"And if, having once had it, we did not constantly forget it, we should always be born with this knowledge, and should always retain it through life. For to know is this, when one has got a knowledge of any thing, to retain and not lose it; for do we not call this oblivion, Simmias, the loss of knowledge?"
"Assuredly, Socrates," he replied.
[55]. "But if, having had it before we were born, we lose it at our birth, and afterward, through exercising the senses about these things, we recover the knowledge which we once before possessed, would not that which we call learning be a recovery of our own knowledge? And in saying that this is to remember, should we not say rightly?"
"Certainly."
"For this appeared to be possible, for one having perceived any thing, either by seeing or hearing, or employing any other sense, to form an idea of something different from this, which he had forgotten, and with which this was connected by being unlike or like. So that, as I said, one of these two things must follow: either we are all born with this knowledge, and we retain it through life, or those whom we say learn afterward do nothing else than remember, and this learning will be reminiscence."
"Such, certainly, is the case, Socrates."
[56]. "Which, then, do you choose, Simmias: that we are born with knowledge, or that we afterward remember what we had formerly known?"
"At present, Socrates, I am unable to choose."
"But what? Are you able to choose in this case, and what do you think about it? Can a man who possesses knowledge give a reason for the things that he knows, or not?"
"He needs must be able to do so, Socrates," he replied.