Robert Toombs / Statesman, Speaker, Soldier, Sage

by Pleasant A. Stovall

After the retreat from the peninsula, General Johnston concentrated his entire army behind the Chickahominy River, sixteen miles from Richmond. On the 12th of May General Toombs writes home that his command near the Chickahominy was "resting easily after a disagreeable march from Yorktown. I hear that there is great consternation in Richmond.... The loss of New Orleans gives us a terrible blow, and, followed by Norfolk, makes it necessary for us to strike a decisive blow somewhere." On 19th of May, 1862, he writes home from the camp near Richmond:

We seem to have come up here to defend this city. You ask me my opinion of the present state of the country. It is bad enough. The utter incompetency of Mr. Davis and his West Point generals have brought us to the verge of ruin. If McClellan is unwise enough to fight us here, we shall whip and drive him out of Virginia.... As to Richmond, it will never be taken while this army is here.

General Toombs' estimate of the army and of the futility of an attack from McClellan was justified when, after the 26th of June, the Army of the Potomac, almost in sight of the spires of Richmond, was forced to reel back, in the deadly clinch of a seven days' combat, to the James River. The Confederate army changed its position from one of retreat to a brilliant and aggressive policy, and the subtle tactics of Johnston gave way to the bold strokes of Lee. The South was thrilled with victory.

General Toombs frequently referred to the incompetency of Mr. Davis. The letters which have just been quoted were written to his wife, and were not made public then, but he did not hesitate to express his opinion openly. Jefferson Davis and Mr. Toombs had some differences while the former was Secretary of War under Franklin Pierce and Mr. Toombs was in the Senate. Mr. Toombs believed that President Davis was too partial to West Point, at which school Mr. Davis had been trained, and that in his management of the army he showed the tenacity of a martinet rather than the breadth of a statesman.

In February, 1859, the Army Appropriation bill had come up before the United States Senate. Mr. Toombs attacked, and Mr. Davis defended the whole system. Mr. Toombs contended that the compensation of army officers was too great. It was more than the same talent could command in any other walk of life. It was upon a wrong basis. "You take a boy of sixteen and send him to West Point, and when he comes out you give him $1400 a year. In the course of a few years you carry him up to $3000, $6000, or $8000. Take the general employment of the youths of the country who are educated at the different colleges for all civil purposes. You may have the highest amount of genius and intellect, and you get nothing like such average there. It will take them many years to make that much money." Mr. Toombs declared that a brigadier general's commission was higher than that of a United States Senator. "I think," said he, "it requires as great qualifications to govern this country as it does to be a brigadier general." Officers had increased far beyond the wants of the country. Members of Congress appoint cadets for the different districts; "they are generally associated in some way, as brothers, sons, or cousins, with the governing power." He thought a salary of $600 or $900 for the West Point graduates enough. According to the way army commissions were valued in England, the commission of a lieutenant who graduated at West Point could not be worth less than $50,000. The pay of a captain was higher than that of a judge. That position required the highest ability and integrity, and the average salary of a judge was but $2000, without traveling expenses. Mr. Toombs contended that West Point men seldom reflected any opinions but those of the government which employed them. They seldom sympathized with the people, and he wanted a government of the people. "You take a boy to West Point," he said, "give him quarters, and fuel, and clothes, and maintain him, and you say he has rendered service. When the citizens of this country send their sons to college they pay their expenses or work their way through; but when a boy is carried to West Point he is taken care of; a house is provided for him; clothes are provided for him; instructors are provided for him, and that is called being in service. I lay down the proposition that the true theory of wages, if you employ these people to keep the peace, is exactly the same—a constable's pay—you ought to pay them what they can be had for."

Mr. Davis held that army officers were constantly tempted to resign by offers of higher pay. It was the training of these men in the service, not for the service, it was their attachment for the country which made them so valuable. It was better to instruct men for officers' places and then appoint them, than to appoint them and then instruct them. He thought appointments were free from partisan selection. A soldier's devotion was as broad as the continent. A West Point cadet is a warrant officer; he goes there to serve the government as it may direct. It directs him to stay there until he has sufficient elementary instruction to properly discharge the duties of an officer.

The debate showed the views of the two men, and indicated the differences which, from points of public policy, soon deepened into personal dislike. On the 30th of May, Toombs wrote from the army, "Davis is polite and formal; so am I."

In the latter part of 1862 it was evident that the two armies must meet and contend for the mastery in Virginia. The day before the seven days' fighting commenced, Dr. Steiner said to General Toombs, his intimate friend: "General, I have a favor to ask of you. Keep your mind unclouded during these important operations." Dr. Steiner knew that during the heat and excitement of battle, temptation was great among soldiers to take ardent spirits, a practice that had grown somewhat upon General Toombs during his service in the field, and which at times deprived him of his best powers. "Why, doctor, I gladly promise," said the great Georgian. Nor did he, during the week, take a glass of any sort of liquor.

General Toombs' brigade was the First Brigade, First Division, Army of Northern Virginia, and during the campaign of the peninsula, was in Magruder's division. On June 15, 1862, Toombs occupied the most exposed position, which was held for nine days. Magruder recommended relief for his troops, which had been suffering from lack of rest and care. Just before the seven days' fight Toombs' brigade was placed in D. R. Jones' division and Magruder commanded his own, Jones', and McLaw's divisions, holding about 13,000 men. Toombs' brigade was composed of the 1st, 15th, 17th, and 20th Georgia regiments.