On the 26th of June Toombs' brigade was posted upon the east of Garnett's House, on Golding's farm, just in front of the enemy. Both sides threw up breastworks so near that neither could advance its picket line. "Just before dark," says Dr. Steiner, ["Mr. Toombs received orders] to charge the enemy, firing having been heard on the left. The position was a dangerous one. A charge at that time of the evening was perilous. Just in front lay a deep gulch—Labor-in-Vain Ravine—which was alive with the enemy, and the charge must be through an unprotected field of wheat and clover. General Toombs was astonished at the order. His first instructions had been to put himself near Garnett House, to hold his position and to take advantage of any retreat of the enemy. He doubted the authenticity of the order, and sent word that he would not obey unless in writing. Pretty soon written instructions were returned and General Toombs prepared for what he believed to be a forlorn hope. He advanced seven companies of the 2d Georgia Regiment, 750 men, under Colonel B. M. Butt, toward the enemy in the face of a heavy front and flank fire. Colonel Williams' regiment crossed the field at double-quick under a galling fire from the opposite side of the ravine. Unshaken by fearful odds, they held their ground and replied with spirit. The 15th Georgia Regiment, under Colonel McIntosh then entered the fight, and this gallant officer was mortally wounded. The 17th Georgia charged on the left and the 20th on the right. The engagement was a very bloody one. Over 200 of Toombs' men were lost and several valuable officers were killed. The opposing troops were a part of General Hancock's command, and the firing ceased only with the night. Next morning the enemy retreated, and Toombs' men pressed forward and held their position. General Toombs was censured for this engagement, for which, it seems, he was in no wise responsible.
On the 1st of July, about three o'clock in the afternoon, commenced one of the famous battles of the war. McClellan's army had gotten away from its perilous position astride the Chickahominy, and now found itself united and strongly intrenched on the heights of Malvern Hill. All hope of destroying that army was gone, and it was evident that an engagement must ensue, with the odds in favor of the Union army. It was in many respects like the battle of Gettysburg, except that the Confederate forces were not handled with the precision and effectiveness of the historic sorties against Cemetery Heights. The battlefield was in plain range of the enemy's gunboats, and there was much surprise that General Lee should have sanctioned an engagement at that point. General D. H. Hill misunderstood the signal for attack at Malvern Hill, and late in the afternoon ordered the charge. Toombs' brigade had been marching and countermarching all day, and went into action much thinned from the effects of the sharp fighting at Labor-in-Vain Ravine. There was no concerted attack. The charge seems to have been made by brigades, even single regiments being thrown forward. They advanced through a swamp, and the difficulties of the charge, owing to a murderous fire which raked the plain from the hills, 600 yards away, cannot be exaggerated. Toombs' brigade was one of the first to reach the plateau swept by fifty guns. It advanced with Anderson's brigade, but obliqued to the left about half-way up the hill, and took position near a fence, where the troops, suffering fearfully from the cool, deadly aim of the Federal gunners, were ordered to lie down and secure some shelter from the cannon-shot. It was at this time that General D. H. Hill rode up to General Toombs and ordered his brigade forward. Some sharp words ensued between these officers, and the men moved forward handsomely to the brow of the hill. At this time, however, the steady stream of fugitives pressing back from the charge, broke the alignment of the brigade and separated the regiments. Colonel Butt's regiment went forward with Kershaw's brigade. The whole Confederate charge was soon checked and the troops fell back in disorder. Their loss was fully 5000 men, and the loss in Toombs' brigade was 219 men, making his losses in the two engagements over one-third of his entire number. Malvern Hill was a blunder which was never repeated, but it was a disastrous one for the Georgia troops.
The subjoined correspondence will be understood in the light of the meeting of General D. H. Hill and General Toombs near Malvern Hill during the progress of the charge of the Confederate forces.
Headquarters First Brigade, First Division,
In the Field, July 6, 1862.
Major General D. H. Hill.
Sir: Military movements since Tuesday last have prevented an earlier reply to your conversation with me on the battlefield that evening. I understood you to say, among other things, that "Your (my) brigade would not fight"; that you "always knew it would not fight"; that it "pretended to want to fight, but would not"; "Where were you when I was riding in front on my horse trying to rally your brigade?" I desire first to know whether I am correct in my understanding of your language, and if not, wherein I am mistaken.
And secondly, to request of you such explanation of that language as you may choose to give.
I am sir,
Your obedient servant,
Robert Toombs.