch: five out of eight directors were French.
Mr. Bedford, the actual head of the Standard Oil, went so far as to content himself with the vice-presidency, leaving the first place to a Frenchman.
The establishment of the Standard Franco-Américaine at this time was the more hazardous because M. Laurent Eynac, taking up the former Klotz-Bérenger program, was working for a definite State monopoly of the purchase and importation of oil. But the French market is of such importance to the Standard Oil in its struggle with the Royal Dutch that it preferred to take all the risks. "France," Mr. Bedford said, "on account of its geographical situation, is naturally a field for competition among all great companies." The Standard desires to have its place there. It proposes to resuscitate the refining industry, which has almost passed out of existence, and set up great warehouses in the ports to receive the crude oil; and it would even go to the length of installing special reservoirs of petrol for supplying motor vehicles in the neighbourhood of the municipal toll-houses.
Events have turned in its favour, for the idea of monopoly is to-day thoroughly discredited in France. M. Laurent Eynac was obliged hurriedly to withdraw his proposal owing to the commotion which it aroused. An extremely violent Press campaign broke out, and the political and diplomatic dangers of the San Remo Agreement became plain to every eye.
The present diplomatic situation is strangely like that of Fashoda. In 1905, France was at one of the turning-points of her history: she had to choose between the two Powers which had hitherto been her hereditary enemies. She decided to follow the British, and not the German, policy. Will she have to choose between the British policy and the American policy—between the two countries which helped her to emerge victorious from the great world conflict?