CONCLUSION
The World in 1923
The political independence of a people may sometimes be nothing but a sham. France, having neglected to obtain her share in the division of the world's oil, is to-day in a position of dependence upon Britain and America. If, to-morrow, she had to defend herself against a fresh attack, her tanks, her aeroplanes, her submarines, and the whole of her supply services could only function by consent of her Allies. Even with the first army in the world, France could be victorious only if Britain and the United States permitted.[58]
Already in time of peace, nations without oil were in a position of considerable inferiority, in view of the hundreds of uses to which oil is put in industry, and especially in the important sphere of the transport and distribution of commodities. There is no true independence for a people but that which is assured economically and financially. Military supremacy is only the happy result of proper efforts undertaken to attain it. During the War, such independence was to be desired for France even more than during peace: it would have avoided the heavy debts which she incurred to her Allies, and it would have enabled her to exploit herself the resources at home and in the colonies which she has been compelled to hand over to foreigners.
Before the War, France consumed more than 400,000 tons of oil a year. To-day, she requires 1,500,000, and the oil wells of Alsace, which the Treaty of Versailles has restored to her, produce only 60,000 tons, and Algeria 3,000-4,000 tons.[59] Thus, she is obliged to pay the foreigner nearly 2,000 million francs a year in order to obtain the oil which she lacks.
Nevertheless, there is almost certainly oil in France, in the Ain valley, the Jura Mountains, Auvergne, and the Landes; there is oil in the French possessions in Northern Africa and in Madagascar; there must be some in the Cameroons, in Indo-China, and in New Caledonia. Is it not abnormal that the West Indies and Guiana, when in British or American hands, produce oil, but when in French hands never yield anything? The same applies to Oceania. But there is no reason to be astonished at this; for, under the legislation which was in force since 1810, no Frenchman had any inducement to search for oil. This explains the epigram of one of the most important members of the French cartel, when he declared that "the greatest misfortune that could happen to an oil magnate in France would be to discover a spring of oil." Happily, on March 22, 1922, the Chamber altered this state of affairs by granting, as was suggested in the first edition of this book, the guarantees which are indispensable to prospectors. Till that year, the exploitation of deposits which a prospector had discovered might be conceded to any foreign company which came on the scene at the right moment to reap the fruits of his labours. Repayment of money laid out was highly problematical, for the local authorities used to grant this only to those responsible for the final investigations leading directly to the discovery of oil. Now, hunting for a "wild cat"—the American term for a boring—is a very risky operation, which entails considerable expenditure. In a protest submitted to the Ministry of Public Works by five Algerian colonists, who had carried out explorations and borings upon land for which a concession was now asked by a company of foreign origin, the colonists stated by affidavit that they had spent 870,000 francs upon 14 borings and 85 wells, of which seven alone were actually producing a few tons of petroleum. Even so, the proportion of seven successful wells out of 85 is rather high. O'Donnell, the president of the American Petroleum Institute, estimates that, out of every hundred borings made, 98 are unprofitable. But for fifty years the 2 per cent. which succeeded sufficed for the consumption of the world.
The policy of France in the Near East since the War has been simply one long suicide. Little by little, French diplomacy has abandoned everything that was promised by the agreements of London. While the San Remo Agreement marked the complete downfall of France in Asia, it considerably strengthened the position of Britain: not only does it recognize all rights acquired by Great Britain, including those which, as in Mesopotamia, rested upon a highly insecure foundation, but it gives British capitalists an important opening in French colonies which are still almost untouched, whereas the corresponding advantages which it confers upon France in some (not all) British colonies apply to territories where the most desirable fields are already being exploited.